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Realms of Influence: The Dynamics of Social 
Entrepreneurship in the Kingdom of Jordan 
 
Abstract 
 
Social enterprises are organizations that employ business-like tactics to achieve 
primarily social goals, with the distinguishing qualities of having social objectives, using 
social capital, and creating social value. While there is a body of literature that 
demonstrates the potential of social entrepreneurship to address various issues in the 
Middle East, this research instead analyses social enterprises’ actual ability to achieve 
their goals as independent, community-responsive actors. The work is situated in the 
wider debates about democratization in the region by assessing the impact that regime 
surveillance tactics have on the development of social capital. This thesis evaluates social 
entrepreneurship in its political and legal context and is based on fieldwork in Jordan 
using semi-structured interviews with social entrepreneurs, members of their support 
networks, and government officials.  
By supporting social entrepreneurship, the international community implicitly 
supports development initiatives that rely on social capital, because social capital is 
intrinsic to social enterprises. This is problematic because the value of social capital in 
development is disputed; it can have positive or negative, exclusionary effects. This 
means that international actors may be supporting a strategy that has been shown to 
promote only ‘accepted’ kinds of association and perpetuate the status quo. The issue that 
therefore arises is what the role of social capital is in Jordan, an authoritarian regime 
where government surveillance is prevalent. 
This thesis finds that the Jordanian regime uses surveillance and bureaucratic 
mechanisms to direct and restrict the work of social enterprises by imposing structural 
restrictions on the development of social capital. Confusing bureaucratic policies, the 
ministries’ pervasive oversight, restrictions in the legal code, a foreign funding control 
mechanism, and royal NGOs’ co-optation of social entrepreneurship are all indicators of 
persisting semi-authoritarian governance approaches. Therefore, Jordan’s social 
enterprises fail to contribute to the growth of an independent civil society and are not 
effective development agents due to the many regulatory restrictions that govern them.  
Through an examination of the impact of the regime’s surveillance on the political 
liberalization process and the development of social capital, the thesis argues that state 
support or involvement with social enterprises and social capital can build hierarchical 
associational relationships instead of social networks that lead to political empowerment. 
Such social networks have been theorized to lead to mutually beneficial collective action 
that results in steps towards democratization. In Jordan, however, state surveillance 
interrupts the pathway from social capital development to democratization. 
Through the case of social enterprises, the thesis demonstrates that the regime’s 
interference with social capital negates any theoretical potential it may have to be the 
‘building block’ of civil society because it renders social capital the dependent variable. 
Thus, the state’s influence extends to the very foundations of any democratization 
processes in Jordan.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Social enterprises shift behaviour from automation to community disruption.1 
 
In our part of the world, human relationships are our biggest asset: the ability to mobilize 
our resources with the resources of another, and our values with the values of another, 
to create some form of change in our life. … Here, relationships are at the heart of the 
theory of power.2 
 
 
These statements by Jordanian social entrepreneurs reflect their perception of the 
power of social enterprise to have lasting and transformative effects on society due to 
their ability to mobilize community relationships through innovative approaches. In short, 
they believe that their use of social capital will allow them to create positive change where 
their government, civil society, and other actors have failed to do so. Social entrepreneurs 
in Jordan do not operate in a vacuum but rather in the complex political environment of 
a state that has employed a range of control mechanisms in its resistance to change. This 
thesis evaluates the extent of social enterprises’ autonomy in Jordan by examining their 
relationship with the state. The resulting analysis seeks to comment on the current status 
of authoritarianism in Jordan. 
 
Background 
The countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) lie at the epicentre 
of a fragmenting Arab state system and changing regional order. These countries have 
also experienced a significant demographic youth bulge in recent years; persons aged 15 
to 29 years across the region comprise almost twenty seven percent of the region’s 
 
1 Interview with ‘ZM3’ (STSE), Amman, Jordan, January, 2018. 
2 Interview with ‘UL6’ (STSE), Amman, Jordan, April, 2018. 
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population.3 This portion of the population grapples daily with issues of tradition versus 
modernity, staggering unemployment rates, the impact of refugee crises, and wider 
regional turmoil.4 The seeming stability of semi-autocratic governments rests on 
pervading attributes of neo-patrimonialism and the security state, both of which, it has 
been claimed, have led to a civil society that is fragile or even synthetic.  
Optimism about possible democratisation in the Middle East, fuelled by the third 
wave of democracy in the 1990s, led to an academic focus on the idea that civil society 
expansion and economic development would significantly liberalize the MENA political 
sphere.5 There has been little tangible democratisation in the region, however, despite the 
emergence of civil societies, economic transformation, and Western democracy 
promotion efforts.6 More recent scholarship recognizes the hybrid quality of many Arab 
states, whose governments are neither entirely autocratic nor fully democratic. These 
‘semi-autocracies’ allow limited political openness and competition, but ultimately, 
power remains within the regimes. Nominal democratic advances serve as a ‘safety valve’ 
 
3 Navtej Dhillon, ‘Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or Opportunity?’ Brookings, May 22, 2008, 
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/middle-east-youth-bulge-challenge-or-opportunity/; 
Georgetown University in Qatar and Silatech, Youth in the Middle East (Qatar: Center for International 
and Regional Studies, 2016). 
4 R. Assaad and F. Roudi-Fahimi, ‘Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity 
or Challenge?’ Population Reference Bureau, April 19, 2007, https://www.prb.org/youthinmena/; L. 
Beehner, ‘The Effects of “Youth Bulge” on Civil Conflicts,’ Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 
2007; Antonello Cabras, ‘The Implications of the Youth Bulge in Middle East and North African 
Populations,’ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, January 25, 2011; P. Salem, ‘The Middle East in 2015 and 
Beyond: Trends and Drivers,’ Middle East Institute, November 18, 2014, 
https://www.mei.edu/publications/middle-east-2015-and-beyond-trends-and-drivers. 
5 M. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977); 
S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991); S. E. Ibrahim, ‘Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World,’ Middle 
East Journal 47, no. 2 (1993): 292–305; A. R. Norton, ‘The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East,’ 
Middle East Journal 47, no. 2 (1993): 205–16; M. K. Al-Sayyid, ‘The Concept of Civil Society and the 
Arab World,’ in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical 
Perspectives, ed. R. Brynen, B. Korany, and P. Noble (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 131–47; R. 
Brynen, B. Korany, and P. Noble, eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: 
Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
6 O. Schlumberger, ‘The Arab Middle East and the Question of Democratization: Some Critical 
Remarks,’ Democratization 7, no. 4 (2000): 104–32; M. S. Ottaway, et al., ‘Democracy: Rising Tide or 
Mirage?’ Middle East Policy 12, no. 2 (2005): 1–27; V. Durac and F. Cavatorta, ‘Strengthening 
Authoritarian Rule Through Democracy Promotion? Examining the Paradox of the US and EU Strategies: 
The Case of Bin Ali’s Tunisia,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 1 (2009): 3–19. 
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for civil society, while the general public is excluded from meaningful participation in 
government.7 Such regimes generally survive due to a skilful combination of co-optation 
and repression aimed at collectives or individuals.8   
In addition, neo-patrimonialism and clientelism still pervade state structures in 
most MENA countries.9 Neo-patrimonialism refers both to macrostructures (the society, 
state, and economy) and microstructures (the family and individual). Neo-patrimonial 
society exhibits facets of modernity externally but remains beholden to clan, tribe, ethnic, 
and sectarian identity structures, which often determine the dispensation of power. 
Patrimonial rule depends on the loyalty of a personal network of bureaucrats to govern. 
In the modern Middle Eastern state, this is manifested in both civil and military 
bureaucracies that have remained little more than extensions of the ruler.10 Several 
countries such as Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, among others, rely heavily on their 
military’s expansive political role; the professional armies and security apparatuses have 
reached great capacity for maintaining domestic stability and protecting regime 
interests.11 
 
7 D. Brumberg, ‘Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform,’ Middle East 
Series Working Papers, no, 37 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May, 
2003); D. Brumberg, Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World (Carlisle, PA: US Army 
War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); H. A. Barari, ‘The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, 
Morocco and the Gulf,’ Middle East Critique 24, no. 1 (2015): 99–111. 
8 O. Schlumberger, ed., Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic 
Regimes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
9 E. Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective,’ Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57; E. Lust, ‘Competitive Clientelism in the 
Middle East,’ Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 122–35; M. P. Posusney, ‘Enduring 
Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory,’ Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 
127–38.  
10 N. Ayubi, ‘Civil-Military Relations,’ in Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle 
East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995); J. Bill and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (New 
York: Longman, 2000); M. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1977); M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free 
Press, 1964). 
11 A. Bligh, ‘The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges,’ Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 5, no. 2 (2001); R. Owen, ‘The Military In and Out of Politics,’ in State, Power, and 
Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 1991). 
15 
 
Another key aspect of patrimonial rule is the strategic fragmentation of potential 
opposition forces, both within the personal advisory network and in groups outside the 
ruling regime, in order to hinder the development of strong power concentrations outside 
the ruler’s sphere.12 This strategy of inhibiting the emergence of a civil political culture 
can extend as far as regulating satellite television and telecommunications.13 Thus, 
regime-challenging institutions are often weak and, in part, provide external legitimation 
to the existing state order. In some cases, such as in Iran and Saudi Arabia, governments 
have been found to control non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by acting as the 
organizations’ sole, or predominant, financial benefactors. Such NGOs are known as 
government-organized-non-governmental organizations (GONGOs); these groups may 
be benign but are often another tool used by repressive regimes.14  
Democracy promotion efforts often support civil society organizations, which 
supposedly create a buffer between citizen and state.15 Civil society in any context, 
however, is dependent upon the government to allow the political space for civil society 
to evolve and develop.16 It is unlikely that even reformist autocratic regimes would be 
willing to give up their monopoly of power and coercion and instead expand the middle 
class and build a strong civil society.17 For example, the process of economic 
 
12 J. Bill and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2000). 
13 E. C. Murphy, ‘Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic 
Failure,’ Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 1 (2012): 5–22. 
14 M. Naim, ‘Democracy’s Dangerous Impostors,’ Washington Post, April 21, 2007; L. Weeden, 
‘Abandoning ‘Legitimacy’: Reflections on Syria and Yemen,’ in The Crisis of the Arab State: Study 
Group Report, ed. M. Hudson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Middle East Initiative, 2015). 
15 L. Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,’ Journal of Democracy 5, 
no. 3 (1994): 5; A. R. Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 
1995); N. Salam, Civil Society in the Arab World: The Historical and Political Dimensions (Cambridge, 
MA: Islamic Legal Studies Program, 2002), 3; J. Schwedler, ed., Toward Civil Society in the Middle 
East? (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995).  
16 O. Schlumberger, ‘Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian 
Contexts,’ in Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East, ed. D. 
Jung (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 33–60; Q. Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control: State Power 
in Jordan,’ Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 43–61. 
17 R. Hinnebusch, ‘Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory, and the Middle East: An 
Overview and Critique,’ Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373–95; O. Schlumberger, ‘The Arab Middle 
16 
 
liberalisation that was initiated by the Arab republics in the 1970s and 1980s helped the 
autocratic regimes to modify their state apparatus and adapt to new conditions. Thus, 
economic liberalisation enabled the old autocratic regimes to transform into more resilient 
‘new autocratic regimes.’ Instead of building pluralistic democracies, these regimes 
evolved the state-society relationship through new patronage systems that did not, 
however, allow for any meaningful political liberalisation.18 It is therefore plausible that 
the monarchies employed the same strategy with regards to the expansion of civil society 
as a controlling mechanism. 
The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ generated renewed optimism about the future of a 
strong civil society and democratic governance in the region. Meaningful democratic 
advances were expected, in part because Arab autocrats face a structural crisis of 
legitimacy brought about by a serious economic crisis as well as strong Western 
expectations of democratisation and market-economic reforms.19 The autocratic republics 
of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria did suffer extensive internal turmoil and even changes 
in regime as a result of this movement. In contrast, the oil-rich Gulf monarchies of Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar remained stable, in large part 
because rent from oil revenues allowed for the strategic forestalment of political 
opposition movements.20 These regimes manipulate oil wealth by allocating much of its 
income for security expenses and other targeted patronage measures to maintain the status 
quo.21 The Gulf monarchies’ politics of patronage continued as a reaction to the 2011 
 
East and the Question of Democratization: Some Critical Remarks,’ Democratization 7, no. 4 (2000): 
104–32; O. Schlumberger, ‘Dancing with Wolves.’ 
18 S. J. King, The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010). 
19 H. Albrecht and O. Schlumberger, ‘”Waiting for Godot”: Regime Change without Democratization in 
the Middle East,’ International Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 371–92. 
20 H. A. Barari, ‘The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf,’ Middle East Critique 24, 
no. 1 (2015): 99–111. 
21 H. H. Al‐Alkim, ‘The Prospect of Democracy in the GCC Countries,’ Critical Middle Eastern Studies 
5, no. 9 (1996): 29–41. 
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uprisings; political challenges were met with financial benefits to key parts of society in 
order to effectively ‘buy allegiance’ to the ruling families.22  
Without its oil wealth, the semi-autocratic monarchy of Jordan was unable to 
employ targeted patronage measures towards ensuring stability and felt pressure from the 
‘regional demonstration effect.’23 Instead, it relied on continued security measures and 
nominal changes in government (e.g. the dissolution of parliaments, dismissal of prime 
ministers, and appointment of new ministers) to quell popular protests. Eight years after 
the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring,’ optimism for change has turned to criticism of a 
period that led to an ‘Arab Winter,’ and pessimism for the future of civil society in the 
MENA countries.24 
It is within this context that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan finds itself 
‘between Iraq and a hard place,’ as King Abdullah II remarked in 2012.25 From the 
founding of the state of Transjordan in 1921, Jordan’s monarchs have had to balance 
citizen demands with stipulations from Western or Arab aid donors, on whom the country 
is heavily dependent.26 Tribal divisions, social cleavages, Islamist demands, and the threat 
of social unrest have shaped the regime’s alternating repression and liberalization tactics. 
 
22 S. Hertog, ‘The Costs of Counter-Revolution in the GCC,’ Foreign Policy, May 31, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/31/the-costs-of-counter-revolution-in-the-gcc/. 
23 G. F. Gause, Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring 
(Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2013); M. Ottaway and M. Muasher, Arab Monarchies: Chance 
for Reform, Yet Unmet (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011). 
24 Daniel L. Byman, ‘After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the Chill of an Arab Winter,’ Brookings, 
December 4, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/after-the-hope-of-the-arab-spring-the-chill-of-an-
arab-winter/; Dimitar Mihaylov, ‘Why the Arab Spring Turned into Arab Winter: Understanding the 
Middle East Crises through Culture, Religion, and Literature,’ Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 11, no. 1 
(2017): 3–14; Richard Spencer, ‘Middle East Review of 2012: The Arab Winter,’ The Telegraph 
(December 31, 2012), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/9753123/Middle-East-
review-of-2012-the-Arab-Winter.html; Howard J. Wiarda, ‘Arab Fall or Arab Winter?’ Journal of the 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy 34, no. 3 (2012): 134–37. 
25 King Abdullah II of Jordan used this phrase to describe his country’s complicated political situation in 
an interview with Jon Stewart on The Daily Show (September 25, 2012). 
26 Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,’ Congressional Research Service, 
November 21, 2011; Amaney A. Jamal, ‘Becoming Jordan and Kuwait: The Making and Consolidating of 
U.S. Client Regimes,’ in Of Empires and Citizens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 38–
62. 
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In the present day, high youth unemployment rates and the influx of refugees exacerbate 
the issues Jordan faces as a resource-poor country. As opposed to the Gulf monarchies, 
Jordan cannot use oil rents to forestall political opposition movements.27 The regime must 
therefore employ other tactics to maintain stability, for example by fragmenting 
opposition forces to prevent the establishment of strong power concentrations outside its 
sphere of influence.28 
 
Innovative Civil Society? Social Enterprises in Jordan 
 The primary foreign aid donors in Jordan are the United States, the European 
Union/Europe, the United Nations, and their affiliates. They have led civil society 
promotion initiatives which have not, however, brought about the political liberalization 
for which they were intended.29 In addition, economic issues remain. Since the 2011 Arab 
uprisings, policymakers have turned to social entrepreneurship in Jordan in the hope that 
it can reduce the youth unemployment rate and increase popular participation in civil 
society. Social enterprises are defined in this thesis as the employment of business-like 
tactics to achieve primarily social goals, with the distinguishing qualities of having social 
objectives, using social capital, and creating social value. While the precise number of 
social enterprises in Jordan is unknown, there is a consensus that the social 
entrepreneurship scene in Jordan is expanding.30 In 2010, it was estimated that there were 
 
27 H. A. Barari, ‘The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf,’ Middle East Critique 24, 
no. 1 (2015): 99–111. 
28 J. Bill and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2000). 
29 Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,’ Saban Center for Middle East 
Policy at the Brookings Institution Analysis Paper, no. 13 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
October, 2007). See also Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US-Egyptian 
Alliance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom’s 
Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
2008). 
30 Sidło, Katarzyna, Mohammed Al-Jafari, and Reema Al-Balous, ‘Social Entrepreneurs’ Responses to 
the Refugee Crisis in Jordan and Lebanon,’ FEMISE Research Papers, FEM 44-12 (September 2019), 13, 
http://www.femise.org/en/slideshow-en/social-entrepreneurs-responses-to-the-refugee-crisis-in-jordan-
and-lebanon-report-fem44-12/. 
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78 ‘globally recognized’ social enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa region.31 
In 2016, the estimate for Jordan alone lay at approximately 100 such enterprises.32 The 
figure of total social enterprises is likely much higher when including those who have not 
received global awards, and any figure depends on the criteria used to identify social 
enterprises. Still, these estimates give an approximate idea of the reach of these 
organizations.  
The stated goals for social entrepreneurship promotion programmes among 
foreign actors are far-reaching and varied; among them are the promotion of communal 
inclusivity, achieving equity for women and minorities, increasing employment 
opportunities for youth, aiding economic growth, and even reducing the threat of violent 
extremism. Initiatives in the Ministry of Social Development and in various royal non-
governmental organizations (RONGOs) also support the development of social 
entrepreneurship in the kingdom, both as a vehicle for development and to combat the 
threat of extremism. While there is a body of literature that demonstrates the potential of 
social entrepreneurship to address various issues in the Middle East in theory,33 this 
research instead analyses social enterprises’ actual ability to achieve their goals as 
independent, community-responsive actors. 
 
 
31 Ehaab Abdou, et al., ‘Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East: Toward Sustainable Development for 
the Next Generation,’ Brookings Institute Wolfensohn Center for Development, the Dubai School of 
Government, and Silatech, April 22, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/research/social-entrepreneurship-
in-the-middle-east-toward-sustainable-development-for-the-next-generation/. 
32 H. W. Al Nasser, ‘New Social Enterprises in Jordan: Redefining the Meaning of Civil Society,’ 
Chatham House, September, 2016, https://reader.chathamhouse.org/new-social-enterprises-jordan-
redefining-meaning-civil-society#. 
33 See Soushiant Zanganehpour, ‘The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East: A Pathway for 
Inclusive Growth or an Alluring Mirage?’ in Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, ed. Dima Jamali 
and Alessandro Lanteri, vol. 1 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 67-83; Rebecca Hill and 
Medea Nocentini, ‘Social Enterprise in the MENA Region: False Hope or New Dawn?’ in Social 
Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, ed. Dima Jamali and Alessandro Lanteri, vol. 1 (Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 84–106; Clare Woodcroft-Scott and Fatimah S. Baeshen, ‘Social Enterprises: 
A Panacea for Engaging Youth and Inspiring Hope?’ in Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, ed. 
Dima Jamali and Alessandro Lanteri vol. 1 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 107–26; 
among others. 
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Research Methodology and Methods  
 
Epistemology and Ontology 
 
This thesis takes a post-positivist approach and therefore uses qualitative, 
inductive research methods. Both positivism and post-positivism adopt realism and 
assume that there is an objective ‘reality.’ However, post-positivism ‘differs from 
positivism in holding that reality can only be known probabilistically.’34 To more fully 
understand this difference, it is important to examine the tenets of classical positivism 
and how the positivist epistemology understands ‘truth.’ In positivist inquiry, researchers 
seek to discover truth ‘through the verification and replication of observable findings’ as 
is common in the physical sciences.35 Classical positivism assumes that there is no 
dichotomy between appearance and reality, which means that a theory’s validity can be 
tested by direct observation and that observers can be objective. It is thus also possible to 
establish causal relationships between social phenomena ‘using theory to generate 
hypotheses which can be tested by direct observation.’36 This perspective assumes that an 
objective reality exists independent of the researcher.37 Fundamental to the positivist 
stance is also the rejection of metaphysical speculations in favour of a ‘correspondence 
view of truth’ in which truth depends on the ‘correspondence of belief to facts present in 
external reality.’38 Another assumption is that it is possible to separate the empirical 
questions (about what is) from normative questions (about what should be), and that when 
 
34 Robert P. Gephart Jr., ‘Qualitative Research and the Academy of Management Journal,’ Academy of 
Management Journal 47, no. 4 (2004): 457. 
35 Alexander M. Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate: Moving from Positivism and Confrontation 
to Post-Positivism and Reconciliation,’ Journal of Advanced Nursing 27 (1998): 1243. 
36 Paul Furlong and David Marsh, ‘A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science,’ in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 193. 
37 G. Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
38 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1244. 
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this is done, social science can be objective and value free.39 Positivism in social science 
thus strives to be methodologically similar to natural science.  
One of the main criticisms against positivist inquiry is its view of researchers’ 
involvement in the research process, which in positivism is atheoretical and unbiased. 
Classical positivism values rationality and intellectualism, but the focus is on objectivity 
and non-self-reflectiveness in inquiry.40  Thus, positivism views researchers as neutral 
observers able to report observations without ‘cultural, social, or experiential based 
biases.’41 Consequently, in positivism, only individuals who are completely detached and 
bias free can discover objective ‘truth.’ Another criticism of positivism is that it focuses 
on discovering universal laws which do not change based on context.42 Positivism rules 
out various sources of understanding such as those deriving from human experience, 
reasoning, and interpretation; it thus ignores context. In the social sciences, however, 
these sources and views are of great importance, and positivism has been criticised for 
attempting to describe the nature of the social world with single universal ‘truths.’43 
Several theorists have challenged this law-centred view, and discuss the issues arising 
from universally generalizing from a limited number of cases.44 Additionally, they note 
that ‘situational and perceptual factors’ may influence researchers’ work.45 
Due to these criticisms, post-positivism has increasingly taken the place of 
positivism in underpinning contemporary empirical social science research activity. Post-
 
39 Furlong and Marsh, ‘A Skin Not a Sweater,’ 194. 
40 Holton, Science and Anti-Science. 
41 D. Phillips, ‘Postpositivistic Science Myths and Realities,’ in The Paradigm Dialog, ed. E. Guba 
(London: Sage, 1990), 31–45. 
42 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1244. 
43 Nick J. Fox, ‘Post-positivism,’ in The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods, ed. L. M. 
Given (London: Sage, 2008). 
44 See for example: R. G. A. Dolby, Uncertain Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); T. Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); K. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Study (London: Hutchinson, 1959). 
45 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1244. 
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positivism continues to endorse the natural sciences’ rigor in that it favours logic and 
empiricism.46 Post-positivists such as Karl Popper, Jacob Bronowski, Thomas Kuhn and 
Charles Hanson proposed a conceptualization of truth that differs from the understanding 
of truth in positivism.47 As with positivism, post-positivism still rejects metaphysical 
considerations, but unobservable factors are recognized and deemed to have the ability to 
explain phenomena which are observable.48 Additionally, post-positivist research accepts 
qualitative data and data outside the quantitative methods used in the sciences. Although 
post-positivism still emphasizes cause and effect, it is less strict in that it recognizes that 
cause and effect is a probability which ‘may or may not occur.’49 Importantly, ‘post-
positivism does not reject the truths present in methodologies focusing on the experiences 
or meanings of individuals.’50 Indeed, post-positivism holds that researchers and their 
perceptions cannot be entirely detached from their inquiry, and that context matters and 
affects analytical findings. Therefore, knowledge gained from post-positivist inquiry is 
not universally generalizable to all cases and situations due to the ‘contextually bound 
nature of research findings, consequential in the acknowledgement of researcher and 
theoretical biases.’51 Post-positivists also regard understanding rather than explanation as 
the objective of their inquiry; understanding is ‘constrained by acknowledgements of 
context and contingency.’52 Social science researchers using empirical methods thus now 
more frequently adopt the post-positivist, rather than the positivist, epistemology and 
ontology. 
 
46 Peter Burnham, et al., Research Methods in Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 24. 
47 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1245.  
48 J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values (London: Penguin, 1956); Clark, ‘The Qualitative-
Quantitative Debate,’ 1245. 
49 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 24. 
50 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1245. 
51 Clark, ‘The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate,’ 1246. 
52 Fox, ‘Post-positivism.’ 
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An early manifestation of the contextually-bound researcher occurs in Max 
Weber’s works in which he describes the role of the social scientist and the concept of 
‘verstehen.’53 Weber recognized that researchers must understand social realities from the 
perspective of the subject, not the observer, and in context, rather than in isolation. This 
involves recognizing that actors are not simply objects of social forces but active subjects 
who produce their social reality. Alfred Schutz argued that social science research 
subjects are ‘sense-making’ human beings ‘who are engaged in interpreting and ascribing 
meaning to their world in interaction with each other.’54 For the researcher, this means 
that understanding involves not only comprehending rational thoughts but also the factors 
that contribute to an actor’s social reality. Methodologically, this requires a degree of 
empathy, and also ‘reflexivity about the processes by which constructs are generated and 
deployed in the creation of social reality.’55 One of the main tenets of post-positivism has 
thus become that objects of study are engaged in producing the social world, which 
necessitates accepting the context of every case without simplistic limitations of study to 
social ‘facts.’  
Within post-positivism, two contrary perspectives have emerged: the realist and 
the constructivist perspectives. Realist post-positivism holds that there is an objective 
reality in the social world, while acknowledging that social science is interpretative and 
involves subjective sense-making, and thus accepts that objective reality is unlikely to be 
discovered. Constructivists believe that objective knowledge is impossible to acquire due 
to interpretation problems, and also argue that ‘reality is itself multiple, contingent and 
value-laden.’56 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s work The Social Construction of 
 
53 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947). 
54 Fox, ‘Post-positivism.’ 
55 Fox, ‘Post-positivism.’ 
56 Fox, ‘Post-positivism.’ 
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Reality represents the root of the realist ontological compromise. They argue that because 
people work together to make sense of the world inter-subjectively, a ‘common-sense’ 
reality emerges that layers institutions, traditions, and social norms, which have stable 
meanings in a particular society, and which take on the appearance of objective reality. 
Though society is not created by individuals, it is reproduced and transformed by them. 
This means that the social world is available to empirical enquiry independent of human 
agency. Enduring social structures, institutions and processes are conditions of human 
agency that constitute an independent social reality that can be objectively studied, 
understood, and described.57 This realist post-positivist position is not simply a revival of 
classical positivism: it recognizes that, in studying the social world, researchers’ tools 
(which include human understanding and interpretation) are ‘value-laden, theory-laden, 
and context-dependent.’ Through continual efforts in methodological rigour, 
triangulating various data sources and analysing data meticulously, however, researchers 
can discover an approximation of reality. 58 
Although this research takes an empirical approach, classical positivism is too 
inflexible for the method of inquiry. Instead, the thesis adopts a realist post-positivist 
epistemology and ontology which allow for a ‘softer’ understanding of reality, accept the 
role of researchers’ bias in analyses, and view examination of context as a necessary 
feature of research. Realist post-positivism allows for an empirical approach to social 
scientific research without sacrificing the important human aspects of the types of 
questions asked in social science, and without necessitating the discovery of universally 
applicable, non-contextual ‘truths.’  
 
57 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge (New York: Anchor, 1966), 19–45. 
58 Fox, ‘Post-positivism.’ 
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Social entrepreneurs have been understood to be active shapers of the social world 
instead of passive actors, so Weber’s previously described post-positivist concept of 
verstehen is all the more relevant. Further, positivism would view social entrepreneurs as 
supportive of the state; thus, social entrepreneurs and the state function as part and parcel 
of the same actor. However, post-positivism understands that social entrepreneurs can 
function as separate actors that could pose a challenge to an all-powerful state. 
Additionally, entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship are historically European 
concepts. Simply applying these concepts to the Middle East presents an inherent research 
bias which must be addressed, and can be addressed, by using post-positivism. By 
acknowledging this bias and explaining its effect on the research, it may be possible to 
have a deeper understanding of how social entrepreneurship functions in the region. 
Rather than using a case study to illustrate existing theory, the thesis examines a case to 
test the theory. This could lead to a review and revision of some aspects of social 
entrepreneurship as it has been understood thus far. 
 
 
Research Questions and Main Arguments 
 
This thesis investigates how the Jordanian regime uses surveillance to influence 
and direct the work of social enterprises in the kingdom, thereby reducing the effect their 
work might otherwise have on a democratisation process in the country. To address this 
question, the thesis sets out to test the theoretical framework of ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
using the post-positivist approach described below. The term ‘social entrepreneurship’ is 
increasingly becoming a buzzword for development and youth unemployment solutions 
in the Middle East, but there is a necessity for more in-depth study of the phenomenon, 
which might discover not only how social enterprises function in the region and how they 
can be understood across various sectors of society, but also how this compares to the 
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extant classical literature on entrepreneurship and the recent literature on social 
entrepreneurship, which may prompt a review and revision of social entrepreneurship 
theory. 
There has been some debate about whether social entrepreneurship is a part of 
civil society, which is defined as ‘the sphere of uncoerced human association between the 
individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and 
substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market.’59 Some 
scholars have described social entrepreneurship as a growing subsector of civil society or 
a new generation of civil society actor.60 Thus, social entrepreneurship is better 
understood as a fluid concept, which, precisely because of the adaptability of its functions, 
is found in diverse realms. It will be interesting to explore the function of social 
entrepreneurship in Jordan, and whether it is as fluid, diverse, and adaptable there as the 
literature suggests. 
The adaptability of social entrepreneurship lends it distinct advantages over other 
established institutions which are more rigid and raises questions of its role in social and 
political change in an autocratic country such as Jordan. The academic literature suggests 
that the ability of social enterprises to restructure and blur familiar organizations makes 
them more flexible, adaptable, and faster to respond to complex, modern, and increasingly 
global issues.61 This distinctive re-assembling of established institutions leads to 
innovation which ranges from incremental changes to disruptive interventions.62 If this is 
true in Jordan, it raises questions about the democratization process.  
 
59 Michael Edwards, ‘Introduction: Civil Society and the Geometry of Human Relations,’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Civil Society, ed. Michael Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 
60 Alex Nicholls, ‘Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurs,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, 
ed. Michael Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 80–92. 
61 Nicholls, ‘Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurs,’ 81–88. 
62 Nicholls, ‘Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurs,’ 84. 
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The challenges that Jordan faces, combined with its relative enduring stability, 
present ample potential opportunities for social enterprises to emerge and thrive. 
However, the question remains whether social enterprises in Jordan are treated similarly 
to civil society organizations, whose function and effectiveness to mediate between 
society and the state remain limited despite reforms, which are widely criticised as being 
superficial. This raises the additional questions of whether social enterprises in Jordan are 
able to address social issues, and if so, how, and under what conditions. Thus, the working 
hypothesis is that the Jordanian government more readily accepts social enterprises as 
avenues for solving social problems than civil society, which is associated with 
democratisation. Social entrepreneurship perhaps poses a smaller challenge to state 
authority because it is associated simply with positive change while accomplishing 
similar objectives to other civil society organizations.  
This thesis addresses the following question: What role do social enterprises play 
in Jordan’s civil society? It discusses the following sub-questions:  
Why and how are social enterprises formed in Jordan?  
What are their sources of financial, material, human, and social capital?  
What, if any, laws and regulations apply to forming and upholding these social 
enterprises?  
What sources of support are available to social enterprises in Jordan, and 
conversely, what difficulties do they face?  
Do social enterprises face restrictions from the Jordanian regime, and if so, what 
are they? 
How do social enterprises use social capital and is social capital impacted by 
regime repression tactics? 
 
The work is situated in the wider debates about democratization in the region by 
assessing the impact that regime surveillance tactics have on the development of social 
capital. This thesis evaluates social entrepreneurship in its political and legal context and 
is based on fieldwork in Jordan using semi-structured interviews with social 
entrepreneurs, members of their support networks, and government officials. The focus 
of this thesis is on the relationship between the state and social enterprises, with particular 
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emphasis on the role of state surveillance and its impact on social capital. These analyses 
seek to contribute to the debate on democratization and authoritarianism in the Middle 
East. While foreign actors and foreign aid mechanisms are discussed, the thesis is not 
primarily concerned with macro-level evaluation of how the structures of the international 
political economy influence social enterprises. 
 
Operationalization 
 
Answering the above listed research questions requires, first, identifying social 
enterprises in Jordan. Ashoka, Innovators for the Public is one of the key organizations 
that seeks to foster social entrepreneurship globally. Ashoka has established five criteria 
of social entrepreneurship to use in deciding whether an individual is a social 
entrepreneur. Ashoka begins by first identifying candidates who most likely would meet 
their criteria of possessing ‘social mission, social innovation, social change, 
entrepreneurial skills, and [entrepreneurial] personality.’63 Through a rigorous selection 
process that involves holding interviews and analysing interviewees’ responses, Ashoka 
determines whether the social entrepreneurship candidates are, in fact, social 
entrepreneurs. A key factor for determining this is that ‘only this rare amalgam of [the 
five aforementioned] qualities makes a social entrepreneur.’64 Ashoka argues that only 
social entrepreneurs ‘are advanced in all five dimensions, whereas other leaders (social 
activists, professional innovators, and socially responsible business people) may excel 
only in some;’65 this makes it possible to distinguish social entrepreneurs from other civil 
society actors.  
 
63 ‘Five Criteria for the Ashoka Fellowship,’ Ashoka, accessed May 7, 2018, 
https://www.ashoka.org/en/program/ashoka-venture-and-fellowship; R. Praszkier and A. Nowak, 
‘Dimensions of Social Entrepreneurship,’ in Social Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24. 
64 Praszkier and Nowak, ‘Dimensions of Social Entrepreneurship,’ 24. 
65 Praszkier and Nowak, ‘Dimensions of Social Entrepreneurship,’ 25. 
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This thesis takes a similar approach to identifying social entrepreneurship, albeit 
using the criteria outlined in the literature review in Chapter One on entrepreneurship and 
social enterprises. The review establishes that social entrepreneurship involves 
innovation, assumption of risk and/or uncertainty, autonomy in leadership and decision-
making, management and investment of capital, social objectives, and social value 
creation. Additionally, social entrepreneurship may involve aspects such as a 
dependency-provision cycle and the cooperation or involvement of society. In order to 
identify social entrepreneurs, I conducted interviews with persons or organizations that 
self-identify as social entrepreneurs or social enterprises, as well as with persons or 
organizations that I identified as possible social entrepreneurs or social enterprises. I also 
spoke to persons familiar with social enterprises in Jordan, such as university faculty, 
members of the government, and entrepreneurship support organizations. Through the 
interviews, I determined whether the persons or organizations in question meet the social 
entrepreneurship criteria, and how social enterprises function in Jordan.  
 However, in keeping with the ideals of post-positivism, it is necessary to 
recognize that the aspects of social entrepreneurship identified in the literature review are 
rooted in a long tradition of European political and economic thought. It is thus important 
to remain open to the idea that in an Arab, Islamic, or Middle Eastern social, political, 
cultural, and economic context, social entrepreneurship may manifest itself differently. 
To not impose an entirely Western framework, the analysis remained open to the ideas of 
Jordanian social entrepreneurs and consider how they define social entrepreneurship and 
its functions. This approach allowed for the discovery of what it means to be a social 
entrepreneur in Jordan, and the role of social entrepreneurship in Jordan’s civil society. 
Determining what role social enterprises can play will show to what extent they are able 
to act as agents of social and political change. Crucial to this was examining how the 
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enterprises function, whether they are able to function independently, and whether they 
face any restrictions, such as intimidation by security forces or issues with bureaucracy 
or the legal system. 
 
Interview Methods 
The thesis takes a qualitative, inductive research approach. I conducted primary 
research in the form of in-person semi-structured interviews with the social entrepreneurs 
themselves to find out the details of how their enterprises operate. I also spoke to local 
academics, government officials, members of social entrepreneurship support 
organisations, and others familiar with social entrepreneurship in Jordan and the region. 
I identified some potential interviewees through online research; for example, several 
social enterprises in Jordan have current websites. Other interviewees were selected 
through the ‘snowball sampling’ process, in which one interviewee may recommend 
another potential interviewee who is also knowledgeable on the topic. Interviews were 
conducted between January and April 2018 in Jordan.  
The conversational nature of semi-structured interviews allows for open-ended 
questions and the opportunity to follow relevant topics that may move on from the 
prepared questions, which can lead to the discovery of information that might not have 
been revealed using the standardised questions and answers of the structured interview or 
survey method.66 I followed an ‘interview guide’ with indicative questions relating to my 
research questions. This technique aims to give interviewees the freedom to express their 
views in their own terms and explore issues they feel are important.67 Semi-structured 
 
66 D. Cohen and B. Crabtree, ‘Qualitative Research Guidelines Project,’ July, 2006, 
http://www.qualres.org/HomeWhat-3513.html; R. Longhurst, ‘Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus 
Groups,’ in Key Methods in Geography, ed. N. Clifford, S. French, and G. Valentine (London: Sage, 
2010), 103–13. 
67 D. Marsh and G. Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
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interviews are particularly useful for exploring complex ideas, experiences, and opinions, 
especially in sensitive areas. These qualities were useful in my research, as social 
entrepreneurship is only an emerging concept in Jordan and has not been widely studied.68 
At the same time, I remained as neutral as possible, because keeping myself ‘out of the 
data’ is an important aspect of post-positivism and allowed me to ‘elicit relatively 
objective approximations of empirical truth’ that I can use as evidence in my analysis.69 
I conducted the interviews in Arabic or English depending on the preference of the 
interviewee in order to minimize errors in communication where possible.  Many 
interviewees were proficient in English, but when there was a question of English 
proficiency, conducting the interviews in Jordanians’ native language aided in avoiding 
miscommunication errors.  
I analysed interview data with the help of NVivo software. The use of NVivo, a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, will add another level of analysis to 
the research in that it will help to identify trends and cross-examine information by 
classifying, sorting, and arranging relationships found in the transcribed interview data.70 
In keeping with post-positivist methodology, and because interviewing can be combined 
well with other kinds of data-collection techniques, I consulted written sources such as 
journalistic accounts, legal documents, and other primary documents, as well as reports 
of primary research gathered by research institutes and think tanks, to supplement 
information gathered in the interviews. This accompanying documentary research helped 
to fill in the gaps in interviewees’ memories and served to cross-check information 
 
68 G. Stedward, ‘On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing,’ in Surviving the Research Process in 
Politics, ed. P. Burnham (London: Pinter, 1997); A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
69 Diana Kapiszewski, Lauren M. MacLean, and Benjamin L. Read, Field Research in Political Science: 
Practices and Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 191. 
70 ‘What is NVivo?’ QSR International, accessed November 11, 2019, 
http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo. 
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given.71 This makes cross-checking information imperative so that the analysis will be as 
accurate as possible. The interview questions are listed in a section of the appendix. 
There are some limitations to the data that could be gathered from the interviews. 
For example, if it had been possible to speak with members of international organizations, 
a clearer understanding of these organizations’ development and civil society goals might 
have emerged. Additional interviews with Jordanian government officials, particularly 
higher-ranked officials, might similarly have given more insight into the government’s 
perception of social enterprises. Finally, interviewing journalists and members of other 
civil society organizations would offer more details on how social enterprises and their 
work are perceived in Jordan’s society and could provide further commentary on how 
social enterprises and other CSOs compare. These could perhaps be conducted in future 
research and would contribute to the wider context of authoritarianism and 
democratization as they could offer insights that did not emerge from the other interviews.  
 
Ethics 
 
I conducted my interviews in person. They took place either in the interviewee’s 
office, or in a public space such as a café, when it was not possible or desirable for the 
interviewee to speak to me in his/her office. The interviewee and I determined a mutually 
agreed safe location. Before beginning the interview, I obtained written consent where 
possible; this was possible in almost all cases besides the video or phone interviews. In 
these cases, I obtained oral consent rather than written consent. In the case of providing 
a written summary, the same principles applied. If it was not possible to provide a written 
explanation, I provided an oral explanation of everything in the written statement. Oral 
 
71 Kapiszewski, et al., Field Research in Political Science. 
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consent was recorded and stored securely on my university (J) drive separately from the 
interview recording, and inaccessible from my personal laptop. 
I made my interviewees aware of my research topic and that the information they 
provided would be used to develop my PhD thesis at Durham University. I also explained 
to them my connection to the Economic and Social Research Council since I received 
studentship funding for the research. My interviewees had the option to withdraw from 
(end) the interview at any time or to retract specific statements. I anonymised 
interviewees’ information automatically due to the sensitive nature of the topic of regime 
surveillance, and each interviewee was assigned a randomly generated number-letter code 
to be used in the thesis text instead of their name. A key to the code is made available 
only to the examiners for the viva and will not be included in the formal thesis submission. 
This coding method protects interviewees’ information while still allowing for an analysis 
and understanding of how the information given fits into the research questions.  
There is nothing particularly problematic about studying social entrepreneurship 
in Jordan. Much of the information about entrepreneurs is public; for example, on their 
own websites or in articles by the Jordan Times. However, in the case that any of the 
interviewees expressed discontent with or criticism of the government, the monarchy, an 
international organization or a funding agency, or any other group on which they rely or 
criticism of whom may influence their projects in any way, this information needed to be 
handled carefully and securely. Further, the progression of the thesis to the discussion of 
how the regime uses surveillance measures required anonymization of interview 
information. Following the interviews, I transferred the recordings from the voice 
recorder to a separate device and deleted it from the recorder. A list that identifies the 
interviewees with the recordings was kept separately and made unidentifiable by name, 
with a random number code attributed to the interviewee and his/her recording. I offered 
34 
 
to give interviewees a copy of my notes. Automatically sending the notes to them may 
have negative effects for the interviewees as a written statement may end up in the wrong 
hands. If the interviewee agreed to having a written record of the interview, then I gave 
them a copy of my notes. 
For the further protection of my interviewees, I deleted/destroyed data 
containing personal details that would lead to the identification of interviewees (e.g. their 
email addresses, telephone numbers, physical addresses, etc but not consent forms) as 
soon as possible. I retained contact details only until the interviewee participated in the 
study, or until they informed me that they did not wish to participate. If an interviewee 
indicated that they would like to receive a copy of my notes or the research findings at 
the end of the study, then I retained their contact details until this information was sent 
out. I also adhered to the University of Durham Data Protection Policy,72 the ESRC 
Framework for Research Ethics,73 and the European General Data Protection Regulations 
(GDPR) during this study. During data analysis abroad, the laptop was off-line to prevent 
hacking. On completion of the analysis, I transferred the data from my laptop to my 
university (J) drive and deleted it from my laptop, which ensured that the information was 
kept securely but separately from me. This was especially important since I was not 
allowed to carry my laptop on my person on my return from Jordan to the United 
Kingdom due to recently implemented aviation security regulations. 
 
Chapterisation 
 
The primary difficulty in studying entrepreneurship arises in ascertaining a 
definition for these organizations, as there is a multitude of conflicting definitions in the 
 
72 ‘Data Protection Policy,’ Durham University, February 2018, 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/ig/policies/dppolicy/.  
73 ‘Research Ethics,’ Economic and Social Research Council, accessed October 1, 2017, 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics/. 
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literature. Chapter One reviews classical entrepreneurship studies and addresses this 
difficult question. Following a review of conceptualizations of entrepreneurship from 
Richard Cantillon to Joseph Schumpeter and beyond, the chapter identifies aspects of 
entrepreneurship consistent throughout the literature which can be used to definitively 
distinguish enterprises from other organizations. These characteristics are innovation, 
assumption of risk and/or uncertainty, autonomy in leadership and decision-making, and 
management and investment of capital. Next, the chapter explores the first mentions of 
the ‘social’ aspect of social entrepreneurship, from Cyril Belshaw’s idea of the social 
entrepreneur as agent of social change to Gregory Dees’ assessment that social enterprises 
necessarily depend on the use of social capital. The chapter thus identifies social 
objectives and social value creation as the defining characteristics of social 
entrepreneurship, which distinguish it from other types of entrepreneurship. Finally, the 
chapter outlines characteristics of social entrepreneurship that are non-essential, but 
which can define its function in some cases. These are a dependency-provision cycle and 
the cooperation and/or involvement of society. The chapter emphasizes the importance 
of social capital social entrepreneurship and outlines the ways in which different types of 
social capital are theorized to aid democratization or lead to authoritarian retrenchment.  
 Chapter Two reviews the domestic and international relations of the Kingdom of 
Jordan. It shows how successive monarchs, including the current King Abdullah II, have 
had to carefully balance international policies with citizen demands, tribal divisions, and 
economic problems. During times of social unrest or in an effort to appease international 
donors, the regime has implemented either more repressive or more liberal policies, while 
simultaneously dealing with various refugee crises and high youth unemployment. The 
chapter also outlines the relationship between Jordan’s monarchy and civil society and 
the ways in which the regime has allowed for a degree of citizen participation while 
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maintaining its power and stability and appeasing international aid donors who expect 
democratization efforts. The state’s heavy reliance on international aid restricts its policy 
options both at home and abroad. 
 Chapter Three outlines the nature of social entrepreneurship in Jordan and 
identifies and defines two distinct types of social enterprises. Each type has distinct 
qualities that affects its role in Jordan’s socio-political landscape. The first type, structural 
transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs) focuses on addressing structural social 
issues. They focus on self-sustainability and continuity and employ independent or hybrid 
funding models to avoid dependence on international or domestic aid sources. Instead, 
they rely on social capital to succeed and aim to incorporate their goals into the 
community to change community norms. In contrast, product-and service-oriented social 
enterprises (PSSEs) focus on providing a specific good or service which the founders 
hope will address a certain social need in the short term. PSSEs depend on foreign and 
domestic grants and loans, much as non-governmental organizations do, and often 
struggle to maintain ongoing funding sources. This chapter outlines STSEs’ objectives, 
funding models, use of ‘targeted creative reorganization,’ the challenges they face, and 
their resiliency tactics. It then explains PSSEs’ formation process and how they are 
impacted by their reliance on the entrepreneurship ecosystem. STSEs are better able to 
address community needs and act as independent organizations due to their non-reliance 
on external funding sources, which allows them to formulate their objectives and 
implement their plans freely. PSSEs are dependent on their financial benefactors, and 
therefore cannot implement long-term plans, but they have some potential to make 
advances in small-business creation.  
 Studies of social entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa have taken 
a positive and hopeful approach and evaluated it based on its potential to effect change in 
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various areas that governments will not, or cannot, address. When evaluating the role of 
social enterprises as members of Jordan’s civil society, it is however not their theoretical 
potential that matters, but rather their actual ability to achieve their goals as community-
responsive actors. Thus, Chapter Four, Five, and Six take a critical approach to social 
entrepreneurship.  
 Through the lens of social capital theory and its criticisms, Chapter Four analyses 
how the international community’s implicit support for social capital creation actually 
restricts social enterprises’ spheres of operation and influence. It provides an overview of 
social capital theory, showing the utility and the negative effects of social capital, outlines 
Jordan’s political economy and the regime’s strategies for security, within which 
international aid programmes operate and to which social capital development is subject. 
The chapter shows how foreign aid impacts Jordan’s civil society, and more specifically, 
social entrepreneurship. The chapter assesses the role of foreign actors in the Jordanian 
social entrepreneurship ecosystem and concludes that the international community 
contributes to the confinement of the political space in Jordan. External aid for social 
entrepreneurship implicitly promotes a development strategy that relies on social capital, 
because social capital constitutes a defining aspect of social entrepreneurship. This is 
problematic because the utility of social capital in development remains disputed. Instead 
of supporting economic growth and political participation, international actors may 
instead be supporting a strategy that has been shown to be exclusionary, perpetuate the 
status quo, and promote only the ‘correct’ kind of association, all while emphasizing the 
obligation of individuals to solve their own problems. These issues raise the question of 
the role of social capital in authoritarian regimes, where government surveillance is 
prevalent. 
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Chapter Five analyses how the Jordanian regime uses administrative power and 
surveillance to devise various tactics for dictating social enterprises’ political space, as is 
evident in its interactions with and influence over and social enterprises. The Jordanian 
government uses soft power through bureaucratic obstacles during the registration 
process; oversight in the form of ‘awards’, working with enterprises through royal NGOs, 
and even co-optation; and controlling the availability of foreign funds to regulate the work 
of social enterprises. From the government’s use of administrative power and 
establishment of permissible and restricted activities, a clear hierarchy of social 
enterprises emerges. The more closely a social enterprise is affiliated with the 
government, the more it is tolerated, because the government exercises more management 
over it. Conversely, the more independent a social enterprise is, the less it is tolerated and 
subjected to greater repression methods, because the government must attempt to exercise 
more control. The emergence of social enterprises has prompted a mixed response of both 
toleration and repression from the government, creating a tension between social 
enterprises and the regime. The government’s response thus far has been a mix of state-
led top-down control and toleration of government-affiliated (and to some degree 
managed) social enterprises. Thus, the chances of social enterprises achieving their 
objectives without external interference and functioning as truly community-responsive 
organizations, rather than being beholden to the demands of the regime, are slim. Most 
Jordanian social enterprises are ultimately extensions of the regime’s neopatrimonial rule, 
and only select few function independently.  
 Having established the role of state surveillance in Jordan, Chapter Six examines 
to what extent the regime’s surveillance tactics penetrate civil society. The chapter 
focuses on the effect this has on social entrepreneurship by analysing the relationship 
between regime surveillance, the development or destruction of social capital, and the 
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political liberalization process. The chapter begins with an outline of the ways in which 
social enterprises can theoretically support progress in political liberalization. It then 
describes the types of social capital, i.e. positive, negative, bonding, bridging, structural, 
and cognitive social capital. Next, the chapter discusses how state support or involvement 
with social enterprises and social capital can build hierarchical associational relationships 
instead of social networks that lead to political empowerment. The chapter takes a 
structural-institutional approach to social capital analysis. It does not discuss cognitive 
aspects of social capital due to the difficulty in determining this from the existing 
interview data. Through the structural-institutional approach, it is possible to determine 
that structural social capital comprises the rules, regulations, and procedures that can aid, 
but also hinder, mutually beneficial collective action that, according to the ‘Putnam 
School,’ would lead to a process of democratization. The chapter examines the 
relationship between public administration, surveillance, and civil liberties and argues 
that pervasive state surveillance negatively impacts social capital development. The 
chapter shows how the pathway from social capital development to democratization is 
compromised with state surveillance. When social capital is restricted and directed by a 
top-down process, there is no progress in political liberalization. 
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Chapter 1: Understanding Social Entrepreneurship 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurship studies have been wrought with several problems, as Gartner,74 
Koppl and Minniti,75 and Alvarez76 have demonstrated. First, within much of the 
literature, definitions of the entrepreneur have been vague, or missing entirely. Second, 
few studies use the same definition or even the same criteria to evaluate entrepreneurship. 
Third, due to the variation in definition, so many different qualities have been attributed 
to the entrepreneur that, if all proposed definitions were correct, the entrepreneur would 
be superhuman and full of contradictions. While a range of definitions has added richness 
to the field, it has also denied it a common theoretical framework. 
The word entrepreneur first appeared in fifteenth-century French, and is defined 
simply as ‘celui qui entreprend quelque chose,’ or ‘someone who undertakes 
something.’77 Over time, the term came to be used more widely in the study of economics 
and, until the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, the standard textbook 
definition of the entrepreneur’s function was that of ‘making fundamental policy 
decisions in an enterprise,’ including decisions on the combination of productive factors, 
the quantity and variety of goods to produce, price policies, and potential financing or 
refinancing of the enterprise.78 
 
74 William Gartner, ‘”Who is an Entrepreneur?” Is the Wrong Question,’ American Journal of Small 
Business (Spring 1988): 11-32. 
75 R. Koppl and M. Minniti, ‘Market Processes and Entrepreneurial Studies,’ in Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship Research ed. Z. Acs and D. Audretsch (Kluwer Press International, 2003), 81-102. 
76 S. Alvarez, ‘Theories of Entrepreneurship,’ Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 1, no. 3 
(2005): 105-148. 
77 E. Littré, ‘Entrepreneur,’ in Dictionnaire de la Langue Française (Paris: L. Hachette, 1873), electronic 
version created by François Gannaz, www.littre.org/definition/entrepreneur. See also B. Hoselitz, ‘The 
Early History of Entrepreneurial Theory,’ Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 3, no. 4 (1951): 193-
220. 
78 O. Smalley. ‘Variations in Entrepreneurship,’ Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 1, no. 3 (1964): 
250. 
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There does appear to be a common emphasis on the entrepreneur as a dynamic 
rather than passive actor; however, this would be a vague and insufficient definition for 
what is so complex a subject that it has generated this degree of contrariety. Historically, 
entrepreneurship has also been consistently associated with leadership. In the earliest 
literature, royalty, military leaders, and even merchants were considered entrepreneurial 
because they subjected themselves to risk in a way that others did not, and at the same 
time positioned themselves to gain significant political, personal, or economic benefits.79  
Traditionally, scholars have analysed the entrepreneur as operating within an 
economic market, describing the entrepreneur variously as a risk-taker; the supplier of 
financial capital; an innovator; a decision maker; an industrial leader; a manager, 
supervisor, and organizer; and the owner of an enterprise, the employer of production 
factors, or the contractor, among others. In short, the entrepreneur ‘is a difficult person to 
pin down.’80 Regardless, some overarching themes of entrepreneurship have emerged 
from the literature. Most authors agree that entrepreneurship involves assumption of risk 
and/or uncertainty, innovation, decision-making and leadership, and management and 
investment of capital. This review thus begins by examining the seminal ideas of classical 
writers associated with one of the aspects of economic entrepreneurship mentioned above. 
It then addresses the question of ‘who’ may be an entrepreneur. From there the review 
progresses to an examination of literature that has emerged which has identified 
entrepreneurship as inherently ‘social.’ The themes emerging from the review will inform 
the working definition of social entrepreneurship for this thesis. 
 
 
 
79 R. Hébert and A. Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ Foundations and Trends in 
Entrepreneurship 2, no. 4 (2006): 9-10. 
80 Hébert and Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 4. 
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Critical Aspects of the Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 
Assumption of Risk and/or Uncertainty 
The English term for an entrepreneur, ‘undertaker,’ at first referred to someone 
who set out to complete a project or job, but the concept evolved into that of government 
contractor. This was someone who performed a government task at his own financial risk. 
Over time, the connection to the government was dropped, and the term designated 
‘someone involved in a risky project from which an uncertain profit might be derived.’81 
Richard Cantillon established the entrepreneur as one who assumes risk and/or 
uncertainty in his work Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, first published in 
1755. Cantillon’s entrepreneur is ‘an arbitrageur, an individual that equilibrates supply 
and demand in the economy, and in this function bears risk or uncertainty.’82 Cantillon 
described uncertainty as all those ‘unknowable’ things inherent in the economic market, 
which are now understood to be ‘Knightian uncertainty.’ Thus, in Cantillon’s work, there 
is a direct link between entrepreneurship and uncertainty, a condition which he 
understood to be inherent in the economic system.83  
Another crucial development in the theory of uncertainty and risk in 
entrepreneurship emerged in Frank Knight’s early 20th century work. Knight explicitly 
argues that the entrepreneur exercises judgment over uncertainty and functions as a sort 
of insurance agent. Knight’s entrepreneurs are company owners who receive profits. The 
entrepreneur initiates innovations or other useful changes, adapts to changes in the 
environment, and, most distinctively, assumes the consequences of uncertainty and risk.84 
According to Knight, management does not imply entrepreneurship, but a manager 
 
81 B. Hoselitz, ‘The Early History of Entrepreneurial Theory,’ in Essays in Economic Thought: Aristotle 
to Marshall, ed. J.J. Spengler and W. R. Allen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1960), 240-242. 
82 J. Iversen, R. Jørgensen, and N. Malchow-Møller, ‘Defining and Measuring Entrepreneurship,’ 
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 4, no. 1 (2008): 4.  
83 R. Cantillon, Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, ed. H. Higgs (London: Macmillan, 1931).; 
Hébert and Link. ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 17-20. 
84 Iversen, Jørgensen, and Malchow-Møller, ‘Defining and Measuring Entrepreneurship,’ 6-7. 
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becomes an entrepreneur when his work requires exercising ‘judgment involving liability 
to error.’85 Knight took the same approach as Cantillon; both writers stressed that the 
essence of entrepreneurship is not found in whether an entrepreneur owns capital. As 
Knight wrote, ‘the only “risk” which leads to [entrepreneurial] profit is a unique 
uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility which in its very nature 
cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried.’86 
One of Knight’s most important contributions was to clearly distinguish between 
the concepts of insurable risk and non-insurable uncertainty. He argued that previous 
theories about the entrepreneur and risk or uncertainty were ambiguous because they did 
not distinguish sufficiently between the two concepts. Knight wrote that ‘risk’ refers to a 
measurable quantity, i.e. the objective probability that an event will happen; risk is not an 
uncertainty because it can be shifted from the entrepreneur to another entity by an 
insurance contract. On the other hand, ‘uncertainty,’ often confused with risk, is an 
unmeasurable factor such as the inability to predict consumer demand.87 Recent literature, 
including a clarifying work by Sharon Alvarez,88 makes three distinctions where Knight 
made two. ‘Risk’ refers to situations where the probability of possible outcomes is 
calculable and known. ‘Uncertainty’ occurs when possible outcomes are known but their 
probability distribution is not known. Entrepreneurs face ‘radical uncertainty’ in 
situations in which possible outcomes are neither known nor knowable.89 
Other writers who agreed with Cantillon’s and Knight’s assessment that risk and 
uncertainty are defining aspects of entrepreneurship are Johann Heinrich von Thünen,90 
 
85 F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 276. 
86 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 310. 
87 Hébert and Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 88. 
88 S. Alvarez, ‘Theories of Entrepreneurship,’ Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 1, no. 3 
(2005), 105-148. 
89 Hébert and Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 89. 
90 J.H. von Thünen, ‘The Isolated State in Relation to Agriculture and Political Economy,’ in The 
Frontier Wage, trans. B. W. Dempsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 187–368. 
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Hans von Mangoldt,91 Frederick Hawley,92 Herbert Davenport,93 Ludwig von Mises,94 
Arthur Cole,95 and George L.S. Shackle.96  
 
Innovation 
Baudeau and Schumpeter established the idea that the entrepreneur is innovative. 
Abbe Nicolas Baudeau developed a theory of entrepreneurship describing the 
entrepreneur as innovative and able to apply new ideas to reduce costs and increase 
profits.97 He and his colleagues known as the ‘Physiocrats’ were convinced that profit 
opportunities would create desirable innovations with the availability of the right 
knowledge, an idea which foreshadowed Schumpeter’s own thinking, in particular the 
concept of ‘creative destruction.’98 
Most modern theories of entrepreneurship assume the qualities that Joseph 
Schumpeter outlined in his seminal work. He opposed the view of the entrepreneur as 
simply risk-bearer and company-manager. He instead argued that the entrepreneur is 
principally an innovator: an individual who creates a new good or quality; creates a new 
production method; opens a new market; captures a new supply source; or creates a new 
organization or industry.99 For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is the main instrument of 
change, the one who disturbs the status quo through a process of ‘creative destruction.’ 
Over time, the ‘new’ becomes part of the ‘old.’ According to Schumpeter, ‘everyone is 
 
91 H. von Mangoldt, ‘The Precise Function of the Entrepreneur and the True Nature of Entrepreneur’s 
Profit,’ in Some Readings in Economics, ed. F.M. Taylor (Ann Arbor, MI: George Wahr, 1907), 34–49. 
92 F.B. Hawley. ‘The Fundamental Error of Kapital and Kapitalzins,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 6 
(1892): 280-307. 
93 H. Davenport, Economics of Enterprise (New York: Macmillan, 1913). 
94 L. von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949). 
95 A.H. Cole, ‘Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurial History,’ in Change and the Entrepreneur, prepared 
by the Research Center in Entrepreneurial History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 85-
107. 
96 G.L.S. Shackle, Uncertainty in Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955). 
97 N. Baudeau, Premiere introduction à la philosophie economique, ed. A. Dubois (Paris: P. Geuthner, 
1910). 
98 Hébert and Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 24-26. 
99 Iversen, Jørgensen, and Malchow-Møller, ‘Defining and Measuring Entrepreneurship,’ 6. 
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an entrepreneur only when he actually “carries out new combinations,” and loses that 
character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to running it as 
other people run their businesses.’100 The appeal of Schumpeter’s theory lies in its 
simplicity and power, which can be summarised in the phrase, ‘the carrying out of new 
combinations we call “enterprise;” the individual whose function it is to carry them out 
we call “entrepreneurs.”’101 
Following Schumpeter, Jeremy Bentham and Johann Heinrich von Thünen also 
emphasized the entrepreneur’s innovative nature. Bentham wrote that entrepreneurs are 
‘talented individuals whose imagination and inventiveness have been responsible for the 
progress of nations.’102 He viewed entrepreneurs as innovators whose work is responsible 
for the development of human progress. In his view, entrepreneurs ‘create utility’ by 
creating new products or ‘in meliorating the quality, or diminishing the expense, of any 
of those which are already known to us.’103 Von Thünen’s work marked a significant 
advancement in entrepreneurial theory in that he viewed the entrepreneur as both risk-
bearer and innovator. The entrepreneur bears the anxiety that accompanies his ‘business 
gamble,’ but von Thünen argued that this anxiety leads to productive thoughts about his 
plans and solutions for avoiding failures. Additionally, von Thünen wrote, ‘the 
entrepreneur through his troubles will become an inventor and explorer in his field.’104 
Israel Kirzner based his approach to entrepreneurship on Ludwig von Mises’ idea 
of the market as an entrepreneurial process, the notion that the marketplace contains a 
learning process, and the argument that entrepreneurial activities are creative acts of 
 
100 J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, trans. R. Opie from the 2nd German edition 
[1926] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 78. 
101 Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, 74. 
102 Hébert and Link, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur,’ 43-44. 
103 J. Bentham, Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings, ed. W. Stark (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), 
170. 
104 von Thünen, ‘The Isolated State,’ 248. 
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discovery.105 He viewed the economy as being in a constant state of disequilibrium in 
which economic agents suffer from ‘utter ignorance’ of various information which may 
or may not be available to them.106 In this environment, the entrepreneur’s function is to 
be alert and to discover and exploit new opportunities. 
 
Decision-Making and Leadership 
Several writers include the theme of decision-making in their work on 
entrepreneurship. In his Principles of Economics, Carl Menger established a distinctive 
school of economic thought which focuses on the subjectivist act of human valuation, 
meaning that economic change arises from individuals’ understanding of circumstances, 
not the circumstances themselves. Menger’s theory relies on the role of knowledge in 
individual decisions, and thus his entrepreneur uses his calculating and decision-making 
abilities to align productive resources over time. Menger wrote that the entrepreneur’s 
activities include gaining knowledge about the economic situation, cost-production 
calculations to maximise efficiency, assigning production processes, and supervising the 
production plan.107 
Friedrich von Wieser added to Menger’s ideas, which heavily influenced him. He 
expanded on the entrepreneur’s dimensions, among them leadership and alertness. Von 
Wieser wrote that the entrepreneur directs an economic enterprise and that ‘he supplies 
not only the necessary capital but originates the idea, elaborates and puts into operation 
the plan, and engages collaborators. When the enterprise is established, he becomes its 
 
105 I.M. Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
106 Iversen, Jørgensen, and Malchow-Møller, ‘Defining and Measuring Entrepreneurship,’ 9. 
107 C. Menger, Principles of Economics, trans. J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 
1950), 160. 
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manager technically as well as commercially.’108 He also described entrepreneurs as ‘bold 
technical innovators, organizers with a keen knowledge of human nature.’109 
Alfred Marshall, who dominated British theoretical economics at the beginning 
of the 20th century, was influenced by the biological evolution principles of Charles 
Darwin. Marshall argued that the skill and ability of the entrepreneur are shaped by the 
economic struggle for survival created by the competitive market. He understood the 
entrepreneur to be a business manager, but by this he meant more than simply 
superintendence, arguing that business managers emerge from a process of specialization 
and division of labour similar to the evolutionary process.110 
Various authors have also described the entrepreneur specifically as a leader in 
some form, whether as manager, superintendent, organizer, employer, or contractor. In 
Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill established the entrepreneur as a 
manager or superintendent – one who has direction and control over the enterprise.111 
Leon Walras similarly characterized the entrepreneur as the coordinator of resources in 
Elements of Pure Economics.112 François Quesnay’s entrepreneur is the independent 
owner of a business, one who ‘manages and makes his business profitable by his 
intelligence and his wealth.’113 Jean-Baptiste Say describes the entrepreneur as the main 
agent of production and distribution in the economy; he is the manager of a firm, yet 
separate from the capitalist.114 Say also wrote that the entrepreneur’s most distinguishing 
quality is to have ‘good judgment,’ a term closely associated with leadership today.115  
 
108 F. von Wieser, Social Economics, trans. A.F. Hindrichs (New York: Adelphi, 1927), 324. 
109 von Wieser, Social Economics, 327. 
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112 L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, trans. W. Jaffe (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
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Other authors whose works attribute decision-making and leadership qualities to 
the entrepreneur are Amasa Walker116 and his son, Francis Amasa Walker,117 Arthur 
Cole,118 George L.S. Shackle,119 and Theodore Schultz.120 
 
Management and Investment of Capital 
Adam Smith established the entrepreneur as the person who supplies financial 
capital.121 He considered the ‘undertaker’ to be a ‘prudent man’ who accumulates capital 
because he is frugal; in this way, he encourages slow but steady progress.122 Ludwig von 
Mises and Amme-Robert Jacques Turgot are among other scholars who emphasize that 
entrepreneurs supply financial capital, and most contemporary work assumes this 
attribute. Notably, Turgot’s contribution was to establish capital ownership as a separate 
economic function. He wrote that a capitalist does not need to be an entrepreneur, but that 
one cannot be an entrepreneur without being a capitalist.123 The different forms of capital 
which an entrepreneur may manage and invest in are financial capital, physical capital, 
human capital, and social capital, defined below:  
1) financial capital - Resources measured in terms of money with which the 
organization’s assets are acquired and its operations are funded.124 
 
116 A. Walker, The Science of Wealth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1866). 
117 F.A. Walker, The Wages Question (New York: Henry Holt, 1876). 
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121 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.A. Campbell and A. 
S. Skinner. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
122 A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 215. 
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2) physical capital – Tangible assets, such as machinery, construction supplies and office 
buildings, that are used somehow in production.125  
3) human capital – Renewable resource of capital, such as knowledge, skills, motivation, 
and creativity, which is owned by individuals, but which contributes to the organization’s 
activities.126 
4) social capital - Entrepreneurs are known to ‘mobilize the resources of others to achieve 
their entrepreneurial objectives.’127 This is also known as social capital, which refers to 
the actual or potential resources accessible and acquired through a network of social 
connections.128  
 
Entrepreneur: Identity or Function? 
There has been some debate regarding the entrepreneur’s identity and whether 
s/he is one person, a group of people, or an organization.  
Although the classical scholars were less explicit about this point, they generally 
agreed that the term ‘entrepreneur’ may be applied widely to various actors and is not 
restricted to a single person or a businessperson. For example, Richard Cantillon wrote 
that even beggars could be entrepreneurs, so long as they faced some type of 
uncertainty.129 Ludwig von Mises offered an even more expansive definition of the 
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entrepreneur. He said that ‘every actor is always an entrepreneur’ because participants in 
the actual economy must make choices and deal with uncertainties, which he generalized 
to all market activities.130 Theodore Schultz extended the idea to include non-market 
activities such as household decisions or time allocation. Considering this, entrepreneurs 
could be any labourer reallocating his or her services: students, home-makers, and 
consumers reallocating their time or efforts.131 To Amasa Walker, the entrepreneur was 
an employer, manager, projector, businessman, merchant, farmer, or ‘what-ever else he 
may be called whose services are indispensable.’132 Jeff Skoll agreed, writing that not 
only governments, corporations, or high-level officials ‘are in a position to determine 
where and how resources are allocated.’133 Schumpeter elaborated that the entrepreneur 
is not necessarily ‘a single physical person’ and that ‘every social environment has its 
own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function.’134 More recent work has established 
that even an entire government may be entrepreneurial.135 
Fredrik Barth clarified this debate when he wrote that the word describes ‘an 
aspect of a role: it relates to actions and activities, … [and] it characterises a certain 
quality or orientation.’136 As Gartner wrote, because entrepreneurship consists of a set of 
behaviours, ‘it is something one does rather than something one is.’137 Similarly, Peredo 
and McLean argued that the characteristics of entrepreneurship ‘could be thought of as 
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roles in a performance; roles which may be split and/or shared.’138 Because of this, 
Drucker added, everyone ‘can learn to be an entrepreneur and to behave 
entrepreneurially.’139  
This means that ‘being an entrepreneur’ is a phrase that refers to a person’s, 
group’s, or organization’s function and behaviours rather than describing their identity or 
profession. Because its ‘membership’ is not limited to any one profession or sector of 
society, entrepreneurship is a broad and far-reaching concept: Any person, any group, any 
organization, any movement, or even any society, may be entrepreneurial as long as they 
carry out the functions of entrepreneurship described previously.  
 
Critical Aspects of the Social Entrepreneur  
Beginning in the mid-1950s, some scholars tentatively began to apply the 
concepts of the entrepreneur to spheres beyond the strictly economic model. Cyril 
Belshaw was perhaps the first to establish the position of the entrepreneur as influencing 
society beyond economic developments. He wrote that entrepreneurs both represent and 
influence the direction of social change, because ‘their values and methods are a reflection 
of the synthesis between old and new that is the developing culture.’140 Belshaw argued 
that scholarship must determine what constitutes the ‘business’ of social entrepreneurship 
in each case study of the entrepreneur as agent of social change.141 Described below are 
aspects of social entrepreneurship that appear consistently in the literature. 
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Social Objectives 
The most distinguishing feature of social entrepreneurship is that a social mission 
forms a part of the objectives of the enterprise. Although a number of innovations address 
social needs, the ‘distribution of financial and social value [is] tilted toward society’ only 
for social innovations.142 A social innovation can be ‘a product, production process, or 
technology (much like innovation in general), but it can also be a principle, an idea, a 
piece of legislation, a social movement, an intervention, or some combination of them.’143 
Peredo and McLean outlined a range of ways in which social objectives can feature in an 
enterprise, and conclude that ‘there appears to be a continuum of possibilities, ranging 
from the requirement that social benefits be the only goal of the entrepreneurial 
undertaking to the stipulation merely that social goals are somewhere among its aims.’144 
This changes the way in which social entrepreneurs assess opportunities, because instead 
of wealth creation being the only criterion, possible mission-relation impact features 
prominently in assessments instead, and wealth creation may only be a means to an end.145 
In contrast, for business entrepreneurs, profit, wealth creation, and customer satisfaction 
are the gauge of value creation; for social entrepreneurs, ‘social impact is the gauge.’146 
 
Social Value Creation Through Social Change 
Joseph Schumpeter offered some early insight into the entrepreneur’s relationship 
with society, writing that entrepreneurial functions involve not only the ability to perceive 
and implement new opportunities but also the ‘will power adequate to break down the 
resistance that the existing social environment offers to change,’ which is known as 
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‘creative destruction.’ In this way, entrepreneurial activity ‘extends to the structure and 
the very foundations of … society.’147 This introduction of entrepreneurs’ role in society 
led to the development of social entrepreneurship theory, on which Fredrik Barth 
expanded. Barth’s contribution is his more precise explanation of how an entrepreneur 
might function in terms of social change. He built on the idea of the cooperation of the 
population, writing that a ‘corporate group’ will arise around the entrepreneur which is 
new in terms of membership, function, and perhaps even composition and structure. The 
resulting organisation establishes ‘innovations and patterns which, proven successful, 
may be expected to become prototypes for the formation of further similar units.’ 
Therefore, this definition of the word entrepreneur ‘leads us directly to highly seminal 
points of social change, and to basic social processes of replacement and activity in 
general.’148  
Other authors also viewed entrepreneurs in a favourable light, describing them as 
persons who improved the status of society because they ‘not only swept and garnished 
their own houses but initiated a … process of social amelioration in an age facing 
insuperable problems of social adjustment.’149 Wilson’s concept of social amelioration 
has carried through to present day analyses of social entrepreneurs. Skoll writes that 
‘social entrepreneurs take workable value creation models and adapt them for the benefit 
of [all] communities.’150 Social entrepreneurship involves ‘creating and sustaining social 
value.’151 a term which refers to ‘contribution of welfare or wellbeing in a given human 
community.’152 Creating and sustaining social value ‘is the core of what distinguishes 
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social entrepreneurs from business entrepreneurs … Social entrepreneurs look for a long-
term social return on investment.’153 Further, because entrepreneurship is based on 
economic theory, which sees change as normal and healthy, the entrepreneur is best able 
to create social value through social innovations; this process may involve Schumpeter’s 
creative destruction of known norms. In fact, as Drucker points out, ‘the rapid changes in 
today’s society, technology, and economy are simultaneously an even greater threat to 
[government agencies, etc] and an even greater opportunity [for innovation and 
entrepreneurship].’154 Social entrepreneurship may, due to its flexibility, achieve 
purposeful, directional, and controlled change in pragmatic, modest, and gradual ways, 
as opposed to the dogmatic, grandiose, and abrupt methods of revolution, civil war, or 
economic catastrophes.155 
 
Cooperation of Society & Dependency-Provision Cycles 
Social enterprises do not, of course, function in a vacuum; rather, precisely 
because they are social, they may depend on the approval of others to succeed. 
Freudenberger develops this further: ‘Despite the awareness of its needs, a society may 
be hostile to the means with which the innovator wishes to satisfy them.’156 This drives 
the entrepreneur to undergo a process by which the entrepreneur ‘destroys important 
social organisms that a given society wishes to but is unable to protect.’157 However, the 
efforts of the social entrepreneur might be unsuccessful; one major reason for this is that 
the society protected the status quo, ‘to be sure at the expense of eventual social 
improvement.’158 
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Other authors have described an enterprise’s ability to capture ‘the active 
cooperation of considerable segments of the population.’159 Barth agreed, and wrote that 
entrepreneurs recognise and develop a ‘set of needs in a population which places clients 
in the strongest relation of dependence to himself.’ In this way, clients begin to view those 
needs as vital, and the entrepreneur ‘can present himself as singularly qualified and able 
to cater for precisely [those] needs.’160 On entrepreneurship in politics, Holcombe wrote 
that ‘entrepreneurial opportunities arise in politics for many of the same reasons that they 
appear in markets, to reduce the inefficiency. … If the political system is unstable … then 
change is more likely.’161 These aspects imply a type of supply and demand, or 
dependency-provision, contract between the entrepreneur and society, in which the 
entrepreneur has become situated in a position to be the best, or main, provider of some 
type of good or service which society requires. 
 
Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
Entrepreneurs are known to ‘mobilize the resources of others to achieve their 
entrepreneurial objectives.’162 This means that their opportunities are not bounded by the 
resources they have direct access to: ‘their reach exceeds their grasp.’163 Entrepreneurs 
access these resources, also known as social capital. As some scholars have argued, social 
capital is unlike other forms of capital because it is not ‘owned’ by actors themselves but 
is instead located in the structure of their relationships with other actors. If one of the 
actors withdraws, then the connection and the social capital it contained disappears.164 
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Social capital can also be understood as ‘an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-
operation between two or more individuals.’ These norms can range from reciprocity 
between friends to complex religious doctrines, but they must involve an actual human 
relationship.165  
Throughout the literature, there are various definitions and analyses of social 
capital. There are three major perspectives on social capital, based on the ideas of Pierre 
Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. Bourdieu studied the concept in his 
exploration of how dominant classes remain dominant, which he believed could not be 
explained only by economics. Bourdieu defined social capital as ‘the sum of the 
resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition.’166 Bourdieu wrote that social networks from which social capital may 
arise are not a given, and that they ‘must be constructed through investment strategies 
oriented to the institutionalization of group relations.’167 In other words, social capital 
acquisition does not occur automatically and requires deliberate investment in resources. 
Bourdieu’s definition shows that social capital consists of both ‘the social relationship 
itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates’ 
and ‘the amount and quality of those resources.’168  
In contrast to other scholars who view social capital as a fundamentally positive 
network of social connections, Bourdieu understood social capital as inherently 
representative of the saying, ‘it’s not what you know, it’s who you know.’ Bourdieu thus 
used the concept to explain the frameworks of social inequality, where social capital is 
 
165 Fukuyama, ‘Social Capital, Civil Society, and Development,’ 7. 
166 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1992), 119. 
167 Alejandro Portes, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology,’ Annual Review 
of Sociology 24 (1998), 3. 
168 Portes, ‘Social Capital,’ 3-4. 
57 
 
simply another tool the elite use as ‘gatekeepers’ of their circles.169 Bourdieu’s approach 
shows that social capital can be exclusionary, in addition to not being freely available. 
James Coleman, on the other hand, viewed social capital as valuable for various 
types of communities including marginalized ones, rather than only for dominant classes. 
Coleman’s model of social capital positions it alongside other potential resources a person 
can use, such as human capital, physical capital, and economic capital. In contrast to these 
sources of capital, however, Coleman posited that individuals cannot own social capital. 
Instead, this is a resource which is simply available to them, because it is ‘a resource 
based on trust and shared values and develops from the weaving-together of people in 
communities.’170 Coleman defined social capital by analysing its function. To him, social 
capital is ‘a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of 
some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether 
persons or corporate actors – within the same structure.’171 Social capital functions in the 
same way as other types of capital in that it enables achievement of certain goals that 
would not be possible without it. However, social capital can be valuable in making 
possible certain actions but be ‘useless or even harmful for others.’172 Coleman 
additionally shows the role of social capital as a source of norms and sanctions that can 
be facilitative, but also restrictive: ‘norms can constitute a powerful form of social capital. 
This social capital, however, … not only facilitates certain actions; it constrains others.’173 
Further, ‘effective norms in an area can reduce innovativeness in an area, not only deviant 
actions that harm others but also deviant actions that can benefit everyone.’174 Thus, social 
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capital realized through norms-acceptance may in fact inhibit innovation in a community 
by restricting perceptions of what is acceptable. Thus, both Bourdieu and Coleman 
emphasize that social capital is inherently intangible, in contrast to other forms of capital: 
‘whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their 
heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships.’175 This means that a 
person must have a connection with others to possess social capital, because it is those 
others who are the source of the capital.  
Robert Putnam agrees with Coleman that social capital is productive. He defines 
social capital as ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.’176 Further, 
social capital facilitates spontaneous collaboration. Putnam draws on Clifford Geertz’ 
work on credit associations, who explains that ‘cooperation is founded on a very lively 
sense of the mutual value to the participants of such cooperation.’177 Therefore, social 
capital ‘serves as a kind of collateral’ in which ‘participants in effect pledge their social 
connections’ in situations where it is not possible to offer physical assets as guarantees.178 
Through social capital in networks, trust among individuals becomes ‘transitive and 
spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you.’179 Further, 
most types of social capital can be called ‘moral resources’ which are ‘resources whose 
supply increases rather than decreases through use and which become depleted if not 
used.’180 This is because the more two individuals show a type of social capital, such as 
trust towards one another, the more confidence they have in each other. Other types of 
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social capital such as social norms and networks also increase with use and decrease with 
disuse, or misuse. Putnam therefore argues that ‘we should expect the creation and 
destruction of social capital to be marked by virtuous and vicious cycles.’181 In addition, 
social capital is ‘ordinarily a public good, unlike conventional capital, which is ordinarily 
a private good.’182 Putnam agrees again with Coleman, and builds on the work of 
Dasgupta,183 writing that social capital does not belong to any one individual who benefits 
from it because it is ‘an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded.’184 
Putnam points out that the concept of social capital as facilitator of cooperation in society 
relates in important aspects to the work of Robert Keohane, who argued that international 
institutions facilitate cooperation in the global political economy.185 
Putnam further explains that all societies, whether democratic or authoritarian, 
capitalist or not, have formal and informal networks of ‘interpersonal communication and 
exchange.’186 These can be horizontal, in which individuals of equal power and status are 
brought together, or vertical, where individuals of various hierarchies and dependencies 
are linked. Civic engagement networks such as sports associations and neighbourhood 
societies are examples of ‘intense horizontal interaction.’187 These types of networks are 
an important kind of social capital. As Putnam notes, ‘the denser such networks in a 
community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual 
benefit.’188 Putnam draws on Elinor Ostrom to explain why this occurs: ‘networks of civic 
engagement foster robust norms of reciprocity.’189 Individuals who interact in many 
 
181 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 169-170. 
182 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 170. 
183 Partha Dasgupta, ‘Trust as a Commodity,’ in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. 
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 49-72. 
184 James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 317.  
185 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 241 note 20. See also Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
186 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 173. 
187 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 173. 
188 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 173. 
189 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 173. 
60 
 
different contexts ‘develop strong norms of acceptable behaviour,’190 and these norms are 
reinforced by ‘the network of relationships that depend on the establishment of a 
reputation for keeping promises and accepting the norms of the local community 
regarding behaviour.’191 In addition, networks of civic engagement ‘facilitate 
communication and improve the flow of information,’ particularly regarding other 
individuals’ trustworthiness.192  
In contrast, vertical networks ‘cannot sustain trust and cooperation’ because the 
information flows within them are less reliable and trustworthy than those in horizontal 
networks. For example, clientelist relationships are characterized by ‘interpersonal 
exchange and reciprocal obligations’ but this exchange is vertical, and the obligations are 
asymmetric.193 Putnam argues that democracy has been more effective than autocracy 
because ‘vertical networks are less helpful than horizontal networks in solving collective 
action.’194 For Putnam, therefore, there are two kinds of social capital, namely, positive 
social capital as characterized by horizontal social networks and negative social capital, 
which is found in vertical social networks. Positive social capital based in horizontal 
social networks leads to achievement of community goals, which facilitates 
democratization, in his view. Negative social capital based in vertical social networks 
instead shores up patterns of autocracy. As Putnam states: ‘social capital … bolsters the 
performance of the polity.’195 
As Portes explains, the term social capital has ‘evolved into something of a cure-
all for the maladies affecting society.’196 The reasons it has entered everyday discourse 
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and become popular are twofold. First, its less attractive features have been ignored in 
favour of focusing on the ‘positive consequences of sociability.’197 Second, it highlights 
how ‘nonmonetary forms [of capital] can be important sources of power and influence.’198 
Portes further observes that social capital can be a source of social control, of family 
support, and of benefits through networks outside the family.199 In networks outside the 
family, social capital can lead to stratification and is often invoked ‘as an explanation of 
access to employment, mobility through occupational ladders, and entrepreneurial 
success.’200 Tight community networks create the type of controlling social capital that is 
useful to various authority figures, such as teachers or police, as they ‘seek to maintain 
discipline and promote compliance among those under their charge.’201 Other scholars 
have commented on the role of social capital for social control in legal matters.  
Kim and Aldrich define social capital as ‘the social connections people use to 
obtain resources they would otherwise acquire through expending their human or 
financial capital.’202 Through their work on social network analysis, they further observed 
that there are three factors that limit access to social capital. First, individuals tend to 
associate with others of similar backgrounds, rather than others of dissimilar 
backgrounds, ‘thus generating social networks characterized by low diversity.’ Second, 
people live in ‘semi-permeable communities’ such as their family, and those communities 
have ‘strong boundaries [that] deflect social relationships back upon themselves, creating 
and maintaining concentrated social networks.’203 Third, individuals’ activities are 
limited by ‘ignorance and uncertainty’ because they do not, and cannot, know the ‘full 
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potential of pursuing indirect network ties.’204 This means that ‘people often ignore 
potentially valuable relationships and unknowingly cultivate ties that harm them.’205 
These factors can limit the usefulness of pursing social capital, and complicate the use of 
social capital, because they impact individuals’ ability to benefit from it.206 
It has also been demonstrated that social capital may be a source of social control, 
whereby community or hierarchical relationships render formal or overt controls to 
maintain discipline and promote compliance unnecessary.207 In political science, a high 
amount of social capital has been associated with a robust civil society; civil society forms 
as a result of social capital but does not constitute social capital itself.208 An abundance 
of social capital makes organization and action towards a common goal in a community 
easier; this may produce a dense civil society. Likewise, low levels of social capital hinder 
the establishment of a robust civil society.209 Social capital is thus a powerful resource 
for entrepreneurs if they manage and invest in it well. Entrepreneurs may also exercise 
considerable influence over various sectors of society and even government through their 
use of social capital, if they choose to do so. One of the gaps in the social capital literature 
is that the involvement of external actors, such as international aid donors and national 
governments, is under-explored. In particular, there are few empirical studies that address 
citizens’ ability to create, develop, and use social capital in authoritarian contexts. This 
thesis explores Jordanian social entrepreneurs’ use of social capital and their ability to 
use it effectively, with reference to restrictions imposed by international aid programmes 
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and regime policies. Chapters Four, Five, and Six analyse the effect of authoritarianism 
and aid-dependence on social capital.  
 
Social Entrepreneurship and Civil Society in the Middle East 
Reports written by civil society organizations and non-governmental 
organizations have used the term ‘social entrepreneurship’ in the Middle East 
overwhelmingly to refer to local start-ups or small businesses which aim to have a 
positive social impact in a community.210 Inter-governmental organizations such as the 
United Nations tend to view social entrepreneurship as a solution that addresses the more 
systemic issues in the Middle East, complementary to civil society.211 CSOs, NGOs, and 
IGOs view social entrepreneurship as an opportunity to increase civic engagement and 
achieve stability, empower women and other minorities, and, most prominently, 
capitalize on the youth bulge while reducing youth unemployment.212 The organizations 
described in these reports more closely resemble socially responsible businesses rather 
than true social enterprises, as they usually refer to small businesses meant to create jobs 
and accumulate capital to redistribute in the local community for a social cause.  
There are exceptions to this; for example, the organizations Beyond Reform and 
Development and Ashoka sponsor and teach entrepreneurship in the Middle East, 
encouraging local community members to use their resources and connections to devise 
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an innovative way to solve a problem in their area.213 There are also start-ups which 
design new technology to deal with issues such as drinking water, farmland, urban 
transportation, waste collection, recycling, and others, and are therefore truly 
enterprising.214 Typically, however, the organizations are simply described as ‘projects 
that are not only businesses but also fulfil some kind of social mission;’215 this 
understanding lacks the important entrepreneurial trait of innovation. 
There has been some debate about whether social entrepreneurship is a part of 
civil society, which is defined as ‘the sphere of uncoerced human association between the 
individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and 
substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market.’216 Some 
scholars have described social entrepreneurship as a growing subsector of civil society or 
a new generation of civil society actor.217 However, it would be a mistake to limit social 
entrepreneurship to the civil society sector: it may be, but is not necessarily, a part of civil 
society, and as described previously, it has been established that social entrepreneurship 
can emerge in the government and the public sphere as well.218 Thus, social 
entrepreneurship is better understood as a fluid concept, which, precisely because of the 
adaptability of its functions, is found in diverse realms. 
The adaptability of social entrepreneurship lends it distinct advantages over other 
established institutions which are more rigid. The ability of social enterprises to 
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restructure and blur familiar organizations makes them more flexible, adaptable, and 
faster to respond to complex, modern, and increasingly global issues.219 This distinctive 
re-assembling of established institutions leads to innovation which ranges from 
incremental changes to disruptive interventions.220 Businesses have cast social 
entrepreneurship as a development from socially responsible investment and as a new 
market opportunity, while governments have viewed it as part of a solution to state 
failures to provide essential services. Civil society organizations have embraced social 
entrepreneurship as a way to create new partnerships and as a method of driving social 
change and political transformation.221 
Social entrepreneurship has received some criticism for its involvement with civil 
society, despite being viewed largely as a positive development meant to generate better 
outcomes than conventional models.222 Social entrepreneurship has been described as the 
‘marketization’ of civil society activities and collective action, and has thus been 
criticised for acting as ‘a mechanism by which business (and the state) can co-opt and 
compromise the integrity and independence of civil society’ instead of diversifying its 
social change models.223 By its nature, social entrepreneurship makes innovations in, and 
thereby disrupts, existing modi operandi of private, public and civil society approaches 
to social issues. Thus, because some of the aspects of social enterprises challenge civil 
society rationales,224 the potential does exist for them to disturb civil society organizations 
and their support bases.225 
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Regarding the Middle East specifically, this is a region which boasts a high degree 
of social capital (a necessary component for both social entrepreneurship and civil 
society) due to clientelism, religion, and neo-patrimonialism pervading state and social 
structures. In the Middle East, autocratic governments might view rapid expansion of 
civil society as a threat to their monopoly on power, because a large civil society is 
understood to be a precursor and necessary component of democratisation.226 Thus, it is 
probable that in this region, the concept of social entrepreneurship (once defined) is more 
easily understood and more readily accepted as a mechanism for social amelioration than 
civil society. Social entrepreneurship offers more concrete solutions and may pose a 
smaller challenge to state authority, because it is associated simply with change and not 
democratisation; it could be viewed as a technical, rather than political, establishment. 
 
A Comprehensive Definition of Social Entrepreneurship 
As is evident from the literature review above, academic studies of 
entrepreneurship are multifaceted and varied. Thus, the study of social entrepreneurship 
also generally lacks a common theoretical framework. The following section identifies 
three categories for the many aspects of social entrepreneurship: essential non-
distinguishing attributes, essential distinguishing attributes, and non-essential occasional 
attributes. Doing so brings clarity to this study and allows for more accurate identification 
of social enterprises. Carefully defining the aspects of social entrepreneurship also allows 
for the study to be replicated or expanded in future research. 
Briefly, entrepreneurship involves innovation, assumption of risk and/or 
uncertainty, autonomy in leadership and decision-making, and management and 
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investment of capital. Social entrepreneurship additionally must include social objectives 
and social value creation. On occasion, entrepreneurship of any type may involve aspects 
such as a dependency-provision cycle and the cooperation or involvement of society. 
 
Essential Non-Distinguishing Attributes 
These characteristics are not unique to social entrepreneurship, but are essential 
to entrepreneurship in general, and distinguish enterprises from regular businesses and 
other organizations and undertakings. 
Innovation: In keeping with the foundational scholarship on entrepreneurship, the 
social enterprise must be able to distinguish itself from similar or related undertakings 
with a characteristic that is new or different. 
Assumption of Risk and/or Uncertainty: The entrepreneur assumes the risk and/or 
uncertainty of the enterprise. The enterprise’s viability depends on the members’ efforts 
and their ability to secure resources, as well as prudent management of capital. However, 
although the enterprise assumes risk and/or uncertainty, its primary focus is opportunity. 
Autonomy in Leadership and Decision-Making: The enterprise is an autonomous 
project that is not managed, either directly or indirectly, by any other organization or 
authority, whether private or governmental. Thus, the enterprise may formulate its 
positions and organise its actions freely, as well as terminate the undertaking. The leaders 
of the enterprise manage, organise, and direct other members and resources.  
Management and Investment of Capital: The entrepreneur manages the capital 
necessary to produce the enterprise’s services and invests sufficient capital to ensure 
future operation of the enterprise. This can be in the form of financial, physical, human, 
or social capital. The latter in particular is a powerful tool which the entrepreneur may 
exploit. 
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Essential Distinguishing Attributes 
These characteristics differentiate social entrepreneurship from other forms of 
entrepreneurship such as business entrepreneurship or political entrepreneurship, i.e. 
these features make it inherently social.  
Social Objectives: The social enterprise aims to serve society, or a part of society, 
to some degree. Social entrepreneurs assess opportunities in terms of their possible social 
impact rather than wealth creation. 
Social Value Creation: The task of the entrepreneur is ‘creative destruction’ of 
existing norms in favour of change, which economic theory sees as normal and healthy. 
Essentially, social entrepreneurs exploit changes as opportunities for social value 
creation. 
 
Non-Essential, Occasional Attributes 
These characteristics are neither distinguishing nor essential but occur and define 
the function of the entrepreneur in social (or other) entrepreneurship in some cases. 
Dependency-Provision Cycle: The entrepreneur has identified a particular need in 
society and has engineered a way to position the enterprise as the sole, main, or best 
provider of the solution to those needs. In this way, society becomes dependent on the 
services provided by the entrepreneur, and likewise, the enterprise depends on society’s 
continued support of its objectives. 
Cooperation and/or Involvement of Society: The enterprise may function with, 
and actively encourage, the support of the society in which it operates. In this case, the 
participation of members of society may become crucial to the success of the enterprise’s 
goals. 
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Conclusion 
 Social entrepreneurs have likely always been a part of society, without necessarily 
having been identified explicitly as such. This chapter reviewed the literature on 
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship, tracing the origin of the term to the 15th 
century and following its evolution through the work of scholars such as Cantillon, 
Knight, Schumpeter, Menger, Smith, Skoll, and Barth, who identified the key aspects of 
entrepreneurship to be assumption of risk and/or uncertainty, innovation, decision-
making and leadership, and management and investment of capital. A consensus has also 
emerged that entrepreneurship is not necessarily the work of one person but can refer to 
a group of people or even a government. From the 1950s onwards, scholarship began 
identifying social aspects of entrepreneurship which could not be confined strictly to the 
economic sphere. These aspects, which are now seen as distinguishing social 
entrepreneurship, are social objectives, social value creation, and the cooperation of 
society (and potentially dependency-provision cycles). 
 The literature on social capital was also outlined, because social capital can be an 
integral part of social enterprises. The ideas of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam have 
defined the social capital field. They have demonstrated how social capital can be 
negative, exclusionary, and used as a method for social control, even though in many 
cases it enables the achievement of goals which could not have occurred without 
cooperation. 
 In addition, the chapter comments on social entrepreneurship in the Middle East 
and shows how various studies understand social enterprises as a solution to women’s 
empowerment, youth unemployment, and to increase civic engagement. These studies 
usually do not emphasize the trait of innovation, however, so the following chapters will 
address this. In addition, the chapter discussed the debate of whether social enterprises 
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are part of civil society and showed how social entrepreneurship can be disruptive in all 
types of arenas, including civil society. 
 Finally, the chapter offers a working definition of social entrepreneurship which 
informs this thesis and can be used to identify social enterprises during fieldwork should 
there be a need to expand or replicate the study. The next chapter provides an overview 
of Jordan’s domestic and international relations in order to contextualize the fieldwork 
findings and subsequent analysis. 
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Chapter 2: ‘Between Iraq and a Hard Place’227 
The Domestic and International Relations of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan 
 
Introduction 
Jordan’s Hashemite monarchs have played a careful balancing act since the 
founding of the kingdom. Due to the country’s dependence on mostly Western aid, its 
international policies have at times been at odds with its citizens. From the beginning, 
there were also tribal divisions; around 40 percent of the population is affiliated with one 
tribe or another, and tribal leaders continuously vie for powerful positions close to the 
king. Adding to this are the social cleavages between the country’s ‘Jordanian’ citizens 
and its citizens of Palestinian origin. Politically, the Islamist associations and parties have 
put considerable pressure on the monarchy as well. In response to social unrest, or the 
threat thereof, and to appease international aid donors, the monarchy has become either 
more repressive or more liberalized; simultaneously it has balanced the demands of the 
tribes, the Islamists, and others while dealing with high youth unemployment and various 
refugee crises.  
Bill and Springborg228 have argued that the Jordanian monarchy has become adept 
at strategically keeping potential opposition forces fragmented, which serves to hinder 
the development of strong power concentrations outside the ruler’s sphere.229 Whether 
the regime in Jordan has become a more resilient autocratic regime instead of moving 
towards political pluralism remains to be determined, but in any case, the intricacies of 
the monarchy’s international and domestic relations should be examined. This chapter 
first traces Jordan’s international relations and the history of its aid-dependency from the 
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establishment of the emirate of Transjordan in 1921. Next the course of the country’s 
halting liberalization process is outlined, followed by an exploration of the monarchy’s 
tense yet sometimes mutually beneficial relationship with the tribes, the Islamists, and the 
Palestinians. An understanding of these themes lends a solid background for discerning 
the environment in which civil society in Jordan has developed and operates. 
 
International Relations and Aid-Dependency 
The political-economy approach of scholars such as Shaikh, Choucair-Vizoso, 
Jamal, and Brand show that the Jordanian monarchy’s persistent role in establishing and 
maintaining positive relationships with international benefactors has played a significant 
role in maintaining the country’s stability and security. International aid levels to Jordan 
have fluctuated, depending on political alignments or differences and in response to 
threats.230 The United States, the European Union, and several Arab states have supported 
Jordan’s interests along with their own, but this assistance has been used as both a reward 
and a punishment.231   
Abdullah I, having just been installed on the throne of Transjordan as emir by the 
British in 1921, ruled over a resource-poor country with a small population of half a 
million, approximately half of which consisted of semi-nomadic tribes. Due to its 
underdeveloped economy and British regional plans, Jordan received a yearly subsidy 
from the United Kingdom.232 Jordan’s geographic position between Syria, Iraq, Israel, 
and Saudi Arabia has always been a vulnerability, as its neighbours have both limited its 
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manoeuvrability and occasionally posed direct threats.233 However, various superpowers 
and Jordan’s neighbours have also recognized the country’s geostrategic location as an 
advantage, and have thus invested diplomatic, financial, and military resources into 
supporting the Hashemite monarchy as a regional stabilizing force.234 It has served as a 
‘regional shock absorber’ between Saudi Arabia and Syria, and Israel and Iraq, and is also 
closely involved with the Israel-Palestine issue.235 By 1928, Jordan was recognized as 
instrumental to regional stability and peace.236 Likewise, the political, military, and 
economic support given to the kingdom over the years by Britain, the United States, the 
European Union, and its neighbouring countries has served as a stabilizing force for the 
monarchy. 
In the early years of Transjordan, Britain gave the monarchy an annual subsidy 
for infrastructure-building and to support the new emirate’s security apparatus, the Arab 
Legion. In return, Abdullah I was expected to contain tribal violence and ‘expel political 
undesirables.’ This was the beginning of Jordan’s hierarchical relationship with external 
powers, as it became clear that the monarchy ‘was first accountable to its external patron, 
and only then to its own citizens.’237 The Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty was signed in 
1946 when Transjordan was granted independence and Abdullah I became king. This 
treaty was similar to previous agreements: in return for subsidies and funds for the Arab 
Legion, Transjordan agreed to having British military facilities within its borders for 25 
years.238 In 1949, the United States established diplomatic relations with Jordan. King 
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Abdullah I sought closer ties to the US to decrease his vulnerability in the face of Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia’s ridicule of the artificially created Transjordan. Diplomatic ties 
between Jordan and the US increased in the following decades.239  
Following King Abdullah I’s assassination in 1951, Prince Talal ruled Jordan for 
several years but was succeeded in 1953 by his son, Hussein. King Hussein understood 
that his rule would be in jeopardy without British support for the monarchy. Jordan was 
soon caught between Egypt’s vision of non-alignment and Iraq, which signed the 
Baghdad Pact with the US and Britain in 1955. King Hussein considered joining the Pact, 
but in the face of massive demonstrations, he announced he would not join after all. He 
backed Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis and argued for war with Israel, despite prime 
minister Nabulsi’s reminders of his obligations to Britain and the benefits of British 
subsidies. In favour of pan-Arab nationalism, and following pledges by Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Syria to subsidize the kingdom, Hussein broke ties with London. However, 
Jordan found itself in a difficult position as only Saudi Arabia paid any part of its pledge. 
The new US Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 offered Jordan a chance to once again align 
with a superpower, and King Hussein requested $30 million in aid, which replaced British 
aid.240 Jordan relied heavily on the United States for aid by the 1960s, and US aid helped 
the country to weather challenges such as the 1970 civil war, the Lebanese Civil War of 
the 1970s, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War beginning in 1981, and Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  
In March 1979, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, and when King Hussein 
refused to do the same, the United States terminated its aid package to Jordan.241 Jordan’s 
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subsequent economic struggles demonstrated the country’s heavy reliance and 
dependence on the United States.242 At the same time, the Gulf states redirected their aid 
from Jordan to Iraq to support its war against Iran. The country’s debt struggles and 
resulting austerity measures led to popular protests in the late 1980s. In 1989, Jordan 
defaulted on its foreign debt and took on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan with 
strict conditions, which led to popular unrest.243 Jordan and Iraq’s strong economic ties 
constrained Amman significantly when the Gulf War broke out in August 1990. Jordan 
did not join the US-led coalition against Iraq, but it did call for its withdrawal from Kuwait 
and rejected its annexation claim. This cautious stance allowed King Hussein to retain his 
domestic popularity, but the US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia halted their aid, which led to 
severe economic repercussions for Jordan.244 
King Hussein thus realised that a rupture in US-Jordanian ties brought great 
instability and economic losses. His participation in the 1993 Oslo Accords gave Jordan 
the political cover to make an accommodation with Israel. Jordan finally signed a peace 
treaty with Israel in 1994, which resulted in a resumption of US aid packages, millions of 
dollars in debt cancellation by the United States, Britain, Germany, and France, and a 
partnership agreement with the European Union. The United States also added Jordan to 
the ‘major non-NATO-ally’ agreement in 1996.245 In 1997, Jordan entered the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, and received over €570 million between that year and 
2008.246   
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King Abdullah II, who succeeded his father in 1999, knew that strategic aid 
packages from abroad were one of the best ways to aid his country’s economy. He 
strengthened Jordan’s ties to the United States as well as major economic institutions such 
as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. In addition, 
Abdullah II’s strong support for the US after the September 11 attacks, American 
‘democratic values’, and the subsequent Iraq War garnered Jordan a free trade agreement 
and the qualified industrial zone program with the United States, which is now Jordan’s 
largest trading partner.247 Another key trading partner is Saudi Arabia, usually a US ally, 
and 80% of Jordan’s imports originate in Saudi Arabia’s energy sector. Thus, Jordan 
depends on the United States and its allies for trade in addition to strategic rents.248  
Besides economic ties, the United States and Jordan shared intelligence 
information on al-Qaeda, and Jordan allowed the US military to attack Iraq from its 
territories in 2003.249 Jordan’s support for American counterterrorism and general US 
regional strategic interests has created a closer relationship with the United States, and 
the monarchy has been rewarded with increased financial largesse. Total US assistance 
increased from $228 million to $818 million between 2001 and 2010.250 From 2011 
through 2016 alone, Jordan received $6.62 billion in assorted US aid.251 Military 
assistance grants have been used to purchase F-16 fighter aircraft, Black Hawk 
helicopters, missiles, and to build a counterterrorism operations centre.252  
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The Halting Political Liberalization Process 
Brand and other scholars warn against optimism regarding the political 
liberalization process in Jordan. They argue that this process has historically been 
carefully managed from above as a way to keep a delicate balance between appeasing the 
population, satisfying Western benefactors’ demands for increased political openness, 
and maintaining security and stability for the country and the monarchy.253 Ottaway 
additionally argues that reform does not equal liberalization as long as the institutions of 
the state remain unresponsive to citizens.254 Despite the formation of parties and other 
indicators of liberalization in Jordan, civil society institutions are not yet very robust, and 
any state-directed liberalization has ebbed and flowed with the needs of the 
government.255 As Shaikh demonstrates, the monarchy simply introduced reforms 
incrementally in response to popular demands, pressure from opposition movements, and 
foreign governments.256  
One of the main issues in Jordan is that over the years the state ‘developed a strong 
allocative as opposed to extractive role’, meaning that instead of relying on taxes to 
survive, it distributes income from benefactors by expanding the bureaucracy, military, 
and security services, as well as developing the infrastructure.257 As outlined in the 
previous section, the monarchy has relied on foreign aid for support, initially depending 
on British subsidies and then aid from the United States and conservative Arab states such 
as Saudi Arabia. The monarchy built a support base from the payoffs it could give from 
external assistance.258 Bush argues that King Abdullah II has been particularly skilled at 
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blending promises of reform and changes in government at home with requests for aid to 
sustain his regime abroad; he has adopted ‘the language but not the substance of 
democracy’.259  
Historically, the monarchy has responded to challenges by sharply containing the 
political sphere. Political party activity was legal in 1955 and 1956, but the coup attempt 
of 1957 led to the state imposing martial law and outlawing political parties altogether.260 
Parties remained illegal despite a slight increase in political freedom between 1967 and 
1970, and they were forced to remain underground until 1989, which marks the beginning 
of the liberalization process.261 The constitution formally recognized freedom of 
expression and assembly, but after the 1967 war, penal and press laws were enacted to 
prevent criticism of the monarchs, the armed forces, and Jordan’s foreign policy. The 
General Intelligence Department (GID, or Mukhabarat) helped to suppress political 
activity during the following years. Parliament was also dissolved multiple times when 
the monarchy was faced with potential opposition and controversial legislation, notably 
between 1968 and 1989.262 Despite these factors, key civil society institutions were able 
to operate. Professional organizations, such as lawyers’, doctors’, and engineers’ unions, 
which drew from Jordanians as well as Palestinians, remained active despite regime 
pressure. Labour unions and women’s unions were less able to serve their constituencies 
because they were ‘intimidated and co-opted by the state’.263  
In the 1980s, the loss of the United States’ economic aid (punishment for not 
signing a peace treaty with Israel), combined with defaulting on its debt, led to Jordan 
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accepting an IMF loan with strict austerity measures. This led to civil disturbances even 
among areas traditionally supportive of the monarchy, and rioters demanded that the 
government resign and hold new elections as well as punish corrupt officials. The 
monarchy was shaken by this and realized the importance of nationalist legitimation. In 
order to appease citizens, some liberalization in the political sphere was allowed.264 One 
of the most significant developments was the parliamentary election of 1989, which was 
held for the first time in over 30 years. Independent candidates were allowed to campaign, 
albeit parties were still outlawed. Islamist candidates gained close to 40 percent of 
parliamentary seats.265  
After the 1989 parliamentary elections, parties could operate more openly, and 
finally were able to register formally following the ratification of the National Charter in 
1991.266 In 1990 King Hussein had appointed a royal commission which included leftist 
and Islamist parties, to draft the Charter. It was not a new constitution, but it did open 
Jordanian politics to the creation of parties which operated within defined limits, and 
lifted martial law. In addition, the government relaxed demonstration restrictions and 
allowed political exiles to return.267 In 1992, the prime minister and parliament passed 
the Political Parties Law which legalized parties, but required them to recognize the 
legitimacy of the monarchy in order to register.268 A new Press and Publications law lifted 
some restrictions on print media in 1993. Although the law was criticized at the time, it 
is now recognized as the most liberal Jordan has had.269  
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The liberalization process under King Hussein was short-lived, however, and by 
increasing its international patronage networks, the monarchy was able to entrench in the 
1990s.270 As a reward for signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Hussein sought 
foreign aid and investments and debt reduction, a position which garnered considerable 
opposition by the Jordanian public. The government sharply curbed the ‘liberalization 
experiment’ and decided to depend on external support rather than domestic 
legitimation.271 To decrease the influence of the opposition, notably the Islamists, the 
regime began curbing political liberties. The 1993 ‘one-person-one-vote’ amendment to 
the electoral law was aimed at the monarchy’s key opponents; it undermined large parties 
and bolstered tribal parties, who were traditionally loyal to the monarchy.272 In 1997, a 
law increased restrictions on newspapers, as well as the restrictions on content they could 
publish. (In 1999, a more liberal law that reduced these restrictions was passed in response 
to international criticism). By the time King Hussein died in 1999, it had become clear 
that liberalization efforts were a tactic to reduce opposition to unpopular economic and 
political policies.273 Civil society certainly made some gains after 1989. The emergence 
of political parties was accompanied by greater freedom of expression and the 
development of political satire, increased respect for human rights, and many open 
conferences and discussions on politics.274 However, these gains aside, the monarchy was 
engaged in ‘managed liberalization’ which encouraged popular participation, but placed 
‘clear limits on the range of expression and activity to be permitted.’275 King Hussein did 
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not aim to truly decentralize authority – this was a tactic meant to ensure stability and 
order, as much for the country as for the monarchy, and was an obstacle to true 
liberalization and responsiveness.  
There were some expectations that King Abdullah II would move forward with 
reform when he acceded to the throne in February 1999. When he opened the parliament 
in November, he proclaimed that democratic reforms were a ‘national and unwavering 
choice’, but it was soon clear that economic reform and regime stability would trump 
political reform. Abdullah II initially focused his efforts in much the same way his father 
had: by strengthening the monarchy’s support base and promoting national unity.276 
Indeed, just a few years after becoming king, security concerns led Abdullah II to restrict 
political activity. Regional pressure had increased due to the collapse of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process and the United States’ plans for a war in Iraq. Parliamentary 
elections originally scheduled for 2001 were first postponed to implement a new electoral 
law and then because ‘the regional climate was difficult’. The regime was likely 
concerned with criticism and public opposition to its quiet support of the war in Iraq. Due 
to foreign aid, Abdullah II did not have to rely on public taxes and backing, and was able 
to keep opposition minimal with rents to key supporters in the tribes.277 While parliament 
was suspended from 2001 until 2003, Abdullah II issued over 200 provisional laws, many 
of which were a blow to civil liberties. For example, the 2001 public gatherings law 
banned rallies and public meetings without a permit, few of which were ever granted. 
Amendments to the penal code imposed fines and prison sentences for publications with 
‘false or libellous information that can undermine national unity or the country’s 
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reputation’. There were also restrictions to citizens’ access to fair civil trials and limits to 
professional associations’ activities.278  
In 2002, King Abdullah II began to take steps to refocus attention from regional 
issues to domestic issues such as economic development, modernization, and political 
reform. Among his efforts are the 2002 ‘Jordan First’ initiative, the 2003 establishment 
of a ministry of political development, and the 2006 ‘National Agenda’. These include 
specific recommendations regarding economic advancement and modernization but are 
vague about political change.279 At the same time, however, political rights were 
restricted. In 2005, professional organizations were ordered to halt all political activities 
and work only to promote their members’ skills and work. Two other laws meant to 
restrict associations and political parties were proposed that year, but the king dissolved 
the parliament before they could be enacted in response to public outcry. The 2007 
elections were considered unfair, with independent organizations reporting that the 
government had been involved in vote-rigging.280 In 2009, the king dissolved parliament 
again.281  
In response to international criticism, Jordan began to adopt some democratic 
institutions and practices to satisfy its Western aid donors. Parliamentary elections were 
held in 2010 and 2013, and international election monitors were invited to observe the 
process. In addition, the quota for women in parliament was doubled from its 2003 
number in 2010. The government also created human rights and women’s organizations, 
although these are tied to the government.282 These reform practices were designed to 
‘maintain a veneer of political openness and moderation that allows Jordan to pose (with 
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a special eye on Western donor countries) as a modern and relatively progressive polity 
amid the surrounding turmoil of the troubled Middle East.’283 The reforms did not target 
the distribution of political power; the relationship between citizens and the regime 
remained the same. The royal court and security services continued to make the 
substantive decisions, albeit public grievances could be expressed through parliament.284 
The king could, at will, dissolve parliament and delay elections, issue temporary laws 
without parliamentary consent, and gave parliament little authority to make laws. 
Freedom of expression and assembly were also sharply restricted and survey respondents 
stated that they were ‘afraid to criticise their government.’285 These domestic constraints 
and international factors impacted local and international organizations’ ability to 
function as liberalizing agents.286  
Regional instability repeatedly placed security, stability, and economic growth 
efforts above political reform; combined with a weak opposition and a strong support 
base for the regime, meaningful reform has been minimal at best. However, economically, 
King Abdullah II’s policies have been a great advantage to Jordan. The United States 
values Jordan’s stability and dependability, and European states have similarly 
recognized the country’s ‘stabilizing and modernizing’ force in the region, as well as its 
significant role in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States 
has rewarded Jordan’s ‘stability’ with annual grants of $450 million since the beginning 
of the Iraq War, in addition to $1 billion meant to aid the country’s security and bolster 
its economy. Jordan also received over €570 million from the European Union’s Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership between 1997 and 2007.287 In 2010, Jordan received a $275 
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million grant from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation and a €223 million aid 
package from the European Union for having made ‘significant progress in the area of 
governance and transparency’.288 The US additionally gave Jordan $258 million in 
economic aid and $380 million in military aid.289 None of this aid was conditional on 
domestic political reform in Jordan.  
In line with regional turmoil now known as the ‘Arab Spring’, beginning in mid-
January 2011, regular protests occurred in Jordan, but did not reach the same intensity as 
in neighbouring countries. The demonstrations highlighted Jordan’s political, economic, 
and social instabilities, and focused on economic and political inequality, and the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF) called for constitutional reform.290 In response, King Abdullah II 
announced new reform programs, dismissed his cabinet, and replaced prime minister 
Samir Rifai with Marouf al-Bakhit. However, these changes appeared as superficial as in 
previous instances. The new cabinet retained six former key ministers, and Al-Bakhit was 
a ‘member of the old guard’.291 The March 2011 creation of the National Dialogue 
Committee, charged with revising the electoral and political party laws and amending the 
constitution, was a more meaningful development. In June, Abdullah II pledged that 
future parliaments would have ‘active political party representation… that allows the 
formation of governments based on parliamentary majority’, and that corruption would 
be addressed.292 Opposition parties were not appeased, however, and various IAF 
members stated that the king had promised nothing new, and that no specifics or 
guarantees given. Unsatisfied by the electoral law proposed by the National Dialogue 
Committee, the IAF, the Jordanian Communist Party, the Jordanian Democratic Popular 
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Unity Party, two Ba’athist groups, the National Party, the Jordanian Women’s Union and 
the Social Left movement created the National Front for Reform (NFR). The NFR was a 
reform coalition that called for constitutional amendments, anticorruption efforts, 
government accountability, greater press freedoms, improvements in education, and other 
economic, security, and legal reforms.293 In August 2011, the king announced 
constitutional amendments proposed by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, 
which are the most significant changes to the constitution since its drafting in 1952.294 
Meanwhile, Jordan continued to successfully request and receive foreign aid from its 
usual donors, and the country remained stable, especially relative to others in the 
region.295 The price for this stability has been the perpetuation of the status quo.296  
 
Tribalism and Patrimonialism  
Neo-patrimonialism persists in Jordan and is most evident in the monarchy’s 
continuing emphasis on the importance of tribal identity, which has its roots in the 1921 
founding of Transjordan. Various scholars have argued that the tribes provide the 
foundation of legitimacy for the Jordanian monarchy and constitute a key part of the 
Jordanian security forces, and thus form one of the main pillars of stability for the 
Hashemites.297 Al-Oudat and Alshboul refer to the symbiotic relationship between the 
Hashemite kings and the tribes.298 They argue that, because ‘the king’s social legitimacy 
derives from traditional claims of kinship, religion and historical performance’, the 
monarchs, who in a sense are considered tribal leaders, have worked closely with the 
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Bedouins, thus affording them institutional legitimacy in the legal processes. As a result, 
the tribes have received state support and sponsorship in return for their support of the 
monarchy in trying times, and indeed tribal leaders have historically been among the 
Hashemites’ most loyal supporters.299  
Tribal members’ dominance in the security forces has contributed to the 
continuation and survival of the regime.300 While tribes in many other regions of the 
Middle East historically rebelled against the central government’s authority, the opposite 
has been true of the Bedouins in Jordan. Shortly after the founding of Transjordan, the 
British established and founded a police force and army which were combined to form 
the Arab Legion in 1923. Recruitment was not universal; rather, members of the Bedouin 
tribes of the south were sought to create a carefully cultivated alliance between the new 
monarch and the tribes. This provided poor sectors with employment and enforced the 
legitimacy of the new state among the groups of Jordan’s south. It also established a 
patron-client pattern that continued after the departure of the British, which still serves as 
‘the bedrock of regime support’.301 The tribes have formed an intricate bond between 
themselves, the monarchy, and the military, from their integration into the Arab Legion 
(renamed in 1956 to the Arab Army and now called the Jordanian Armed Forces) in the 
1930s, and their entrance into various civil service branches.302 The Jordanian monarchy 
still relies heavily on its military’s expansive political role; the professional army has 
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reached great capacity for maintaining domestic stability and protecting regime 
interests.303   
Most of the security forces continue to be recruited from the tribes due to their 
enduring loyalty and commitment to the state. They thus constitute a significant aspect of 
Jordan’s stability. The country’s population of 9.5 million is low relative to that of its 
neighbours; Syria for example has a population of 18.4 million and Egypt has a population 
of 95.6 million,304 but Jordan’s security organizations are large for its size and need only 
control a relatively small territory, with only the northern part of the kingdom being 
densely populated. Thus, the population can be controlled ‘with relative ease.’305  
Additionally, the monarchy has ‘cultivated tribal identity as a symbol of Jordan’s 
unique national identity’ and has adopted the ‘familial and tribal identities into the greater 
Jordanian identity’.306 The tribes have accepted this identity and view the state as the 
representative of the Jordanians (as opposed to the Palestinians). They are generally 
committed to ensuring the security and welfare of the kingdom. Although the tribes’ 
political autonomy has weakened considerably, the tradition of family loyalty has 
remained, and Transjordanians have a systemic advantage over Palestinians in matters of 
government employment. Susser refers to this as a ‘bedoucracy’ which perpetuates 
itself.307  
Despite having transformed from a predominantly tribal, rural, and colonial 
creation to a predominantly urban and economically modern state in the past decades, 
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Jordan’s society is still heavily influenced by tribal values. The family and the tribe are 
among the most prominent institutions in Jordan, as evidenced by the political system.308 
King Abdullah I aimed to act as an ‘honest broker’ among the tribes and other prominent 
families, and his successors have followed suit. It appears that the monarchy has made a 
strategic choice not to marry into the Jordanian tribes to maintain its neutral position. 
Thus far, royal spouses have been Hashemites, foreigners, or Palestinians. Another 
indication of the careful neutrality the monarchy has sought to uphold becomes clear 
when senior government positions are appointed. The various tribal families seek power 
and influence while serving the Hashemites, and thus pursue positions as close to the king 
as possible. Once appointed, these families’ elites remain in their positions for a short 
time before the positions are rotated to representatives of other families. Thus, it appears 
that one of the king’s main domestic concerns is to maintain a careful balance between 
the elite tribal family members, whose connections to their corresponding tribal 
constituencies make them highly influential. It also seems that many of the same families 
who supported King Abdullah I, now, in their third generation, support King Abdullah 
II.309  
The Hashemite monarchy has strategically used legal amendments to use the 
tribes’ support to its advantage, even following periods of liberalization such as the years 
between 1989 and 1993. This is evident, for example, in the key role of the tribes in the 
1993 elections, when an amendment to an election law was introduced by the monarchy 
to reduce its opponents’ influence.310 The Islamist parties had been increasingly well-
organized and popular, and so in August 1993 the election law was amended.311 The 
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amendment restricted each voter to choosing only one candidate, no matter the number 
of seats to be filled, and became known as the ‘one-person one-vote law’. Previously 
voters could cast as many votes as there were seats in their district.312 The amendment 
was aimed at curtailing any strong opposition movement, and it succeeded: as voters 
could make only one choice, they tended to choose the candidates they knew personally 
and thereby reinforced tribal representation at the expense of urban parties.313 In addition, 
deliberate gerrymandering enforced by the 1993 and 2003 electoral laws in Jordan has 
been used to manage opposition groups. Greater access to parliament has been ensured 
for those from traditional bases of support for the regime. Due to proportional over-
representation, the rural and tribal districts have more members and greater influence in 
Parliament than the urban and Palestinian-dominated districts.314  
 
Islam and the Islamists 
The legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan stems in large part from the 
king’s Islamic credentials. Since its founding in 1923, Islam has been nurtured as a 
powerful state-building tool. King Abdullah I’s nationalism was both religious and ethnic. 
He held a hereditary religious office in Mecca, which helped him to gain support for 
taking a leading role in the Arab revolt against the Ottomans in the first World War. As 
Emir of Transjordan and later king of Jordan, Abdullah I established an enduring pattern 
of cooperation between the monarchy and Islam. Islam is the state religion, and the king 
still exercises the role of protector and benefactor of Islam.315 Abdullah I emphasized the 
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important cultural and religious role of Islam in his new state and stressed the need for 
religious lessons in schools. King Hussein continued Abdullah I’s policies and 
encouraged the building of mosques. He also encouraged Islam in society and everyday 
life. The emphasis on Islam also had a political utility. Because Jordan was dependent on 
British support until 1953, critics argued that it was too dependent on Western powers. 
The Hashemite monarchs’ legitimacy was bolstered by their strong Islamic roots.316  
Jordan has given Islamists more freedom and autonomy in social and political 
activities than most other Arab states; it is one of the few Arab states where the Muslim 
Brotherhood has had legal standing and where the organization has not been repressed, 
though individual members have been persecuted.317 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
is dominated by the professional elite and the middle class, as well as some tribal leaders. 
In the early years of the kingdom, the Brotherhood’s leaders frequently met with the king 
for political consultation.318 The ‘alliance’ that the monarchy has with the Muslim 
Brotherhood has helped the monarchy in domestic and foreign issues. The Brotherhood’s 
‘pan-Islamic, modernist and activist approach’ was instrumental in helping Abdullah I 
gain respect in the region, and in return, it obtained legal status as a charitable society in 
1945 and broader legal status as ‘a general and comprehensive Islamic committee’ in 
1953.319 Despite a ban on political party activities following a failed coup against King 
Hussein in 1957, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue its activities as a 
humanitarian and educational institution, and it ran schools, a hospital, and other 
clinics.320 While party politics were suspended, the Brotherhood was still able to create a 
political space close to the regime. Hussein’s willingness to allow the Islamists some 
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degree of freedom served him well in using the Brotherhood as a counterweight to 
Egypt’s Gamal Abd al Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s.321 In 
return, King Hussein allowed the Brotherhood to spread its influence throughout 
Jordanian society, and gave its members influential positions in economic, cultural, and 
financial institutions.322  
Although usually a loyal supporter of the monarchy, the Muslim Brotherhood did 
sometimes criticize policies. For example, when in 1958 the monarchy agreed to a British 
military presence in response to the threat of pan-Arab nationalism and the overthrow of 
the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood protested. The Brotherhood 
also became increasingly critical in the time leading up to the 1980 crisis with Syria, and 
the king blamed the Brotherhood for its inflammatory role and arrested several of its 
members. This began a period of tension between the monarchy and the Brotherhood, but 
this did not last. Near the end of the 1980s, dialogue and accommodation had increased 
and the Brotherhood participated in the 1989 election campaign.323 Involving the Muslim 
Brotherhood was advantageous to the monarchy during this period as protests over 
economic issues had spread even to areas in which the Brotherhood was prevalent. King 
Hussein promised liberalization and an election was scheduled, although political parties 
were still outlawed. This election enhanced the Islamist parties’ role as they were 
parliament’s largest bloc in elections that year, winning nearly half of the seats.324   
The Brotherhood’s entry into politics as a political opposition movement rather 
than supporters of the monarchy tested the nature of the traditional relationship between 
the king and the Islamists, however.325 The organization was still restricted in some ways, 
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but during the Gulf crisis, it organized anti-American rallies and demonstrations with 
nationalists and secularists. In an attempt to moderate the Brotherhood’s views and 
activities, King Hussein gave seven cabinet positions to the Islamists, among which were 
the ministries of justice, religious affairs, education, and social development. The king’s 
willingness for dialogue and openness for a greater role for Islamists in government eased 
a tense situation.326  
In 1992, after a new law was passed on political parties, the Islamic Action Front 
Party (IAF) was formed. It united Muslim Brotherhood members with other Islamists 
who wanted Islam to play a larger role in politics. The Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF 
remained distinct organizations, however.327 In their new role as political actors in the 
IAF, Jordan’s Islamists needed to redefine their relationship with the monarchy to avoid 
unproductive confrontation while maintaining a strong independent position. Because 
Jordanian society was already mostly conservative and Islamic, the IAF elected to focus 
on foreign affairs and issues such as human rights and corruption.328  
The 1993 amendment to the electoral law, discussed previously, resulted in a 
setback for Islamists and a corresponding advantage for tribal candidates. Tribal 
representation was deliberately increased at the expense of the more organized urban 
Brotherhood.329 The 1994 peace treaty with Israel was an additional shock and many 
Islamists viewed it as discrediting the government.330 Further dissatisfaction among 
Islamists arose in 1997 when the elections appeared rigged; the Islamic Action Front 
called for a boycott of the elections, but in the end, a few Islamist candidates were elected 
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after all.331 The IAF pointed to ‘the deterioration of democracy’ due to the changes in 
voting and press laws and stated that ‘boycotting the 1997 elections is necessary to 
establish democracy and protect the homeland’.332 Built-up frustration throughout the 
Islamist stream led to a split between older moderate members and younger members 
who wished the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF to be a stronger voice of opposition. By 
the end of the 1990s, four currents had developed within the Islamist movement in Jordan: 
the pragmatists, who advocated working with the government by consensus; the activists, 
who emphasized political reforms, international Arab solidarity and ‘non-normalization’ 
with Israel; traditional conservatives, who worked for cultural, legal, and social matters, 
and the ultra-conservatives, who were ‘were doctrinaire on social issues and rejectionist 
concerning foreign policy.’333  
In 1999, King Abdullah II inherited a deliberalizing government. On the advice 
of the military, and to court United States approval, he expelled the leaders of Hamas. 
Security forces conducted a widespread search for Islamist terrorists who followed 
Osama bin Laden. Despite these intimidating tactics, the monarchy continued its dialogue 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and its political sector, the IAF. Both of these organizations 
had advocated for pragmatism, openness, and pluralism in their political agendas from 
1989 onwards, and they were thus not targeted by the monarchy’s expulsion efforts. Over 
the past decades both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF have continued to embrace 
moderation, especially regarding political issues, even declaring a commitment to 
democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood’s understanding of democracy is evident in its 1997 
statement to boycott the elections; it outlined three ‘bases’ of democracy as follows: ‘(1) 
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elected representative governing institutions, (2) a free press and freedom of expression, 
and (3) “political pluralism and parties.”’334 The IAF placed itself alongside leftists, 
nationalists, secularists, liberals, and even tribal leaders when it signed on to the National 
Charter of 1991. Since then, the Islamists have cooperated with other groups, and the IAF 
has been flexible with its social principles when necessitated by politics. Despite having 
boycotted the 1997 elections, the IAF was convinced to participate in the 2003 and 2007 
elections. It downplayed its conservative social visions before the 2007 elections and 
instead emphasized governance and corruption issues in its agenda in an attempt to gain 
more votes.335 It has also been a priority for the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF to 
disassociate from terrorism and violence. Their non-violent position was made very clear 
during terrorist incidents in the early 2000s, which were linked to the insurgency in Iraq. 
No Muslim Brotherhood or IAF members were implicated in these events and they 
condemned the violence strongly.336 In addition, Islamists in business and financial 
positions supported Abdullah II in his efforts to globalize the economy, even though they 
participated only tangentially in the reform process.337  
Close, relatively constructive ties between the Islamists and the monarchy have 
acted as a moderating and cohesive force in Jordan. Ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
then the IAF helped the monarchy deal with periods of unrest and likewise spared the 
Islamists the repression their counterparts in other countries faced.338 It has thus been a 
mutually cooperative relationship not dissimilar from the symbiotic relationship between 
the tribal entities and the monarchy. 
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The Palestinians in Jordan 
An additional social and demographic challenge facing the Hashemite monarchy 
is its Palestinian population. There are estimates that 50 to 65 percent of the Jordanian 
population is of Palestinian origin.339 There are social and economic cleavages between 
the Palestinian and non-Palestinian population, one of which is that the Palestinians have 
become the business elite whereas non-Palestinians are less well-off financially.340  
Palestinian refugees arrived in waves beginning in 1948 and their presence 
brought ‘an urbanized, educated, and politicized element’ with no particular loyalty to the 
monarchy into Jordan. Many of these families made a fortune during the 1970s oil boom 
and have therefore developed an interest in the monarchy’s stability.341 Since then, the 
large population of Palestinians has been a defining element of Jordan’s domestic politics 
and social affairs. The government offered citizenship to the Palestinian refugees of the 
1948 war and after the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, but they nevertheless 
felt they were treated unfairly.342 In particular those families who arrived as refugees in 
1967 and are still living in camps have been less interested in merging with the Jordanian 
identity, but they only comprise 10 percent of Palestinians in Jordan.343 Wealthier 
Palestinians who came to Jordan from Kuwait during the 1990 Iraqi invasion integrated 
more and became part of the economic elite. Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who live in 
urban areas, still remain underrepresented in politics, the public sector, and the armed 
forces as the monarchy has favoured rural, pro-monarchy districts.344  
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The presence of such a high percentage of Palestinians created a long-lasting 
debate in Jordanian politics concerning Jordanian identity.345 The Palestinians ‘do not fit 
into either the country’s mainstream historical narrative or the political status quo that the 
narrative serves.’ Both King Hussein and King Abdullah II have tried to integrate the 
Palestinians into Jordanian society and identity by giving them a sense of belonging and 
a stake in the country’s stability. Most Palestinians wish to become full citizens and are 
dissatisfied with the occasional government positions they are given due to their 
professional skills. They would rather ‘become full partners in the administration of the 
state’s affairs by virtue of their civil right, and not as a favour given to a guest,’ or to fill 
a passing political need. On the other hand, non-Palestinian Jordanians are wary of the 
Palestinians’ demographic and economic strengths.346  
King Abdullah II followed in his father’s footsteps by referring to citizens as 
‘Jordanians of their various origins;’ Hussein had called them Jordanians ‘from every 
origin and of any descent’ to try to help foster a unified national identity. When he became 
king, Abdullah II spoke in favour of integrating more Palestinians into the political 
establishment, but this was put on hold due to the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000.347 In 2005, 
Abdullah II established a committee to create a national agenda for cohesion between 
Jordanians and to create ‘balanced representation.’ The king has found himself in a 
difficult situation, however. On the one hand, integrating Palestinian citizens more fully 
into all parts of government would likely serve his long-term interests well, but on the 
other hand, this absorption would have to come at the expense of the ruling establishment 
to whom the Hashemites have owed their rule for several generations. As a result, the 
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national agenda was made public but has been dropped from national discourse. It is 
important to remember, though, that the rift between Jordanians and Palestinians is 
superficial, and that their shared history, religion, culture, language, and historical 
political ties are strong bulwarks against any real rift. If there are social lines in Jordan, 
they have less to do with Jordanian and Palestinian identities and more with religious and 
communal differences.348  
 
The Development of Civil Society 
There are various definitions of civil society, but the term is generally understood 
to be the various ‘associational forms that occupy the terrain between individuals and the 
state.’ Civil society refers to ‘collective empowerment that enhances the ability of citizens 
to protect their interests and rights from arbitrary or capricious state power.’349 In theory, 
the development of a vibrant and robust civil society is seen as a necessary precursor to 
democratic transitions, and a remedy to authoritarian rule. The United States in particular 
allocates substantial resources to civil society organizations in the Middle East to promote 
democratic reform in the region;350 since the early 2000s, Jordan has also benefited from 
these efforts. In practice, the equation is more complex and shoring up civil society 
institutions has not (yet) delivered the expected results.351  
The previous sections demonstrate that Jordan’s civil society development has 
been impacted both by domestic upheavals and the security role that Jordan has played 
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over the years for Britain, the United States, and its Arab neighbours, depending on the 
period. The subsidies that the state received created and reinforced the roles of the security 
forces, and Jordan’s international political alignments raised tensions with its citizens on 
several occasions. In response to domestic upheavals, the monarchy repeatedly curbed 
the activity of civil society organizations, most notably politically oriented organizations. 
However, despite the long the period of martial law before 1989, during which political 
party activity was outlawed, professional organizations, trade unions, charitable societies, 
religious organizations, community development groups, and even the Muslim 
Brotherhood were allowed to function as civil society organizations, although any activity 
that was seen to be challenging the state was outlawed.352 In the early 1970s, King 
Hussein also established the Jordanian National Union, which was open to all except 
communists and Marxists. The Union was not meant to be a political party but rather a 
formal space for Jordanians to express their opinions on political matters. In 1978 a 
consultative council was created that could submit recommendations to the cabinet, but 
the council’s decisions were not binding. Nevertheless, both the Union and the 
consultative council represent the earliest stages of the creation of a space for political 
participation in Jordan.353  
In 1989, a process of liberalization began that led to ‘unprecedented gains’ for 
civil society in Jordan. This was marked by the legalization and development of political 
parties, free and regular parliamentary elections, greater respect for human rights 
including freedoms of expression and for the press, the development of political satire, 
and the ability for citizens to hold discussions and conferences on politics and civil 
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matters.354 Despite these positive developments, Brand argues, ‘the king and his advisors 
are involved in a process of “managed liberalization.”’ While civil society has been 
allowed to grow and citizens have been encouraged to participate in the political process, 
there are no concrete plans to decentralize authority.355 Milton-Edwards agrees, observing 
that the political reform process in Jordan has been ‘slow, incremental and completely 
dictated by the palace and ultimately the monarch.’356 This kind of reform is called ‘top-
down’ reform and, because the reform process begun in 1989 began in response to 
domestic unrest,357 Milton-Edwards points to an argument put forth by Huntington: an 
‘oligarchy will choose democratization over other options [such as repression] “as a 
means to other goals, such as prolonging their own rule, achieving international 
legitimacy, and minimizing domestic opposition.”’358 She therefore concludes that 
Jordan’s liberalization efforts were tightly controlled and determined by King Hussein’s 
own political agenda, rather than a desire to move to popular sovereignty. Mufti adds that 
Jordan’s liberalization process is made up of a ‘series of bargains between government 
and [Islamist] opposition elites.’359 Robinson explains that Jordan’s political 
liberalization ‘is best understood as a series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain 
elite privilege’, in which the regime implemented reforms to ensure its own survival, 
without altering the core power structures.360  
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For Jordan’s civil society, this context presents deep-rooted challenges. Civil 
society is always regulated by a certain system of law, whether in a democratic or 
authoritarian context, that constrain and regulate its activities through a system of 
regulations such as tax codes and permit requirements. This means that ‘civil society is 
never autonomous from the state; it has only varying degrees of independence.’361 The 
Jordanian monarchy, faced with multiple international and domestic challenges, has 
permitted civil society to grow in a very controlled manner since the 1990s. Civil society 
organizations in Jordan are subjected to many bureaucratic regulations and legal codes 
which allow the regime to monitor these organizations; thus the regime ‘utilizes the 
growth of civil society institutions through non-governmental organizations to enhance 
state social control using order and visibility.’362 This tactic was begun under King 
Hussein and has continued with King Abdullah II since his accession to the throne in 
1999. This serves to maintain the power and stability of the regime, allows citizens to 
participate in collective action, and appeases international aid donors who increasingly 
expect democratization efforts, but it does not truly empower citizens. When civil society 
has been co-opted by the regime, collective action becomes ‘predictable, transparent, and 
thus controllable.’363 The effectiveness of civil society in this instance remains inherently 
limited, because it has become another mechanism of state social control.  
The Arab Spring and Beyond  
When the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, thousands of protesters across the Middle 
East and North Africa took to the streets and demanded reform, first economic, and then 
political. Several dictatorial leaders, such as Zine El Abiddine Ben Ali of Tunisia and 
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Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, were successfully removed from power. Jordan, too, felt the 
effects of the regional demonstrations. Although citizens’ demands echoed those of their 
peers across the region, the size of protests in Jordan never neared the turnout in Bahrain, 
let alone Egypt. The monarchy’s response was one of appeasement. Police were seen 
handing out water bottles to protesters, and King Abdullah tried to placate his citizens 
with an increase in government salaries and pensions and by reinstating subsidies on fuel 
and food. When this approach failed, the king dismissed his prime minister and appointed 
a new one, who, he hoped, would convince Jordanians that a reform effort was 
underway.364 
Smaller scale protests continued through the next years, calling for tax reforms, 
opposing the government’s withdrawal of subsidies on fuel, and demanding an end to 
widespread corruption. Despite citizens’ varied grievances, protests still failed to reach 
large scales such as those seen elsewhere in the region. In part this may be due to the 
United States government’s interest in maintaining Jordan’s status as a ‘safe zone’ in an 
unstable region. The US has enormous influence over the General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID), or Mukhabarat, and maintains army bases in the country. The US Embassy is also 
involved in Jordanian policymaking, such as through aiding in drafting the new 2009 tax 
law. Thus, external influences may have contributed to the stemming of widespread and 
large protests in the country, although Jordanians also viewed the deteriorating situation 
in Syria with great concern.365 In the latter half of 2012, there were larger protests around 
the country, which even came close to calling for regime change. By the time of the 
parliamentary elections several months later in January 2013, however, the protests had 
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subsided.366 Jordan came to be known as the country where citizens chose ‘evolution over 
revolution.’367 In a similar vein, around this time, social entrepreneurship in Jordan began 
to become more established as an alternative to traditional civil society organizations, in 
part due to international organizations pivoting their support towards social enterprises. 
In the following years, reforms and constitutional amendments appeared to 
consolidate increasing power in the king. Furthermore, regional security challenges posed 
by conflicts in neighbouring Iraq and Syria with the Islamic State (IS, or ISIS, also known 
as Daesh) and the subsequent huge influx of refugees into the kingdom led to additional 
restrictions on civil society. The regime cracked down on those suspected of terrorism 
but extended its effort to repressing the free speech rights of activists, journalists, and 
other dissidents. Revisions to the 2014 anti-terrorism law not only forbid criticism of the 
king, which had existed previously, but also classified statements that ‘disturb Jordan’s 
relations with foreign states’ as terrorism. The GID was reported to repeatedly harass 
peaceful dissenters and torture government critics. All forms of public assembly, 
including some entertainment such as concerts, were also shut down in the name of 
security.368 These new challenges facing Jordanians and their government created ample 
opportunities for social enterprises to thrive in Jordan. In fact, as social entrepreneurship 
theory suggests, the more difficulties a society faces, the more social enterprises should 
thrive as they provide solutions to these challenges. From 2015 to 2018, when fieldwork 
for this research was conducted, the number of social enterprises in Jordan increased 
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significantly. Like other civil society organizations, however, they soon experienced 
resistance from the regime. 
In June 2018, political contestation again reared its head in Jordan when a 
coalition of professional associations and labour unions called for a general strike to 
oppose the proposed amendments to the income tax law. This turned into a large range of 
groups protesting nationwide over several days, asking not only for a repeal of the income 
tax law but also for a reversal on price hikes on fuel and electricity as well as the dismissal 
of the prime minister. Protesters felt that the regime was asking them to shoulder more of 
the kingdom’s financial burden and pay more of its debts, amid increased poverty and 
educational inequality, chronic unemployment, and corruption. After some hesitation, 
King Abdullah dismissed Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki and his entire cabinet, replacing 
him with the Minister of Education Omar Al-Razzazz. While this protest movement 
surprised many, it likely had roots in long-standing and recurrent issues.369  
Smaller protests associated with these larger ones continued into 2019, with 
activists meeting regularly. The breadth of movements across the kingdom since 2011 
suggests that a more unified opposition coalition might be possible, but so far, this has 
not materialized. Since the summer 2018 protests, the regime has established and 
enforced five ‘red lines’ that protesters are expected not to cross, and these have allowed 
the regime to reduce the impact of a potential unified protest movement. The five ‘rules’ 
that protests should follow in Jordan are that protesters should focus on the government 
and not the monarchy, that they should not insult key allies of the regime, that they cannot 
occupy protest areas for extended periods of time, that protests in the capital cannot be 
linked to those in governorates, and finally, that there may not be cross-class or cross-
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national alliances. The activists, of course, push back against these ‘red lines’ to make a 
point or to challenge the regime, and likewise, the regime sometimes cracks down on 
protesters even if they keep within their boundaries. The larger-scale protests that 
emerged in Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, and Sudan, seen by some as a second Arab Spring, 
may explain why the regime has again taken a harsher stance vis-à-vis these 
movements.370 Restrictions for social enterprises, especially those with political motives, 
has also likely continued. The careful balancing act between civil society and the regime 
has thereby continued from 2011 to the present. 
Social Capital in Jordan 
Historically, a combination of political and economic conditions affected the level 
and nature of social capital in Jordan. Social capital in the country can primarily be found 
in nationalism, tribalism, Islamism, and wasta, which is a significant form of social capital 
throughout the Arab World. Wasta refers to the use of one’s connections or influence and 
to the norms of reciprocity between the beneficiary and the provider. It can be defined as 
relying on an intermediary, usually a person with good connections and high social status, 
to achieve a particular end. Wasta, combined with the way nationalists influenced public 
policy, especially after the 1971 civil war, significantly undermined social ties in Jordan 
and weakened general trust. Furthermore, this led to an increase in poverty, polarization 
in social and economic spheres, and political instability.371 
Following the 1948 war against Israel, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians left 
their homeland, and many settled in Jordan. The 1950s in Jordan were characterized by 
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political turmoil, but socially, the Palestinian influx contributed to the formation of a new 
stock of social capital. Palestinians became socially and economically active, and ‘built 
trust, informal insurances, and a stock of [social capital] through intermarriages and 
participation in civil society organizations.’ They also brought new skills, experiences, 
and financial capital with them, which they invested locally in industries, services, and 
real estate.372 During this period wasta played an important role in building social capital 
between Palestinians and Jordanians, and both communities resorted to wasta to resolve 
their challenges. Jordanians and Palestinians, supported by their Arab identity and 
nationalism, perceived their problems as one. Following the 1957 ban on civil society 
organizations, Palestinians and Jordanians together established informal civic institutions 
and networks that brought together members of both communities to discuss and solve 
common problems.373 From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, therefore, strong social capital 
developed in Jordan and was associated with economic growth and political stability, 
especially after 1957.374 This was undermined in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however.  
The 1967 war with Israel created another large wave of 400,000 displaced 
Palestinians to Jordan and strained Jordan’s resources and infrastructure.375 Further, the 
creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 led to increased social 
tensions between Jordanian and Palestinian communities. The PLO relied on social 
capital to achieve its goals and its guerrillas employed violent tactics such as plane 
hijackings, kidnapping, and executing military operations against Israeli targets. Israel 
responded with reprisals against Jordanian towns; the situation led to the 1970-1971 
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armed conflict between Jordanian armed forces and the Palestinian guerrillas. Ultimately 
the guerrillas and their supporters were expelled to Lebanon. The lack of political 
competition and political liberalization in Jordan during this time did not support 
associational life, and led to a stagnation in the development of social capital.376 While 
the social capital that had previously developed between the Jordanian and Palestinian 
communities did protect and facilitate their ability to coexist, the PLO guerrillas’ 
activities and the subsequent conflict created a rift between the two communities. For 
Jordanian nationalists, ‘the issue of origin became of paramount importance’ from this 
point forward.377 They began to see Palestinians as ‘guests whose presence in the army, 
security, and public sector represented a threat to Jordanian national identity.’378 
The process of “Jordanization” that followed consisted of purging both Palestinian 
and Jordanian dissidents and was made possible by the security services, the Mukhabarat 
and the Jordanian army.379 King Hussein aimed for social cohesion and stability in his 
quest for national unity, but at the same time could not aggravate the Jordanian 
nationalists, which had become the backbone of his regime. He therefore opted to reduce 
the number of Palestinians in his administration and relied more on Jordanians to fill 
influential cabinet, army, and security positions.380 They, in turn, co-opted their relatives 
and friends too, and thus tribal and regional ties, constituting bonding social capital, 
undermined bridging social capital.381 By the late 1970s, a division of labour based on 
ethnicity developed: Jordanians dominated the public sector, while Palestinians 
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dominated the private sector. In effect, ‘wasta came to determine almost everything.’382 
With the rise in poverty and unemployment from the mid-1980s, the nature of wasta 
changed, and aided in building bridging social capital during good times and a supportive 
public policy environment. On the other hand, it also played a harmful role as a tool that 
strengthened bonding social capital during times of biased and corrupt public policy. 
Previous political cooperation between Palestinians and Jordanians seemed to be 
forgotten, many Palestinians left Jordan to seek employment in the Gulf, and bribery, 
corruption, and nepotism became more prevalent instead.383 Therefore, after the 1970-
1971 civil war, social capital’s negative bonding aspects came to outweigh its positive 
bridging elements.384 
Following the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the process of Jordanization became more 
intense, and additionally, over 300,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin returned to Jordan 
from the Gulf. The structural readjustment programs that the IMF and World Bank had 
promoted since 1989 aimed to reduce the state’s economic role. Due to the Jordanian-
public sector versus Palestinian-private sector divide, ‘Transjordanians felt threatened by 
the economic restructuring from which Palestinians seemed poised to benefit,’ while 
Transjordanians felt they were ‘gradually losing control of their country to successive 
waves of outsiders.’385 Palestinians returning to Jordan were seen as outsiders and 
competed for already scarce resources and employment.386 Furthermore, each sector 
envied the other its successes, and since the mid-1990s, both communities have been 
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unsatisfied with the status quo: both are reminiscing ‘those days…[when life] was 
good.’387 Therefore, from the 1970s onwards, public policy and increased hardship, 
poverty, and inequality have eroded not only bridging social capital across communities 
in Jordan, but also bonding social capital within communities.388 
 
Conclusion 
 Since the founding of the emirate of Transjordan and later as the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, the country’s ruling elite have faced challenges on multiple fronts. 
The monarchy has had to carefully balance the demands of its international aid donors 
with those of its citizens, and mostly resorted to repression to control public upheaval. In 
return, however, the country has benefited from enough international aid to ensure its 
wellbeing. The kings also have struggled with tribal divisions, which it managed by 
rotating the senior tribal members through important government positions. In return for 
these patrimonial gestures, the tribes have mostly been staunch allies of the regime, and 
the manipulation of voting districts ensures their overrepresentation in the parliament. 
The kingdom still recruits overwhelmingly from tribal areas for the expansive security 
forces that are an additional pillar of stability. The monarchy additionally relies on its 
strong ties to Islam, and its amicable relationship with Islamists in politics. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front have served as a moderating force in Jordanian 
politics and have helped the monarchy to deal with periods of unrest. In return, they have 
not been repressed as their counterparts in neighbouring countries were. The issue of the 
Palestinians in Jordan has also been challenging, with the kings seeking to integrate them 
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into Jordanian politics and society while simultaneously ensuring the ‘Transjordanian’ 
supporters continued loyalty to the regime. The relationship that the monarchy has had 
with these groups over the years has been mutually beneficial to varying degrees. The 
tribes and the Islamists both serve a distinct purpose to the monarchy, as of course do 
international aid donors. The Palestinians and more broadly, civil society, pose perhaps a 
greater challenge to the Hashemites. Civil society in particular has been alternatively 
more or less repressed, depending on the other circumstances facing the regime during a 
certain period of time. This sector is still emerging and growing, and its relationship with 
the government of Jordan will likely be redefined several times. 
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Chapter 3: Defining and Identifying Social Entrepreneurship 
in Jordan 
 
Introduction 
 
 Social entrepreneurs in Jordan come from diverse socio-economic and geographic 
backgrounds. They are a mix of men and women from all major cities of Jordan. While 
they are not strictly part of the ‘youth’ as defined in the literature,389 they are, apart from 
one interviewee in his sixties, among the younger generations, with their ages ranging 
from approximately twenty to forty-five years. Social entrepreneurs are also 
educationally and socially diverse, ranging from a refugee of Palestinian descent who 
grew up an orphan in Souf Camp, Jerash and dropped out of school in the eighth grade, 
to an Ammani from an upper-class family with a doctoral degree in medicine. 
Approximately half of those interviewed came from a middle-class background. Social 
entrepreneurs appear to be divided roughly equally among men and women, although a 
broader survey would be required to show an accurate gender comparison. In terms of 
geography, most social enterprises are based in Amman, but often work in non-Ammani 
communities such as in other cities or rural areas. The entrepreneurs themselves are 
primarily from Amman, however; perhaps their social connections based in the capital 
city make them more likely to succeed. For all social entrepreneurs, their social capital 
and the extent to which they were able to involve their communities in their work was 
decisive in determining the extent of their initiatives’ success. This was more important 
than their gender, class, level of education, or geographic location alone. Entrepreneurs’ 
ability to use social capital effectively could override any disadvantages they might 
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otherwise have, such as having little formal education or coming from a rural background. 
Their initiatives are varied as they address issues in society regarding race and class, 
poverty, gender equality, education, refugees and rural communities; environmental 
issues, especially as related to water, health, and sanitation; and politically-related topics 
such as governmental accountability and tackling corruption, dialogue between citizens, 
and general civic participation. It appears that the only thing they all have in common is 
a desire to provide a social service to their community and country. 
 From the interview analysis, however, it became clear that ‘social 
entrepreneurship’ in Jordan is not homogeneous. There are two groups of social 
enterprises, each with distinct qualities that affect their roles in Jordan’s socio-political 
landscape. Structural transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs) focus on 
addressing structural social issues. The founders of STSEs know that social changes are 
gradual and take time, and thus focus on self-sustainability and continuity, and employ 
independent or hybrid funding models. STSEs rely heavily on social capital in the form 
of community resources to succeed. The objective is to incorporate the enterprise’s goals 
into the community to change community norms. In contrast, product- and service-
oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) more closely resemble what are known as ‘socially 
responsible businesses’ or SRBs.390 PSSEs depend on external grants and loans, both 
foreign and domestic, much as non-governmental organizations do. The missions of 
PSSEs focus on providing a specific good or service which the founders hope will address 
a certain social need. 
 This chapter describes both types of social enterprises and analyses their roles in 
Jordan, using the findings of forty-three semi-structured interviews conducted from 
 
390 See for example the definition in David Lewis, ‘Promoting Socially Responsible Business, Ethical 
Trade and Acceptable Labour Standards’ (Social Development Systems for Coordinated Poverty 
Eradication, Paper No. 8, London School of Economics, January 2000), 
http://www.chs.ubc.ca/lprv/PDF/lprv0495.pdf.   
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January through April 2018 in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Most of the interviews 
took place in Amman, the capital city, but interviewees also worked in various other cities 
around the country, namely Jerash, Irbid, Karak, and Zarqa. Although many interview 
participants agreed to the use of direct quotes in this thesis, some preferred that quotations 
not be attributed to them, i.e. to remain anonymous, and some interviewees requested that 
certain statements remain anonymous while the remainder of the interview could be 
attributed to them. However, due to the sensitive nature of this research regarding state 
surveillance, all statements made by interviewees have been anonymised for their 
protection. For this reason, each interviewee was assigned a randomly generated number-
letter identity, and this identity is used to cite their statements. 
 The chapter begins with an overview of STSEs, outlining their objectives, funding 
model, their use of ‘targeted creative reorganization’, challenges, and resiliency tactics. 
The first section gives preliminary suggestions of how the work of STSEs alters societal 
norms. Then PSSEs, their formation process and their reliance on the ‘entrepreneurship 
ecosystem’ are discussed, including an explanation of this sector’s deficiencies and the 
organizations attempting to aid PSSEs. The chapter concludes by offering comprehensive 
and concise definitions of STSEs and PSSEs and gives recommendations for identifying 
each type of enterprise. 
 
Structural Transformation-based Social Enterprises (STSEs) 
 
Structural transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs) address ways of 
thinking and doing. Their missions focus on changing mindsets between and among 
communities, towards the government, and about social responsibility. They recognize 
that they are working on long-term goals and that any sustainable change is gradual. They 
focus on what they perceive to be root causes to alleviate the symptoms Jordan is suffering 
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from. The emphasis is on social impact and social investment throughout the community. 
Due to these enterprises’ strong belief in their social mission and drive to be sustainable 
and independent of outside influence, they generally adopt the independent funding 
model, and they rely primarily on social capital. STSEs strive to be community-
responsive and use targeted creative reorganization to achieve their objectives. 
Structural Transformation-based Social Entrepreneurs’ Criticism of Jordanian NGOs, 
CSOs, and Foreign Funding 
 
When asked about their enterprises, structural transformation-based social 
entrepreneurs in Jordan generally agreed that implementing their goals requires self-
sustainability in their funding model in order to ensure the long-term continuity of their 
initiatives. In connection to this, they commented on their opinions and concerns 
regarding the role of the international donor community and how this affects civil society 
organizations in Jordan. The entrepreneurs also discussed the various funding models 
they considered for their enterprise and why they chose the model they are currently 
implementing; and how they feel that their enterprises are better equipped to address 
Jordan’s social problems because of this choice. 
As part of their reasoning for choosing to create a social enterprise, rather than an 
NGO for example, STSEs expressed their frustration with the way they perceived civil 
society to normally operate in Jordan. Their main criticism with civil society 
organizations (CSOs) was that they depend on mostly foreign funding and thus on the 
goals of the international community to operate. Interviewee ‘ZM3,’ founder of an STSE 
focused on education, said, ‘civil society is supposed to be the voice of the nation, or the 
voice of the locals. Now they operate as the donor voice, not the people’s voice.’391 
Another social entrepreneur, interviewee ‘HY3,’ similarly stated that ‘civil society in 
 
391 Interview with ‘ZM3’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, January, 
2018. 
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Jordan remains project-based, grant-dependent, grant-shaped, and the funding comes 
mainly from foreign aid.’392 He added that local funding for CSOs remains very limited, 
and that even local companies’ contributions to civil society through their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programmes are very small. Interviewees from most mentorship and 
training organizations, among them CEWAS, BADIR, TTi, and Injaz, made similar 
remarks. Thus, most CSOs must rely on funding from international donors, an 
arrangement which imposes certain conditions on Jordan’s civil society. 
Issues of Sustainability and Continuity 
 
One of the main criticisms structural transformation-based social entrepreneurs 
have for the civil society funding model is that they perceive it as unsustainable and 
lacking in continuity. STSEs understood CSOs to be lacking in continuity because they 
continuously go through the ‘rat race of raising funds’393 from one grant application cycle 
to the next. Only those CSOs which manage to secure funds year after year continue to 
exist, and those who cannot secure funding shut down. The frequent changing of topics 
that are driven internationally also jeopardizes the continuity of CSO’s programs. 
Interviewee ‘CI5,’ a social entrepreneur, gave the example that, ‘one year, we have a 
hundred campaigns on child abuse, and the next year we have zero campaigns on child 
abuse because the donor ran out of money, and now they’re doing women’s rights. We 
have a hundred campaigns on women’s rights now.’394 When the goals of the international 
community change, funding for previous objectives shifts towards the new objectives, 
thus leaving CSOs with no choice but to amend their programmes to match the new 
objectives or risk shutting down due to lack of funding. Additionally, interviewee ‘A28,’ 
 
392 Interview with ‘HY3’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, March, 
2018.  
393 Interview with ‘A28’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018.  
394 Interview with ‘CI5’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise/royal NGO), Amman, Jordan, 
February, 2018. 
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a regional social entrepreneurship trainer, reported that in her many years of experience 
previously working with various CSOs, she saw that this funding model can cause CSOs 
to amend or even change not only their programmes but also their core missions, only to 
be able to continue to function.395 Interviewee ‘R34’ was one of the STSEs who 
encountered this issue while applying for a large grant from an international organization. 
During the grant-writing process, he felt that he began to change his initial objectives to 
those favoured by the donor, and ultimately, he decided not to apply for the grant at all. 
He explains:  
In the beginning we wanted to get a huge fund. … While working on this, and 
sending the proposal back and forth, after three, four months, we looked at the 
proposal, and it was something else. …That’s when we said we don’t want [the 
grant]. Because they started saying, “you know the jury would like something else, 
so how about we add something about dropouts? This is good, and how about 
dropout boys connected with sports?” But this is not our project.396  
 
Interviewee ‘R34’ was in the position to be able to continue his organization’s work 
without the international grant due to funding from other sources. A CSO relying entirely 
on grant funding would be in a more difficult situation with less room for a choice like 
this and might be forced to change its project objectives to more closely match those of 
the donor.  
Social entrepreneurs criticized international organizations for the brevity of the 
projects they implement. Interviewee ‘LR2,’ a social entrepreneurship project developer 
working for an international organization commented that ‘in general, [international 
organizations’] thinking is based on project durations’ and that they often ‘don’t have 
money to develop a ten-year program that [they] know would make more sense than a 
two-year program’.397 ‘LR2’ lamented that there is not enough funding, or not enough 
 
395 Interview with ‘A28.’ 
396 Interview with ‘R34’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
397 Interview with ‘LR2’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
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funding allocated over long time periods, to be able to develop long-term projects on the 
ground in Jordan. The resulting short-term projects are known as ‘hit and run projects’ 
and one social entrepreneur expressed the following critical view: ‘[They have] 5000 
JD398 to do a project, throw it in one community, take a couple of photos, write a report, 
out. With this regard, what impact did that have on the community? It … gave them false 
impact.’399 Another entrepreneur, interviewee ‘CI5,’ commented that this is ‘the way 
foreign aid money is deployed, and this is not unique to Jordan. … You have a specific 
budget for a specific time, so I wouldn’t entirely say that it’s this party’s fault or that 
party’s fault. What I would say in general, is that [the donor’s] program design needs to 
include an element of sustainability.’400 This inhibits the ability of CSOs to implement 
long-term programs usually necessary to implement lasting changes, as they can only rely 
on short-term funding. 
Issues of Programme Content and Implementation 
 
Another problem that structural transformation-based social entrepreneurs 
described is that international organizations drive the programmes connected to the 
initiatives they perceive as important in the community. In and of itself, this was not 
perceived to be a problem, but social entrepreneurs are frustrated that in connection to 
this, locals’ own expressions of their problems are not addressed. This suggests a 
paternalistic approach on the part of the international community, bordering on orientalist 
tendencies. Interviewee ‘R34,’ a structural transformation-based social entrepreneur, 
illustrated this point with an anecdote:  
For example, the problem in Jordan Valley is the flies, but now no one mentions 
the flies … because no organization wanted to fund such projects. So even the 
community started not seeing it as a problem, or not remembering to mention it. 
 
398 JD = Jordanian Dinar 
399 Interview with ‘ZM3.’  
400 Interview with ‘CI5.’ 
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They repeat the problems that most organizations came to tell them are their 
problems.401  
 
Interviewee ‘CI5’ said that the presence of foreign aid has an overall positive effect on 
Jordan by promoting growth and helping the government address various areas it cannot 
afford to or does not have the ability to address. However, he said, ‘when you look at the 
effect on civil society, what I am seeing from my humble experience is that there’s this 
whole group of NGOs that does whatever the donor wants them to do.’402 These CSOs 
are therefore not necessarily representative of the Jordanian people, but rather of the 
topics that are driven internationally and for which funding is provided in any given time. 
In such a donor-driven and donor-dependent environment, the political space in Jordan is 
conditioned not only by the government but also by the international donors. 
Further, STSEs expressed concerns that international organizations are out of 
touch with the communities in which they work. Interviewee ‘ZM3’ recounted that in his 
experience working with international organizations, ‘they lack the perspective of the 
local community … They’re not listening to what the local community is saying.’403 In a 
specific example, interviewee ‘ZM3’ described an entrepreneurship training programme 
hosted by an international organization in Zarqa, a city northeast of Amman. 
Entrepreneurship training programmes have recently become one of the ways that 
international organizations aim to increase employment in Jordan, especially among 
youth. 
A Canadian organization with a local partner conducted a four-day training on 
social entrepreneurship in Zarqa. One of the kids who was in it messaged me. ... 
Supposedly he should come up with a project and they will pick three out of ten 
projects to fund, to continue. He called me when he was taking the training, telling 
me about his idea. He asked me, “is this social entrepreneurship or not? Is it a 
business that leads to social responsibility?” I said, “I don’t think so, did you tell 
the trainers about it?” He was telling me, “I did, and they told me it’s great.” And 
I knew his idea was not going to work in Jordan. He wanted to create a mobile 
 
401 Interview with ‘R34.’  
402 Interview with ‘CI5.’ 
403 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
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caravan that sells juices for people with allergies and diabetes. First, in Jordan, we 
don’t authorize mobilized sellers. So, you will never see a caravan or a car selling 
tea or coffee or sandwiches. How can you say it’s a good idea knowing that he 
can’t be successful? At the end of the training, he pitched the idea. They told him, 
“your idea is great,” even though the trainers and the funder knew that it’s not 
feasible. They pushed him to end the training, so they just had him as a number.404 
 
This example illustrates that the organization running the training was not familiar enough 
with local laws and regulations in Jordan to accurately assess whether a project developed 
by a participant has a chance of success, much less offer appropriate advice.  
Interviewee ‘ZM3’s’ example sheds light on an additional issue. The way 
international organizations appear to measure success is by counting numbers of 
participants, as illustrated by interviewee ‘R34’:  
For example, if you’re teaching music, a lot of organizations say they want to see 
a concert at the end.  But is really the concert the thing that counts? Don’t you 
think that the process was also so important for people? … [The international 
donors] don’t care, they want numbers. Fifty youth in front of two thousand 
people: Bravo! But if [the community] took funds but they couldn’t make a 
concert, the donors consider it a failure. No. A lot of things happened during the 
process.405 
 
Seeking high participation rates has evidently led international organizations on multiple 
occasions to offer cash incentives for Jordanians to attend their programmes. Interviewee 
‘ZM3’ noted that the organizers of this particular training programme seemed to be more 
concerned with the number of participants they could report back to their superiors in 
their impact statement than with the quality and applicability of the training itself. 
Interviewee ‘ZM3’ later added that his acquaintance had received 20 JD as payment for 
participating in the training session. He reported that he himself had also been paid 40-50 
JD for each training held by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) he attended. He expressed concern that many of the other training participants 
were in attendance primarily because of the financial reward offered, and not because 
 
404 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
405 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
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they were interested in the skills or knowledge they could gain. In the same vein, other 
entrepreneurs expressed frustration at international organizations and their implementing 
partners paying 20 to 30 JD per day to their volunteers, and that this practice has warped 
Jordanians’ understanding of what community service is. One structural transformation-
based social entrepreneur said, ‘if I want [youth] to come to volunteer, they ask me, “how 
much are you paying me?” And that’s a ripple effect of what the international 
organizations did. They changed the mentality.’406 For those social entrepreneurs 
dedicated to increasing civic activism and involvement in community service, this trend 
was particularly worrying, not only because they felt that people’s expectations of the 
rewards of volunteering had changed. They also reported difficulties in recruiting 
volunteers to help with their initiatives because they cannot afford to pay their volunteers, 
like international organizations do.  
 
STSE Funding Models 
 
Instead of relying on the donor-funded model, structural transformation-based 
social entrepreneurs in Jordan use business-like strategies to ensure their enterprise’s 
longevity. Both independent and hybrid funding models are popular with social 
entrepreneurs as they seek to provide an alternative to the foreign-aid-dependent funding 
model most used by other CSOs and hope to thereby avoid some of the issues civil society 
faces in Jordan. The independent model appeared to be the preferred model for social 
enterprises when fiscally possible. In this model, social enterprises use only their own 
capital from sales of products, sponsorship from local companies such as 
telecommunication companies or banks, and members’ direct contributions. They rely on 
the community’s cooperation and involvement. They often reject foreign funding entirely 
 
406 Interview with ‘ZM3’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), January 2018.  
120 
 
in favour of being more sustainable and politically independent. For interviewee ‘ZM3,’ 
the choice to be entirely financially independent was clear, and he explained that he wants 
his enterprise to act as a role model for other organizations: ‘So far ILearn operates on … 
local sponsorship and funding. I’m trying to prove something. Why can’t we do it by 
ourselves? Why don’t we get funded by ourselves? Why do we always need a foreign 
hand to show us how?’407 Similarly, interviewee ‘X2K’ explained that he insists on not 
receiving grants or other funding from anyone because he is ‘trying to prove that you can 
make great change if you really put determination and focus into it.’408 For interviewee 
‘X2K,’ the long-term continuity of his objectives plays an important role in the decision 
not to accept grants. He stated,  
I have pure and clear goals and objectives that are constant that I’m focusing on 
for the next 20 years. I’m not going to be "fake" just so I can satisfy the granter or 
the donor. This is another reason why I don’t apply to grants. It’s more about 
continuing the ideas that I started with and staying consistent, rather than going 
with what is fashionable in grant industry.409  
 
Interviewee ‘R34’ said, ‘our model is to give people hope, that yes, you can work and 
have an organization that is independent and still exist’.410 His reasoning for choosing an 
independent funding model is based on experience. He said that in the early 2000s, many 
CSOs received USAID funding. When the grants ran out several years later, many of 
these organizations closed because they were unable to find other sources of funding. 
Interviewee ‘R34’s’ social enterprise is connected to a parallel for-profit consultancy 
company, and profits from this company help to sustain the STSE. Interviewee ‘A28’s’ 
organization is an example of a social enterprise which changed its funding model from 
being dependent on donors to being independent. She explained she no longer wanted to 
 
407 Interview with ‘ZM3.’   
408 Interview with ‘X2K’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
409 Interview with ‘X2K.’ 
410 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
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go through the cycle of cultivating a relationship with a donor and then having to worry 
about the money. She said, ‘for example, [our program funded by] Coke: That grant was 
such a big grant, it was such a beautiful program. Then at some point they changed their 
CSR strategy and they decided to stop funding the program. Now it's shut.’411 STSEs 
often see choosing the independent funding model as part of their mission to be 
independent and sustainable and also to serve as a role model for other organizations. The 
independent model allows them to focus on their mission for as long as they see fit 
without any external influence and without the threat of being forced to adjust or end 
programmes.  
In the hybrid model, structural transformation-based social enterprises use their 
own capital to sustain themselves but apply for and receive foreign funds for specific 
projects. They use foreign support to run particular programs but remain inherently 
politically independent and do not rely on foreign funding to exist. This allows them to 
work with donors and receive grants which reflect their core mission and ideals, rather 
than adapting their projects to fit donors’ objectives. Commenting on the hybrid model 
as a possibility for funding a social enterprise, interviewee ‘R34’ said that ‘[foreign 
funding] is good for a specific project, but not the whole organization.’412 He strongly 
believes that the hybrid model can only be successful if the STSE’s main funding model 
is not dependent on foreign funds. Interviewee ‘HY3’ explained the way he adapted the 
funding model of his social enterprise to be more sustainable using the hybrid model:  
When we first started Leaders of Tomorrow, we were registered as an NGO and 
we were heavily aid dependent. The initiatives that were sustained by foreign aid 
were difficult to keep going. … But it’s imperative for any organization or civil 
society initiative to be independent and sustainable, and to do that it must have its 
own income. … We now have some income generating units. We sell some 
services. So, it is a hybrid model of funding. For example, we have the art market. 
People can buy the art.413  
 
411 Interview with ‘A28.’ 
412 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
413 Interview with ‘HY3.’ 
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Interviewee ‘6V2’s’ STSE also uses the hybrid funding model. Most of the 
enterprise’s income stems from founding members’ direct contributions, so that the 
enterprise is self-sustainable. He said, ‘we’ve made it a point not to get external funding, 
definitely not for our running costs.’414 He explained that he is currently looking for 
foreign funding sources for one of the enterprise’s initiatives, but that he does not want 
the enterprise itself to depend on foreign funds. By using the hybrid funding model, 
STSEs can use foreign aid to supplement the enterprise’s income and thereby fund 
specific projects, but at the same time still remain politically independent and financially 
self-sustainable. 
 
Why Social Entrepreneurship? 
 
Social entrepreneurs are acutely aware that Jordan and the Middle East face many 
issues, and the solutions that are provided are mostly given by the government, public 
institutions, or international donors. As interviewee ‘LR2,’ social entrepreneurship 
project developer for an international organization, points out, ‘the sustainability of those 
can be questioned often. … In all the sectors, I think a lot of localized solutions are still 
missing.’415 Interviewee ‘A28’ agrees, saying that ‘people are looking for sustainability 
and they are looking for smart sustainability. How can you do good, but also sustain 
yourself and not be funder driven?’416 Structural transformation-based social 
entrepreneurs are trying to provide the localized solutions that interviewees ‘LR2’ and 
‘A28’ mention. Interviewee ‘HY3’ defines a social enterprise as ‘something independent, 
sustainable, and strategic.’ He believes that ‘social enterprises can go beyond the concepts 
 
414 Interview with ‘6V2’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
415 Interview with ‘LR2.’ 
416 Interview with ‘A28.’ 
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of grants leading to projects, to a general programmatic approach in which the passion 
for a particular issue or set of issues is sustainable.’417 The issue of self-sustainability, and 
the ability to ensure continuity of the enterprise’s core mission(s), lies at the core of social 
entrepreneurs’ choice to create STSEs rather than another type of civil society 
organization. In the words of interviewee ‘X2K,’ founder of an STSE:  
I could sum it up by a quote by from Chuck Palahniuk. It says “We all die. The 
goal isn’t to live forever, it’s to create something that will”. What I wanted to do 
was create [this enterprise] to be my legacy, to continue and enhance humanity 
even after my departure. … You need to create something that continues to grow 
even after you’re gone.418  
 
Structural transformation-based social entrepreneurs expressed considerable 
concerns regarding the way the international donor community operates in Jordan. While 
they recognized that international aid does help to promote growth and address certain 
issues the government is unable to deal with, they also felt that in certain regards, civil 
society organizations’ reliance and dependence on foreign aid funding weakens the 
overall ability of civil society to engage in solutions to Jordanians’ needs. STSEs noted 
that the involvement of international organizations seemed to change local CSOs’ goals 
to the goals of the international community, with not enough regard for the needs the local 
community expressed. They also said that CSOs’ reliance on international donors restricts 
their project implementation to just a few years with limited funding.  
For these reasons, the founders of STSEs chose to establish independent financial 
models for their organizations, which gives them the opportunity to be self-sustainable, 
i.e. not reliant on foreign or domestic grants or loans. This further allows them to protect 
the integrity of their mission and projects so that they are not influenced by external 
actors. Therefore, STSEs are better positioned to reflect the needs of the communities 
 
417 Interview with ‘HY3.’ 
418 Interview with ‘X2K.’ 
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they serve, and are more able to provide long-term solutions, than other civil society 
actors. 
STSEs face many of the domestic issues present in Jordan that affect civil society, 
such as bureaucratic obstacles and occasional harassment by security forces. Adopting 
more independent funding models is one of the demonstrable ways that these social 
enterprises are more flexible and adaptable than most of their CSO counterparts. This 
makes them better equipped to work on long-term solutions to community issues because 
they are not constrained by the various issues that arise from dependence on international 
funds. Jordan’s STSEs address diverse issues through their enterprises’ programmes. 
Additionally, through their adoption of business-like practices, they have provided an 
alternative to dependence on foreign aid, which they view as one of the structural issues 
facing civil society in the country. Social entrepreneurs’ adaptability in this regard allows 
them to be more directly responsive to the communities they serve, as well as ensure the 
continuity of their programmes and the self-sustainability of their enterprises. 
 
STSE Objectives and Their Achievement Through Targeted Creative Reorganization  
STSEs seek to transform the communities in which they operate through 
comprehensive mobilization tactics. Through the work of the STSE, and the STSE’s 
extensive use of social capital, community members become so involved in the STSE that 
the enterprise becomes not only self-sustainable but also self-perpetuating. STSEs’ 
substantial reliance on social capital in ensuring the success of the enterprise matches 
well their desire to be independent of governmental and international resources. This 
social capital manifests itself in collaboration and cooperation with the community in 
which the STSE works. Since a large part of STSEs’ work focuses on creating positive 
social impact and social investment in the community, the use of social capital not only 
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allows the STSEs to function, but also serves to achieve their greater objectives. STSEs 
have two layers of objectives: the first, publicly stated objective, tends to be superficial, 
though it is still a cause that is important to the STSE, and relates to providing a good or 
service to the community. The second layer of objectives goes deeper and is meant to 
address the structural issues the STSE sees in society. The publicly stated objective is the 
vehicle through which the STSE ‘creatively reorganizes’ existing community norms and 
replaces them with new social values that are more closely aligned with the social 
entrepreneur’s vision of what is necessary for the community and the country to progress. 
Thus, STSEs have public and hidden agendas, of public engagement versus their wider 
objectives, respectively. 
STSEs achieve their objectives and become self-sustainable and self-perpetuating 
through Targeted Creative Reorganization (TCR). This process generally follows similar 
steps from one STSE to another (Figure 3.1). Initially, the STSE determines its objectives 
based on a need it has found in society. This need could be social, political, economic, or 
even environmental. Then, the STSE identifies various sectors of society whose needs 
and capabilities fit into the STSE’s plan to achieve its objectives. These sectors of society 
become the pillars on which the STSE’s work and, indeed, success, rests and relies. In 
the next stage, the STSE reorganizes the interaction between these pillars and inserts itself 
into their activities to create a symbiotic relationship. It does this by assigning new roles, 
beneficial to the STSE’s work, to the chosen sectors of society, and by simultaneously 
addressing the need(s) of these same sectors of society. Consequently, the acceptance of 
revised social norms into society occurs as the new work of the sectors of society becomes 
routine. STSEs often choose sectors of society which are well-established and thus trusted 
by the community, which consequently aids in the community’s acceptance of the STSE’s 
work; the STSE faces less resistance to change in this way. In the final stage, society 
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integrates and normalizes the STSE’s objectives, as community members initiate and 
implement independent programs of their own which are in line with the STSE’s 
objectives. As this occurs, individual members of society take on new roles, and 
collectively, the community normalizes new socio-political values. Through this process, 
the STSE ensures that its work is self-sustainable and self-perpetuating, but also that its 
greater objectives are achieved through thorough integration of its values into society. 
 The phenomenon of targeted creative reorganization of existing societal norms is 
best illustrated with an example, to show how this manifests itself in practice. Interviewee 
‘ZM3,’ who works in an STSE, has successfully employed this tactic in several 
communities in Jordan. Interviewee ‘ZM3’s’ personal experiences allowed him to 
identify issues in his community, Jerash and Souf refugee camp, that he felt should be 
resolved so that future generations of children can have access to improved educational 
possibilities. As stated on the organization’s web page, ‘ILearn started by mobilizing 
youth volunteers to work with children and provide them with access to non-traditional 
learning opportunities and access to safe spaces where they can interact, express 
themselves freely, and acquire the skills, attitudes and behaviors necessary in life.’ 419 
Interviewee ‘ZM3’ created ‘a model that works on disruption, mobilization, and then 
organization.’420 ILearn operates in eight communities in four of Jordan’s municipalities 
and targets what interviewee ‘ZM3’ calls the ‘three pillars’ available to schoolchildren in 
Jordan to provide the components necessary for ILearn to provide new educational 
solutions to underprivileged children. The three pillars consist of university students, 
schoolteachers, and existing community organizations. Each of the three also gains an 
advantage in exchange for their participation in ILearn’s initiative.  
 
419 ILearn, ‘About,’ Accessed September 17, 2018, http://ilearnjo.com/about-i-learn/.  
420 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
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 Interviewee ‘ZM3’ examined each of the sectors. He noted that university 
students’ main worry is unemployment, particularly for students who come from rural 
villages and do not have powerful connections in Amman. These students also lack the 
ability to receive training that prepares them for the job market. Interviewee ‘ZM3’ 
arranged for local start-ups to give these university students the training they need, and 
in return, the students provide volunteering hours to ILearn. They also help ILearn to 
reach the school dropouts and unemployed youth. The second pillar, schoolteachers, often 
need to show evidence of community service or training from professional academies to 
be awarded promotions or for their schools to receive awards. Again, ILearn helps 
teachers receive this training and they gain community service hours by coming to ILearn 
and volunteering their time by teaching ILearn’s children. The teachers also work with 
ILearn to create a dropout prevention program. The local organizations benefit from 
donating their training services to the university students and schoolteachers as well, 
because they are able to network and build their infrastructure in this way. Additionally, 
they can list their cooperation with ILearn as a ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) 
activity, which improves the local community’s trust in the organization. The local 
organizations also allow ILearn to use their spaces for free, and the community’s trust in 
ILearn grows with its trust in the local organization. In addition, these organizations are 
often charities and are well situated to be able to identify poverty pockets and find 
children who are working instead of attending school. In this model, therefore, three 
different sectors of the local community mobilize and work towards ILearn’s objectives, 
while at the same time benefiting themselves, and no financial capital is exchanged. 
Interviewee ‘ZM3’ calls the process of convincing the three ‘pillars’ to participate the 
‘mobilization’ stage. The ‘disruption’ phase occurs at the same time, because when 
interviewee ‘ZM3’ successfully convinces a university student, schoolteacher, or local 
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organization to participate in ILearn, he has already disrupted their norm. He explained, 
‘we create a routine, so our old lifestyle that the university students are just doing 
whatever they want, the teacher whatever they want, this no longer exists. Now you have 
social pressure and responsibility to come to this space and offer something.’421 
Interviewee ‘ZM3’s’ initiative, ILearn, has consequences beyond the reach of 
simply providing better education opportunities for children. The university students, 
more equipped for the job market, receive better employment opportunities but also 
acquire a sense of personal responsibility and commitment to their community. 
Schoolteachers are better able to teach and with the incentive of awards or promotions, 
potentially work harder in their professions, but also learn how to identify at-risk children 
and how to help them. Finally, the local organizations have a strong incentive to continue 
their involvement in the community. Notably, this pattern became so ingrained in the 
communities where ILearn works that interviewee ‘ZM3’ noticed that ‘they started 
organizing by themselves. After a year and two months of implementing this program in 
a small community, we realized that the community started creating their own initiatives. 
The mother, if she has an unemployed youth, she starts telling her youth, “go do 
something” … It became a mentality, a mindset.’422 In a relatively short time period, ‘it 
became a taboo for someone who is privileged not to show up’ and contribute to his/her 
community in some way: ‘It became, if you don’t do these volunteering hours, you don’t 
count as a productive community member. … It opened their eyes, so the way they 
perceived their community is no longer the way it is.’423 People accepted ILearn’s 
targeted creative reorganization of the previous norm and now actively participate in 
perpetuating the new norm. This is significant in multiple ways. First, ILearn’s publicly 
 
421 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
422 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
423 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
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stated objective, to provide better educational opportunities for underprivileged children, 
can be achieved. Second, ILearn does this without using external resources, relying 
instead on the resources of the communities in which it operates; the STSE is thereby an 
initiative both for, and by, local community members. In this way it can be directly 
reflective of and efficiently responsive to community needs. Finally, ILearn’s successful 
targeted creative reorganization created a powerful ripple effect throughout the 
communities, going beyond education to addressing deeply rooted issues by normalizing 
social responsibility, reciprocity within the community, and active citizenship.  
 Other STSEs in Jordan employ similar methods to achieve their objectives. 
Crucially, they all work directly with the community members they aim to serve, use only 
limited, if any, financial capital, and primarily seek to address structural challenges on a 
localized scale, rather than simply providing a particular good or service. In this way they 
hope to make tangible changes in Jordan’s civil society, because their initiatives deal with 
citizenship, government accountability, civic participation and responsibility, and 
dialogue among citizens. The use of social capital, or directly engaging community 
members in the STSE’s work, ensures that the changes STSEs wish to create are achieved 
from within, rather than being imposed. This makes the STSE an influential sector of civil 
society, and perhaps one that can be more effective (albeit on a smaller, more confined 
scale) than other sectors of Jordanian civil society.  
 
STSE Challenges and Adaptations  
 
 Due to STSEs’ underlying objectives, which address Jordan’s structural issues 
society and politics, they are at risk of facing serious challenges. One of the greatest 
challenges is repression by the government through intimidation by the security forces or 
even being shut down because civil society organizations in Jordan are only rarely 
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permitted to truly address political issues, and social issues are contentious as well. 
Additionally, the STSEs which work outside of Amman and the larger cities and focus 
on rural communities can be subject to more oversight because these communities are 
viewed as areas where popular uprisings and radicalization can occur more easily. Often, 
the STSEs state only their superficial objectives publicly, i.e. on websites and social 
media platforms and in their official registration papers. STSEs’ structural objectives 
often seek to change social and political norms, and they fear repercussions from Jordan’s 
legal system and security forces if they express and advocate these objectives openly.  
 Several STSEs discussed being harassed by security forces and government 
employees and reported that there were multiple occasions when their programmes or 
events were shut down or otherwise prevented from operating as planned. One of these 
STSEs, who requested to remain anonymous, stated that after legally registering with the 
organization with the Ministry of Social Development, they felt that they were always a 
suspect with the government and the intelligence services. The interviewee said that 
ministry officials required them to communicate all of their activities with the ministry, 
‘because they need to tell the intelligence about our work’.424 This made their day-to-day 
operations stressful because they felt a lot of pressure from the constant government 
observation. This particular STSE had been more open about their political objectives, 
but explained that they encountered issues because ‘we’re not allowed to be involved in 
any political activities or they will close [us] … they want us just to be volunteers … for 
them it’s threatening, so you’re not allowed to talk politics or make any political 
activities’.425 They reported that police presence almost always accompanies their 
activities in the rural communities, and that government officials often call to inquire 
 
424 Interview with ‘R34’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), February, 2018.  
425 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
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about the names of persons involved in events. A particularly challenging instance was 
when members of Zamzam, a centre-right Islamist political party, attended one of the 
STSE’s events to observe their work. The interviewee recalled that  
The government made many phone calls: “why are they coming, what do they 
want, do you know who this is?” I told them, for me, anyone is welcome to the 
project, [the party leader is] not coming to make a political speech. He wants to 
see what we are doing. I can’t say to anyone not to come. So, it was a little bit 
tense. And then… they started calling the people [in the rural community] and 
making them afraid.426 
 
The STSE continued to explain that these things occur because ‘sometimes [the 
government is] afraid of someone influencing the community to start a movement, so 
they’re always looking at who’s coming, who’s doing what … it’s risky to start any 
movement in rural areas and governmental places that they are known to be loyal 
people.’427 Organizations that address social or political issues in particular are subject to 
government oversight, involvement and intimidation practices. 
The STSEs explained that this harassment occurred until they changed their 
strategies. Interviewee ‘R34’ described that the STSE had originally been legally 
registered as a non-governmental organization with the Ministry of Social Development, 
but that it is now registered as a not-for-profit company with the Ministry of Trade and 
Finance. This move from one legal registration to another has afforded the STSE 
substantial freedom to operate as it wishes, because government involvement has become 
reduced to the standard taxation procedures, and harassment by the security forces occurs 
only rarely. As ‘R34’ said, ‘they are more relaxed. Now the issues are only bureaucratic’. 
428 With the registration as a not-for-profit company, the STSE operates the same way as 
it did when it was registered as an NGO, except without the restrictive intimidation and 
oversight measures. Most STSEs had similar experiences. Interviewee ‘HY3’ also 
 
426 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
427 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
428 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
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founded an STSE that is politically oriented and stated that a major challenge was dealing 
with the government and security services. The founder said,  
Our activism has caused problems, like when we held large public debates. Other 
things are mostly OK. We want to affect society. The concept of debates, we didn’t 
invent that, but it is pretty new here in Jordan. We made people focus on 
reinforcing their arguments with facts and numbers and we held officials 
accountable. We had huge debates in the open, in Rainbow Street and Wasadt al 
Balad.429 We invited many officials, ministers … afterwards, they made trouble 
for us.430 
 
This STSE has 250,000 users on its online platform and reaches around a million people 
every week. The scope of this STSE was likely an additional concern for the government, 
besides its political messages. The founder explained that the STSE also experienced 
significant pressure from the security services, but that ‘the pressure from the security 
services is usually not on the enterprise, it’s on the person, it’s on me. It’s really bad, 
more than you can expect. It was really difficult to deal with and keep going.’431 However, 
the STSE persevered and also changed its tactic; it is now registered as a business, not as 
an NGO, and like ‘R34’, reports much fewer current issues with the government. 
An experienced official working for the USAID Civic Initiative to Support (CIS) 
programme, which works to promote and support civil society organizations in Jordan 
through training and grants, commented on the challenges that any politically oriented 
organization faces. The official wished to remain anonymous but explained that,  
The bottleneck is the acceptance of the government. Usually anything related to 
politics, anything related to religion, it's more difficult … especially the political 
issues. … If you are working with something related to-- issues related to Israel, 
any other political things… Avoiding the sensitive issues will be welcomed by the 
government.432 
 
 
429 The areas around Rainbow Street and Wasadt al Balad are in the centre of Amman and are often 
considered the heart of the capital’s social and cultural scene. 
430 Interview with ‘HY3’ (structural transformation-based social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, March, 
2018. 
431 Interview with ‘HY3.’ 
432 Interview with ‘VG4’ (USAID Civic Initiatives Support Program Employee), Amman, Jordan, April, 
2018. 
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Some STSEs were aware of this issue when they founded their organization; others only 
realized the full extent of government and security forces’ oversight, and the 
consequences of this, when they began to operate. Each STSE, however, has adapted to 
the situation and made its operations more covert. Most STSEs have done this by hiding 
their true objectives behind ‘superficial’ objectives, as explained in the previous section. 
A few avoid ‘detection’ by not registering their organization with the government and 
operating out of their homes. Others have chosen to keep their true objectives clear, but 
have changed their legal registration from NGO-status (in the Ministry of Social 
Development, which exercises extensive oversight) to business-status (in the Ministry of 
Trade and Finance, which only oversees organizations’ financial matters). In some cases, 
STSEs had to employ both tactics, but the end result overall is that these changes have 
allowed the STSEs to continue to operate throughout politically unstable periods of time 
without compromising their ability to function, and indeed, thrive.  
 
 
Product- and Service-oriented Social Enterprises (PSSEs) 
 
Product- and service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) address specific 
problems and focus on quicker solutions to effect short- and medium-term improvements. 
They address issues such as women’s and refugees’ employment, providing specific 
services to the disabled, introducing services in the water, sanitation, and health sector, 
or developing technological advances to aid in medicine or pharmaceutical services. The 
emphasis is on improving a particular aspect of a specific community sector. In this way, 
PSSEs resemble businesses that are socially responsible, with the difference being that 
PSSEs are usually not financially self-sustainable. This is because they rely on national 
or international donor funding to operate, which also has the disadvantage of making 
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these enterprises adapt to the changing needs of the international donor community (e.g. 
shifting the focus from ‘leadership’ to ‘helping refugees’ in recent years).  
 
PSSE Formation Processes and Their Reliance on the Jordanian ‘Entrepreneurship 
Ecosystem’ 
 
 The formation process of PSSEs generally follows that of any other start-up or 
small enterprise in Jordan, and they are therefore heavily dependent on what is known in 
economics and business terms as the ‘entrepreneurship ecosystem’. The 
‘entrepreneurship ecosystem’ is defined as ‘a set of interdependent actors and factors 
coordinated in such a way that they enable productive entrepreneurship within a particular 
territory.’433 It is thus understood to be the ‘environment’ in which an enterprise operates. 
Entrepreneurship ecosystems comprise a myriad of domains, which are usually grouped 
into six categories: government policies, private- and public-sector support, access to 
human capital, access to financial capital, the market, and the culture which influence an 
enterprise’s function and success. For example, this could consist of incubators and 
training programs; support from the government, the monarchy, GONGOs, INGOs, and 
international organizations; and private, public, and international funding in the forms of 
grants and loans.434 Economic development plans in many cities and countries cite 
fostering entrepreneurship as a core component. It is seen as part of the answer to high 
unemployment rates, especially among youth. In its 2015 report examining the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations and outlining a 
 
433 Erik Stam and Ben Spigel, ‘Entrepreneurial Ecosystems’ (Discussion Paper Series, no. 16-23, Utrecht 
School of Economics, 2016), 1, https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:1613. 
434 Daniel Isenberg, ‘Introducing the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem,’ Forbes, May 25, 2011, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danisenberg/2011/05/25/introducing-the-entrepreneurship-ecosystem-four-
defining-characteristics/#530f986d5fe8. 
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framework to achieve these goals, Jordan lists the creation of ‘an enabling environment 
for entrepreneurship’ as a main objective.435  
 In Jordan, the general entrepreneurship ecosystem is expanding, but the social 
entrepreneurship ecosystem is barely emerging. Since 2010, and especially in the last 4-
7 years, the word ‘entrepreneurship’ has become trendy in Jordan and in this period, the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem really emerged. The term ‘social entrepreneurship’ has 
become more popular only in the last 2-4 years. There are just a few organizations which 
specifically support social enterprises. All the others support enterprises in general, and 
although some are socially oriented, most focus on entrepreneurship in technology, water, 
sanitation, and health, and environmental issues. Social enterprises and the few 
organizations which support them both report that a lack of awareness (in every sector) 
about social enterprises has hindered the growth of existing social enterprises and affects 
the ability of new social enterprises to form. 
Among the main supporting organisations of entrepreneurs in Jordan, which also 
work with socially-oriented enterprises, are the telecommunication companies Umniah 
and Zain, which run the entrepreneurship incubation facilities known as ‘The Tank’ and 
‘ZINC’, respectively; Oasis500 which focuses on seed funds and ‘scaling’ i.e. growing 
enterprises; int@j, which focuses on technology-oriented start-ups; Seven Circles 
Consulting, which connects enterprises with suitable investors; the International Youth 
Foundation (IYF)/BADIR which specifically targets youth entrepreneurs; the Abdul 
Hameed Shoman Foundation; TTi and Ruwwad, which offer logistical support and 
advice; and Injaz, which seeks to teach and promote entrepreneurship among 
schoolchildren and university students across the Middle East. Notable international 
 
435 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ‘Jordan’s Way to Sustainable Development,’ September 28, 2015, 38, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/16289Jordan.pdf. 
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governmental and intergovernmental entities offering training and funding for enterprises 
are the United States Agency for International Development Local Enterprise Support 
Project (USAID LENS); the embassies of the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Australia, and the Netherlands; the German Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); the European Union; the World Bank (mostly in the form of 
loans); and the Swiss organization CEWAS. In recent years, several of Jordan’s royal 
NGOs (RONGOs) have also added the promotion of entrepreneurship through small 
funds, training courses, and education to their objectives: the Queen Rania Foundation 
(QRF)/Edraak, the Crown Prince Foundation, the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development (JOHUD), the King Abdullah Fund for Development (KAFD), and the 
King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation and Achievement (KAAYIA). 
Additionally, the government, in the Ministry of Youth and the Ministry of Social 
Development, have been working to promote entrepreneurship. The University of Jordan, 
in its Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center, and the German-Jordanian University, 
offer courses and other resources to students to encourage them to found enterprises while 
they are studying or shortly afterwards. While this list mentions the most prominent actors 
in the entrepreneurship ecosystem of Jordan, it is not exhaustive. TTi created a more 
comprehensive ‘map’ of the ecosystem detailing the roles of organizations known to work 
with entrepreneurs.436  
Support for PSSEs coming from royal NGOs and international organizations has 
received a lukewarm response, however. In recent years, royal NGOs have become 
interested in supporting entrepreneurship in Jordan through direct investments, in the 
form of grant awards, and entrepreneurship training. The response of PSSEs to these 
RONGOs’ involvement is somewhat divided. Some PSSEs appreciate the recognition and 
 
436 This map is available at http://ttinnovation.org/entrepreneurship-ecosystem-map-in-jordan/.  
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the exposure that working with RONGOs gives them and view royal involvement in the 
issue as a positive development for the country, hoping that royal ‘patronage’ of 
entrepreneurship will help to bring about positive developments in official government 
policies. Other PSSEs are wary and, in some cases, even suspicious of these royal 
initiatives, and believe that royal NGOs are just another extension of the security state 
monitoring and interfering with private citizens’ initiatives. There is a similar attitude 
towards grants, loans, and training offered by foreign governments, international 
organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. Some PSSEs appreciate the foreign 
aid while others categorically oppose it, explaining that foreign entities cannot 
sufficiently understand Jordan’s needs, or even that these foreign entities have ulterior 
motives that do not really serve Jordanians’ interests but rather support their neoliberal 
foreign policy objectives.437 
 It is in this environment that PSSEs progress through the various stages of 
development. Generally, the initial step for the founder of a PSSE is to create a vision for 
a profitable business, and to attend entrepreneurship or innovation training programmes, 
often called ‘bootcamps’. There, they learn business practices and often receive 
networking help to connect with organisations offering financial investment for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). This financial investment can take the form of grants, loans, 
free office space, free web hosting platforms, or a combination of these. Various 
organisations also offer competitions or ‘awards’ which consist of several days’ training 
at the end of which participants present their ideas to a panel of judges, who then decide 
which participants should receive financial aid. Other organisations offer ‘incubation’ for 
enterprises. In this model, the enterprise founders apply to the organisation with their 
business idea, and if accepted, they receive desk space and IT support in an office shared 
 
437 Based on multiple interviews. 
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with other start-ups, networking support, legal support, and attend workshops and 
conferences. The enterprises also receive financial aid in the form of ‘seed funds’, usually 
a few thousand Jordanian Dinars, intended to cover enterprises’ expenses until they 
become formally established, registered with the government, and earn enough profits to 
sustain themselves. After that it is up to the PSSE founder to decide whether the enterprise 
should grow, or ‘scale up’ in business terminology. 
 
The PSSE ‘business model’ and challenges to becoming established 
 
 Unfortunately, most PSSEs in Jordan struggle to even reach the self-sustainability 
stage and constantly rely on grants and loans from national and international sources to 
continue operating. Product- and service-oriented social enterprises mostly follow the 
dependent funding model, in which the enterprise uses external funds and resources and 
depends on the renewal of these funds or acquisition of funds from other sources. It 
chooses sponsors to match its ideals but must sometimes adapt its own mission or 
programs to fit existing funding programs, which reportedly change frequently (e.g. from 
‘women’s empowerment’ to ‘youth leadership’, etc). This is somewhat surprising, 
because most PSSEs’ founders participate in many training periods, workshops, and 
certification programmes offered by local and international organizations specifically 
designed to help them learn sustainable business strategies. Some of these programmes 
provide extended periods of mentorship as well, to help start-ups ingrain these strategies 
into their operations. This means that PSSEs should have established methods for 
financial self-sustainability in which they are not reliant on external funding sources and 
patterns. Whether it is the programme content, method of teaching, issues in the 
‘entrepreneurship ecosystem’ or a combination of these factors that prevents 
entrepreneurship training organizations from being effective and producing robust 
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enterprises is unclear. However, there are undoubtedly several structural issues in Jordan 
which prevent PSSEs from reaching their potential or even their initial goals. As 
mentioned previously, every PSSE interviewee and organization working with PSSEs 
mentioned deficiencies in the entrepreneurship ecosystem as a major hindrance to the 
success of PSSEs in Jordan. The areas in which the Jordanian ecosystem is lacking most, 
according to their reports, are in governmental policies, issues related to wasta and the 
prerequisite of having powerful connections, securing sustainable financial income, and 
cultural challenges related to involvement in a high-risk occupation.  
Governmental policies, laws and regulations, and ‘wasta’ 
 
 One of the issues in Jordan for PSSEs is that there is no designated legal 
registration option for enterprises as there is in other countries. Jordanian enterprises 
register either with the Ministry of Trade and Finance as for-profit companies or not-for-
profit companies, or with the Ministry of Social Development as non-governmental 
organizations. Founders choose the registration type depending on which is best suited 
for their goals and which has the greatest financial advantages. A growing number of 
PSSEs also chooses to officially register their enterprise abroad in a country that has a 
specific registration for enterprises, and associated financial and legal advantages, such 
as the United Arab Emirates. They then benefit from various benefits such as tax breaks 
and favourable market legislation, but still work on the ground in Jordan. Others decide 
to move the entire enterprise abroad.438 This strategy is even encouraged among 
entrepreneurs, as observed by interviewee ‘K38’: ‘A lot of entrepreneurs, successful 
people, they always advise us the following: “Don't register in Jordan. Go to Dubai or go 
to somewhere else.”’439 Interviewee ‘73L’ explained this very clearly. He said that  
 
438 Interview with ‘FN7’ (RONGO), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
439 Interview with ‘K38’ (product- and service-oriented social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
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it’s easy for [entrepreneurs] to go to Saudi, to Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. 
It’s the same language, almost. So, it’s easy to move there. Plus, there’s no taxes 
there. There’s a lot of taxes here… It is a numbers game. You just calculate, what’s 
the game here, what’s the game there, what do I pay here, what do I pay there. 
And sometimes [entrepreneurs] find that it’s economically better to go [abroad].440  
 
While there are economic advantages to the PSSEs themselves, neither tactic of moving 
the enterprises abroad is particularly beneficial to the Jordanian economy as tax revenues 
are collected from a foreign country and human talent is also exported.  
 Besides not having a legal registration for enterprises that could encourage their 
formation and retention in Jordan, most entrepreneurs explained that it was difficult to go 
through the registration process itself. Those who experienced fewer issues had hired a 
lawyer, but not every PSSE founder can afford to do this and most need to navigate the 
web of rules, regulations, and ministry employees alone. PSSEs also reported that 
working with government officials during the registration process was discouraging and 
frustrating, and that some of their peers gave up on trying to found a PSSE because of 
this. One entrepreneur who had interacted with various officials in different ministries 
said that the experience was ‘awful’ because ‘these guys have a bad mentality … if I want 
to speak to this official, he will not understand my passion, my struggle, or my needs.’441 
This reflects both an unwillingness on the part of the ministry official to make an effort 
to help and a basic lack of understanding of entrepreneurship in general. Other 
entrepreneurs had to give bribes to government employees before being allowed to 
register their PSSE. Those entrepreneurs with well-positioned personal connections were 
able to register their enterprises more easily and swiftly. The almost necessary reliance 
on personal connections, however, is another weakness in Jordan’s entrepreneurship 
ecosystem. 
 
440 Interview with ‘73L’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
441 Interview with ‘9F1’ (Product- and Service-Oriented Social Entrepreneur), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
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 When trying to establish a PSSE, most entrepreneurs learned that wasta, or 
personal connections, are an implicit requirement for success. This is a structural issue 
throughout Jordan but in addition to the other challenges PSSEs face, it can be truly 
debilitating, especially in the earliest stages. As interviewee ‘VL4’ commented, ‘if you 
know about wasta, then you know exactly how everything works in Jordan… it’s a tribal 
system.’442 This means that many resources are only accessible to Jordanians who are 
already privileged and come from well-connected backgrounds. For example, even being 
able to contact bank or telecommunication companies, who could provide essential 
funding opportunities, is out of reach of most Jordanians.443 Interviewee ‘GK9’ pointed 
out that this makes social entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurship ecosystem in Jordan 
’quite elitist’, even though ‘the people who come up with the best solutions to the deep-
rooted problems are the people who are facing those problems who don't necessarily 
speak English and cannot attend a workshop in English, who don’t have those 
connections, etc.’444 Consequently, many of the PSSEs who do manage to overcome 
various challenges are from privileged backgrounds and possibly not as aware of the 
specific needs of society’s most vulnerable sectors. This is how PSSEs whose purpose is 
to address a social problem, such as education, through on-line programmes are created. 
Such a programme cannot achieve its intended objective. While many Jordanian children 
even in low-income families might own a smartphone, their families cannot afford an 
internet connection, so these children cannot access the on-line learning platform created 
to help them.445 This is only one example of many PSSEs which are well-intentioned but 
ultimately too detached to be suitable for the target community. 
 
 
442 Interview with ‘VL4’ (Hult Prize Employee), Amman, Jordan, April, 2018. 
443 Interview with ‘ZM3.’ 
444 Interview with ‘GK9’ (PSSE), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
445 This example is based on the accounts of multiple interviewees. 
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Securing steady financial income 
 Each PSSE and organization working with PSSEs identified the inability of 
enterprises to secure financial income as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, challenge 
to their success. Accessing finances, having seed money, or other types of capital is 
difficult for all entrepreneurs in Jordan due to the developing entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Banks and telecommunications companies are some of the greatest investors in 
entrepreneurship, but they support primarily technology-oriented start-ups. It is very 
difficult to find an investor interested in the social entrepreneurship sector.446 If a social 
enterprise happens to also be technology-oriented, they can secure funding in this way, 
but if not, there are few options. Private sector companies often do not understand the 
main purposes of social entrepreneurship or are unable to justify to themselves investing 
in a social enterprise, where the return on investment is difficult to measure. The 
companies that do invest in social enterprises often award their grants or loans to their 
personal connections, rather than following a fair process, because they feel it reduces 
their risk.447 One entrepreneurship consultant described an ‘access to capital’ event that 
took place with the purpose of bringing entrepreneurs together with banks who might 
invest in them:  
It was a heated discussion between both sides, but eventually the entrepreneurs 
basically poured their hearts out about how the banks are being very strict with 
asking for papers and very strict with the amounts and all of that. But in return the 
banks said, ‘this is a risk for us. We need to study this risk very carefully so that 
we decide whether we’re going to lend you the money or not, because what if the 
idea doesn’t work out? Then who will pay?’ Then came up the problem of the 
collateral. The banks said, ‘if you really want the money then we need a collateral, 
just for us as a security.’ It was a bit heated and then I realized going to a bank for 
money is the last option for entrepreneurs.448 
 
 
446 Interview with ‘VL4.’ 
447 Interview with ‘E7U’ (product- and service-oriented social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
448 Interview with ‘R41’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
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Additionally, most investors only give between five and twenty thousand Jordanian 
Dinars, which is not enough to really start a business, and various interviewees argued 
that it would also not be enough to have a real impact on the economy.449 Apart from the 
private sector, the ‘big monsters in the market’ which invest heavily in development are 
USAID and the UNDP. They, however, receive criticism for inconsistent investment in 
different sectors. Just as STSEs had commented,  
getting funding from international organizations is not very sustainable in the long 
term. Maybe it’s good to start out, but you have to move on because otherwise if 
next year they all shift to women’s empowerment, what happens to the 
entrepreneurs? … Then you just close your business.450 
 
For many PSSEs, therefore, the help they receive from family members, friends, and 
‘accelerators’ only helps in the beginning, and as their enterprises grow, access to funds 
becomes more and more elusive. The director of a centre focused on entrepreneurship at 
a Jordanian university, interviewee ‘YC3,’ said that ‘more than 95 percent, if not more, 
up to almost 99 percent, of these social initiatives, they are just one shot. They die after 
just one month, or two months, because they are not sustainable at all.’451 Even those 
enterprises which do survive beyond the first stages struggle to continue generating funds, 
and some are forced to become opportunistic in this regard. Instead of being able to secure 
funds from organizations that align with their objectives and needs, many PSSEs must 
instead match their enterprise’s aims with those of the funding body.452 This of course 
does not allow them to work consistently or in a manner true to their objectives. 
Cultural challenges  
 The cultural challenges to PSSEs in Jordan are twofold. First, Jordanian society 
is generally risk-averse, and from this arises the second cultural challenge: both men and 
 
449 Interview with ‘N9X’ (product- and service-oriented social enterprise), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
450 Interview with ‘FN7.’ 
451 Interview with ‘YC3,’ (Professor at the University of Jordan), Amman, Jordan, April, 2018. 
452 Interview with ‘VG4.’ 
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women face pressure from their families to become financially stable and/or start families 
rather than become involved in an uncertain undertaking. As interviewee ‘YC3,’ 
professor at the University of Jordan, observed, ‘the culture doesn't support at all 
something called start-ups and self-employment.’ For young people, it still seems better 
to ‘find a job than to start a company and take the risk of failure.’453 Interviewee ‘73L,’ 
who works for an organization that provides various resources to enterprises in Jordan, 
further explained that ‘there is a shame attached to failure. Most of us don’t want to be 
called or titled or stamped with failure.’454 Interviewee ‘N9X’ agreed that this fear of 
failure affects Jordanians’ likelihood to start an enterprise. She said that no one wants 
‘people thinking of them as failures.’455 
This is an issue because that mind frame deters Jordanians from even considering 
creating their own enterprise. Interviewee ‘73L’ said that Jordanian society needs to 
realize that ‘it’s ok to start something and to fail. You are not a failure if you fail.’ Risk 
and uncertainty are simply aspects of entrepreneurship that can hardly be avoided. 
Jordan’s geographic and political situation are not conducive to a positive attitude towards 
risk, however. Interviewee ‘FN7,’ employee of a royal NGO, explained that  
 The region is on fire and we’re in the middle of that fire. As much as we want to 
feel safe, I’m sure everyone deep inside is just terrified. Will I actually start 
something now and make it big and expand, or should I wait another year and see 
the political situation? And then that year goes for another.456 
 
One of the things that needs to change, therefore, is people’s perception of failure. As 
interviewee ‘VL4’ stated, ‘people don’t understand that it’s a part of the journey’. He 
suggested that one way to make it easier for people to accept failure would be to show 
that even entrepreneurs with ‘amazing success stories’ experienced severe difficulties and 
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setbacks, so that taking risks and ‘failing’ can become more normalized in Jordan.457 
Publicizing the complete story of an enterprise could help to encourage and inspire 
beginning entrepreneurs.  
The fear of risk and failure not only affects Jordanians’ willingness to start an 
enterprise, but also influences others’ acceptance of it. This became evident in the 
interviews with PSSEs who spoke of their family and social circle’s limited understanding 
and support of their endeavours. There is pressure on young people to become doctors, 
lawyers, or engineers, but these fields are over-saturated. Instead, some university 
graduates, undeterred by risk, are tending towards creating a start-up or enterprise. 
However, both men and women face cultural challenges. Men have a lot of pressure from 
their families and social circle to start earning money, so that they are financially stable 
and can marry and support a family. One PSSE who preferred to remain anonymous said 
that his family is somewhat supportive but ‘they want to see me studying a PhD, having 
something permanent, something sustainable. I’m 30, I’m moving into 31 now and for 
them I’m wasting my life in a sense.’458 Another explained that ‘it took my family around 
4 years to understand that I'm doing something. I remember my dad always bringing me 
business cards. Once he got me a business card from a computer shop telling me, “if you 
want to work again, maybe you want to consider it and fix PCs there.”’459 Most PSSEs’ 
families had the same reaction, asking their sons if they were crazy and remarking that 
they were just wasting their time, while they could be working and building a steady 
career elsewhere.460 Interviewee ‘W71’ described that there are ‘some cultural barriers 
within the community here…Everybody wants their kid to become either a doctor or an 
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engineer, … and after they graduate, they want their son to get married.’461 It can take 
two or more years for an enterprise to become established and begin earning revenues, 
and this process requires full-time commitment. During this time, PSSEs’ families 
become impatient and do not understand why their sons would dedicate themselves to 
such an undertaking instead of starting to earn money through regular employment. 
Women on the other hand still sometimes face the challenge that they should be 
looking for a spouse rather than spending time and resources on developing an enterprise. 
Even women who have attended university are encouraged to find a husband soon after 
graduating, as in the case of interviewee ‘DZ6’:  
My mother asked me every day, ‘When will you get married? Fatimah, where is 
a husband? Fatimah, there is a good guy from your art club.’ I didn’t find it’s the 
time to get married yet … originally, she had this thought in her mind, because 
my aunts asked her, ‘Why is your Fatimah not married?’ In my family some girls 
got married and engaged. So, you have some pressure from others.462 
 
Other female entrepreneurs told similar stories. For example, interviewee ‘N9X’ 
explained that her family supports her, but that they are equally confused about her 
motivations. She said, ‘it's a problem within my family for a start. They all believe in me, 
they all love me, they are okay, but they also ask, “what the heck are you doing?”’463 As 
interviewee ‘LR2’ explained, PSSEs’ families’ acceptance of their work also ‘very much 
depends on where you are, if you’re in Amman or if you’re in a village somewhere.’464 
Women from more rural areas experience more pressure from their families to marry than 
those living in urban areas, and starting an enterprise does not fit this desire. 
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Conclusion: Defining and Identifying Social Enterprises 
 
Because there are two types of social entrepreneurs in Jordan, it is important to 
clearly define them and their attributes. It is insufficient to rely on their legal registration 
type: as outlined previously, both STSE and PSSE founders choose the registration type 
based on whichever category they feel will best suit their goals and be most advantageous 
for them financially. This means that it is impossible to determine the type of social 
enterprise based on whether it is officially registered as a non-governmental organization, 
a for-profit company, or a not-for-profit company. Instead, it is necessary to closely 
examine the following defining characteristics of STSEs and PSSEs: objectives, function, 
and sustainability models. Based on this, an STSE is defined as a self-sustainable and 
self-perpetuating organization which seeks to address structural issues and change social 
norms through targeted creative reorganization of society, relying primarily on social 
capital and community resources. In contrast, a PSSE is a business-oriented organization 
that seeks to ameliorate a specific social issue by providing a product or service, using 
business strategies to reinvest profits into the community by offering additional products 
and services. PSSEs do not purposefully engage in targeted creative reorganization to 
achieve their objectives. Of course, targeted creative reorganization may still occur, but 
it is not part of the PSSEs’ plan and is not done in a calculated manner. PSSEs have the 
potential to be self-sustainable if the business becomes profitable; in Jordan, this is rare 
due to the restrictions of the entrepreneurship ecosystem, and PSSEs therefore rely on 
externally provided finances in most cases.  
 Due to these social enterprises’ very different functions, they take on different 
roles in Jordan. STSEs, with their purposeful reorganization of society and goal of 
addressing structural issues, have a greater role in civil society. They are actively 
responsive to community needs and wish to solve the deeply rooted issues they feel are 
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at the heart of many of Jordan’s problems. Because they are independent organizations, 
they are able to minimize pressure from the government and international or 
intergovernmental organizations. In this way they are at liberty to formulate their 
objectives and implement their plans freely and can have a powerful influence on the 
communities in which they work. STSEs wish to be an alternative to Jordan’s NGOs and 
CSOs, which they view as flawed. PSSEs also exercise important work, though more in 
political economy terms. These enterprises have the potential to make advances in small-
business creation. If the entrepreneurship ecosystem continues to improve and more 
PSSEs can move beyond the very beginning stages in which they rely on external 
financial capital, to more advanced stages in which they are profitable and self-sustaining. 
If this occurs, PSSEs could be one of the solutions to high rates of unemployment, 
especially among Jordan’s youth. PSSEs are an alternative to regular profit-centred 
businesses, because their founders wish not only to make a personal profit but also to 
address a social need.   
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(Figure 3.1) 
The Process of STSEs’ Targeted Creative Reorganization 
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Chapter 4: Social Entrepreneurship and Social Capital as 
International Development Goals 
 
Many studies of social entrepreneurship in the Middle East have taken a positive 
and hopeful approach, evaluating it based on its potential to effect change in various areas 
including youth unemployment, marginalization of social groups, and addressing various 
social issues governments are unable or unwilling to solve. For example, social 
entrepreneurship in the Middle East has been called ‘a pathway for inclusive growth,’ ‘a 
panacea for engaging youth and inspiring hope,’ and a ‘new dawn’ for creating 
sustainable social impact.465 In evaluating the role of social enterprises in Jordan’s civil 
society, however, it is not the theoretical potential of social entrepreneurs that matters, 
but rather their actual, current ability to achieve their goals as independent, community-
responsive actors. Therefore, chapters five and six take a critical approach to social 
entrepreneurship.  
Through the lens of social capital theory and its criticisms, this chapter analyses 
how the international community’s implicit support for social capital creation actually 
restricts social enterprises’ spheres of operation and influence. The chapter begins with 
an overview of social capital theory in all its promises and pitfalls, showing the debate 
between the utility of social capital and its negative effects. It then progresses to an outline 
of the context of Jordan’s political economy and regime security, within which 
international aid programmes operate and to which any social capital development is 
subject. Following this is a discussion of how foreign aid impacts upon civil society in 
 
465 See Soushiant Zanganehpour, ‘The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East: A Pathway for 
Inclusive Growth or an Alluring Mirage?,’ in Social Entrepreneurship in the Middle East, ed. Dima 
Jamali and Alessandro Lanteri, vol. 1 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 67-83; Rebecca Hill and 
Medea Nocentini, ‘Social Enterprise in the MENA Region: False Hope or New Dawn?,’ in Social 
Entrepreneurship in the Middle East ed. Dima Jamali and Alessandro Lanteri, vol. 1 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 84-106; and Clare Woodcroft-Scott and Fatimah S. Baeshen, ‘Social 
Enterprises: A Panacea for Engaging Youth and Inspiring Hope?,’ in Social Entrepreneurship in the 
Middle East, ed. Dima Jamali and Alessandro Lanteri, vol. 1 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
107-126; among others. 
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Jordan in general, situating within this the role of social entrepreneurship support in 
addressing concerns over youth, unemployment, and political participation. The chapter 
then focuses on the politicization of youth and how youth policy is framed in terms of a 
market economy and democratization approach. It shows how youth are given 
opportunities within a narrowly prescribed space, which may support the status quo rather 
than progress. Finally, the chapter assesses the role of foreign actors in the Jordanian 
social entrepreneurship ecosystem. 
 
Social Capital and its Critiques 
 
In economic development, social capital is seen as a valuable resource that should 
be tapped; the rationale is that social cohesion is directly related to growth and prosperity. 
Theoretically, individuals with stronger associations among one another can better 
communicate and coordinate for mutual benefit.466 Collective action is understood to 
build trust through repeated association and reciprocity, which should lead to greater 
developmental capacity.467 Prosperity is also linked to political representation, as social 
capital supposedly enables people to better participate collectively in local decision 
making, monitor government agencies, and lobby for better services.468 Social capital 
theory, as based on the work of Robert Putnam, suggests that trust, cooperation, and 
public participation will lead to citizens being more active and engaged in government 
institutions. Likewise, government processes are predicted to become transparent and 
 
466 Frances Cleaver, ‘The Inequality of Social Capital and the Reproduction of Chronic Poverty,’ World 
Development 33, no. 6 (June, 2005): 893.  
467 See for example E. Ostrom and T.K. Ahn, Foundations of Social Capital (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2003); and N. Uphoff and C.M. Wijayaratna, ‘Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The 
Productivity of Farmer Organisations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka,’ World Development 28, no. 11 (2000): 
1875-1890. 
468 Cleaver, ‘The Inequality of Social Capital and the Reproduction of Chronic Poverty,’ 893. 
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accountable through citizens’ increased engagement.469 Thus, social capital has been 
theorized to have both economic and political development benefits.  
During the 1990s, national governments and international agencies discovered 
social capital as a valuable means to attain their development outcomes and 
commissioned projects as well as studies exploring the relationship between social capital 
and development. The World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and UNDP heralded social capital as the ‘missing link’ in 
explaining development in comparative perspective.470 In 1996, the World Bank launched 
the Social Capital Initiative (SCI) that represents one of the main endeavours in this field. 
The SCI aimed at both assessing how social capital can influence the effectiveness of 
development interventions as well as at identifying ways in which development assistance 
might affect its creation. At the same time, the SCI sought to develop methods and 
indicators to monitor and measure the impact of social capital on development.471  
In the second half of the 2000s the SCI was disbanded, and the notion of social 
capital became unfashionable among decision makers worldwide. In academic circles, 
the use of social capital in development was initially criticized due to the difficulty in 
defining, measuring, and theorizing the concept. The positive view of social capital has 
been challenged by studies that outline the exclusionary processes of cooperative 
action,472 outlined in Chapter One. Other studies have shown that local groups and 
associations are unable to compensate for failed governments and do not operate 
 
469 See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
470 Frans J. Schuurman, ‘Social Capital: The Politico-Emancipatory Potential of a Disputed Concept,’ 
Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (2003): 991-992, doi: 10.1080/01436590310001630035. 
471 World Bank, ‘The Social Capital Project,’ accessed August 26, 2019, 
https://socialcapitalproject.com/world-bank-social-capital-initiative/. 
472 See for example Tor A. Benjaminsen and C. Lund, ‘Formalisation and Informalisation of Land and 
Water Rights in Africa: An Introduction,’ The European Journal of Development Research 14, no. 2 
(December, 2002): 1-10, doi: 10.1080/714000420; and Lyla Mehta, Melissa Leach, and Ian Scoones, 
‘Environmental Governance in an Uncertain World,’ IDS Bulletin 32, no. 4 (2001): 1-14. 
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equitably in inequitable communities.473 In addition, criticism turned to the depoliticizing 
aspects of social capital, with accusations that development frameworks focusing on 
social capital form part of the apolitical post-Washington Consensus.474  
As Cleaver points out, there is major criticism of the concept of social capital 
which focuses on its agency in addressing inequality. This is because social capital studies 
‘seemingly [account] for power differences without proper consideration of the negative 
aspects of social life, or the structural constraints on empowerment of the poor.’475 
Further, there is a possibility that social capital can lead to the exclusion of certain groups 
of people. Other studies view social capital through the lens of rational action theory, in 
which ‘people are conceived as social entrepreneurs, consciously investing in 
relationships of trust and the creation of norms in anticipation of reciprocity and tangible 
benefits.’476 In this kind of relationship, people can trade and transform the assets 
available to them through their relationships, and they can use them strategically to 
achieve their own goals.477 Some critics understand social capital as ‘dynamic and 
negotiated’ social resources or social networks and processes, which, in contrast to other 
forms of capital, cannot be accumulated and stored easily. Thus, resources coming from 
social capital are both enabling and constraining for individuals, and ‘may reproduce 
structural inequalities’ of the status quo.478  
 
473 See for example E. La Ferrara, ‘Unequal Access to Social Capital? Evidence from Tanzania,’ 
Development Research Insights 34 (September, 2000); and Frances Stewart, ‘Groups for Good or Ill,’ 
Oxford Development Studies 24, no. 1 (1996): 9-24, doi: 10.1080/13600819608424101. 
474 See for example Schuurman, ‘Social capital,’ 991-1010; and Cleaver, ‘Inequality of Social Capital and 
Reproduction of Chronic Poverty,’ 893-906. 
475 Cleaver, ‘Inequality of Social Capital and Reproduction of Chronic Poverty,’ 894. 
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Additional analyses examine how the application of social capital theory to 
neoliberal policies depoliticize and ‘domesticate’ it and thus limits its ‘politico-
emancipatory possibilities.’ This makes it easier for autocratic regimes to embrace. 
Cleaver argues that when social capital is used to explain ‘inequality, prosperity, and 
political participation through associated relationships, it legitimizes a policy focus on 
individual and collective action and shifts responsibility for “social inclusion” from 
economy to society and from government to individual.’479 The assumption that people 
can use their network of connections and participate in institutions to improve their 
disadvantaged positions can lead to a view that people are individually responsible for 
their own social capital deficit and marginalization.480 Social capital has been heavily 
criticized as being ‘an apolitical approach to explaining agency,’481 an ‘anti-politics 
machine,’482 and a ‘source of social control.’483 Frances Cleaver’s view of social capital 
presents a particularly troubling analysis of how social capital reinforces the status quo: 
… Institutions as embodiments of social process ensure that things are done ‘the 
right way’ in cultural and symbolic terms. The ‘right ways’ of socializing, 
associating, and participating in public are generally those that confirm dominant 
world views, which reinforce existing relations of authority and which channel 
routinized and habitual everyday actions to reproduce such social structures.484  
 
Cleaver further argues that social capital remains a weak policy tool when insufficient 
attention has been given ‘to linking the social with the political, to the need to transform 
institutional arrangements, and to challenging systemic sources of power.’485 Efforts to 
promote participation, engagement, and social capital formation must consider structural 
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obstacles and constraints on individuals’ agency: ‘social capital is not automatically 
created from association, trust does not magically emerge from repeated interaction.’486 
 As Schuurman outlines, the main problems with using the concept of social capital 
in political/emancipatory programs are as follows. First, there is a tendency to blame the 
victim: ‘individuals, neighbourhoods, villages, regions, countries are underdeveloped 
because supposedly they do not have the “right” kind of social capital’ but at the same 
time, ‘the poor are expected to pull themselves out of a problematic situation by 
developing the right kind of social capital.’487 Second, the Putnam theories assume that 
membership of any association will lead to increased political awareness and engagement. 
However, to detect whether there is any meaningful relationship with political 
participation, it is necessary to examine the type of association. Third, the argument has 
been made that ‘of the two components of social capital, it is primarily social trust and 
not associational networks that seems the most active component related to democratic 
development.’488 Fourth, as various authors have pointed out, social capital can have 
negative effects such as exclusion; to identify whether social capital is exclusionary in a 
particular case, it is crucial to identify whether it is bonding or bridging social capital.489 
Bonding social capital refers to ‘ties among actors who are members of the network’ 
while bridging social capital refers to ‘ties that interconnect actors from otherwise 
separate networks,’ with bridging social capital being preferred for economic and political 
development.490 Finally, it remains unclear whether social capital acts as the independent 
or dependent variable in relation to the state, that is, whether social capital influences the 
way the state functions, or vice versa. For Putnam, social capital is the independent 
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variable, but Hyden491 and Foley and Edwards492 have shown how local and national 
government exerts considerable influence on the way social capital works. If social capital 
is indeed beholden to top-down processes, it would instead be an independent variable. 
Thus, the concept of social capital and its utility in application to development remains 
disputed. 
 
Jordan’s Changing Political Economy and Regime Security 
 
Jordan’s political economy has changed significantly in the past two decades, 
which has put pressure on the regime’s stability. The state has reduced its privilege and 
patronage circle and retreated from citizens’ economic lives. In addition, Jordan is now 
dealing with many thousands of refugees, who may remain in the country long-term.493 
Jordan adopted an IMF economic liberalization program in 1989; analysts attributed this 
to the country’s economic crisis in the late 1980s and the ‘crisis of the rentier state.’494 
Rentier states, such as the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf, rely on external revenue 
sources more heavily than on popular taxation, while semi-rentier states rely on external 
revenue in a more limited way. Semi-rentier states, such as Jordan, depend on foreign aid 
instead of oil.495  
Prior to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, the monarchy relied on an 
‘authoritarian bargain,’ which ‘offered citizens economic security in exchange for their 
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political loyalty (or at least acquiescence) to the Hashimite [sic] monarchy.’496 The regime 
ensured the vital support of East Bank Jordanians through generous patronage. In the late 
1980s, this patronage ‘social contract’ came under increasing pressure and was nearly 
destroyed in 1989, when the economic crisis and falling energy prices led to a recession 
in oil-exporting countries, on which Jordan was ‘heavily dependent for expatriate 
remittances, trade, and foreign aid.’497 Following the Khartoum Agreement in 1967, 
Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia had agreed to provide Jordan with JOD 37.7 million in 
aid grants annually. From 1967 to 1985, Jordan received approximately 82.4 percent of 
its total foreign aid from oil-producing Arab countries.498 From the 1950s through 2017, 
Jordan has also received approximately USD 20.4 billion in total bilateral aid; it is 
currently the third largest recipient of US aid globally.499 In Jordan, the economic crisis 
thus led to high inflation, a GDP collapse, a currency crisis, large external debt, and a 
budget deficit. In addition, unemployment reached 30-35 percent. Thus, Jordan’s 
‘political model [was] incompatible with its economic constraints;’ the patronage network 
on which the regime relied was unsustainable and needed to be re-evaluated, especially 
given Jordan’s own lack of natural resources and water scarcity, and dependence on fuel 
imports.500 
These events led the monarchy to establish a new relationship with its support 
base to ensure the regime’s survival; Greenwood calls this is the ‘new liberal bargain.’ 
The authoritarian and new liberal bargain have in common that they are both influenced 
by policy-makers’ need for budget security and regime security.501 Brand defines budget 
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security as ‘a state or leadership’s drive to ensure the financial flows necessary for its 
survival’ and regime security as the ability of a regime to persist over time.502 Brand uses 
these terms to explain Jordan’s foreign policy, but Greenwood argues that they can be 
useful in analysing Jordan’s liberalization progress (or lack thereof) since 1984. As in 
other Middle Eastern countries, Jordan undertakes liberalization as a survival strategy to 
ensure that the regime can survive in the long term. Greenwood notes, ‘a key aspect of 
this survival strategy is the need for the government to secure the loans and grants 
necessary to cover its annual budget deficits and pay the costs of economic 
restructuring.’503 Without this external financial revenue, the government would need to 
take drastic measures leading to the unemployment of many public employees, 
eliminating subsidies on basic commodities, and reducing spending on social services, all 
of which would severely erode the carefully-balanced patronage networks upholding the 
regime’s support base.504 Thus, King Hussein sought to establish and keep a productive 
relationship with the IMF.  
The 1989 economic crisis was likely a critical factor influencing King Hussein to 
pursue liberalization, but there were political reasons as well, as put forward by 
Greenwood’s notion of the ‘new liberal bargain’ of economic liberalization post-1989.505 
Jordan’s liberalization tactics, as seen in the resumption of national elections and revival 
of Parliament, were part of an effort to strengthen the monarchy’s relationship with East 
Bank Jordanians and the business community, both of whom constitute the monarchy’s 
traditional support base. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 put the kingdom in a difficult 
position, because it was unwilling to join the US-led coalition against Iraq. The United 
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States and Jordan’s allies in the Gulf thus cut off their aid support to Jordan, which 
threatened its budget security. Subsequently, King Hussein supported the US-sponsored 
Madrid peace process, for which he hoped to receive an increase in aid and cancellation 
of Jordan’s foreign debt. The insecurity of the early 1990s ‘undermined the government’s 
ability to ensure long-term budget security and gain access to the economic resources 
needed to maintain its bases of political support.’506 Consequently, the regime realized 
that a new type of political bargain, in the form of some liberalization, was necessary.507 
Jordan turned to the IMF for support and began to liberalize sectors of the 
economy and balance public expenditures. In general, Jordan’s reforms have been 
labelled a success and have met IMF targets, although various challenges such as 
inflation, budget deficit, and high debt remain. The industry and communications sectors 
have benefited from foreign investment, but many Jordanians cannot gain from this 
because the jobs created there require skills not supplied by the state’s education system. 
Small-business development is inhibited by regulatory obstacles and lack of available 
capital, so the market economy has done little for many Jordanian citizens and has not 
addressed massive youth unemployment. In addition, a small circle of ‘regime insiders’ 
comprises a new urban economic elite.508 
Among the reforms Jordan was asked to implement is a reduction of the state 
subsidy programme, on which the regime has historically relied as part of its patronage 
system in order to ensure a level of stability among the populace. As Itani points out, ‘the 
government can no longer afford to continue this level of subsidization, but any attempt 
to reduce subsidies risks provoking large-scale public discontent amid accusations that 
the government is unfairly financing itself at citizens’ expense,’ as seen in November 
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2012 when the government reduced subsidies on fuel, which triggered rioting.509 Jordan’s 
economic liberalization reforms have improved ‘some basic macroeconomic indicators 
at the cost of widespread public alienation and a narrowing of the regime’s support 
base.’510 
King Abdullah II has continued the late King Hussein’s strategy of maintaining 
strong relationships with foreign funders, with the most significant difference between 
him and his father being Abdullah’s commitment to support the United States in its post-
2001 ‘war on terror’ and in the US-Iraq War. With this, Abdullah has secured increases 
in military and economic aid from the United States. Abdullah thus pursues regime 
security by aligning more closely with the United States’ interests and pursuing his 
‘Jordan First’ strategy, with the hope that these will ensure regime survival through any 
short-term difficulties. Greenwood argues that this is an evolution and refinement of the 
‘new liberal bargain’ due to domestic and regional developments and challenges.511 
Overall, ‘policies designed to promote the regime’s long-term security take precedence 
above all else.’512 
 
 
Foreign Aid and Its Impacts on Civil Society in Jordan 
 
Foreign aid for entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship in Jordan has not 
brought about political liberalisation, participation, or true youth empowerment, which 
are normative goals aligning with neoliberal foreign policy objectives of the United 
States, Europe, and their allies. Rather, foreign aid funding for entrepreneurship and 
social entrepreneurship shores up the Jordanian government to ensure the country’s 
continuing stability. This stability is aided by economic growth, expanded employment 
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opportunities, especially for youth, and upholding the public-participation ‘safety valve.’ 
Entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship are avenues for each aforementioned goal. 
Foreign aid funding that prioritizes Jordan’s stability over other objectives restricts the 
political space and influences the way civil society and, within this, social enterprises can 
function. This section demonstrates this by first outlining the issues associated with 
neoliberal foreign aid programmes focused on political liberalization, and how these 
programmes have failed to produce significant advances and instead inadvertently aided 
the entrenchment of authoritarian governments. A brief examination of the rhetoric of 
international actors elucidates the underlying objectives of their entrepreneurship 
promotion efforts and situates these findings within the wider debate of foreign aid 
policies and youth as a ‘security risk.’  
The primary foreign aid donors for development in Jordan are the United States, 
the European Union/Europe, the United Nations, and their affiliates. They have in recent 
years observed that their ‘civil society’ promotion initiatives have not brought about the 
political liberalization of the Middle East for which they were designed,513 however. 
Economic issues, among them high levels of youth unemployment, also remain.514 
According to the International Labour Organization and the World Bank, Jordan’s youth 
unemployment rate has risen from 28.6% in 2008 to 39.7% in 2017. Indeed, international 
efforts have arguably shaped strategies of authoritarian survival, rather than promoting 
reform. Jordan’s King Abdullah II has, so far successfully, combined ‘promises to reform 
and government shake-ups at home with pleas for more aid to sustain his regime 
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abroad.’515 In 2016 he cited the Syrian refugee crisis and regional instability combined 
with his country’s continuing economic issues as the reason continued foreign aid is 
necessary.516 This plea was successful: in 2018, Jordan and the United States signed a 
five-year memorandum of understanding on economic and military cooperation which 
will provide Jordan with $6.3 billion in assistance. The aid is meant to ‘enable Jordan to 
continue reform and development programmes, and to mitigate the impact of the refugee 
burden’ and in return, Jordan will continue to work with the United States in military and 
counterterrorism cooperation.517 This is an example of a ‘quid pro quo’ or ‘aid-for-policy’ 
deal, in which ‘donor leaders give aid to recipient leaders in return for policy 
concessions.’518 As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith explain, ‘while questionable from a 
normative perspective, aid-for-policy deals are a rational allocation of resources and 
efforts by both recipients and donors that advance the interests of political elites in each 
nation’ and even ‘promotes the political survival of leaders.’519 Ultimately, ‘democracy 
promotion’ in the region is meant to promote stability and continuity, rather than 
encourage change, as this could lead to ‘unruly or take-to-the-streets revolutionary 
upheavals’ which might not be in the best interests of the international aid donors.520 
Thus, it should not be surprising when this aid fails to fulfil normative goals such as 
political and/or economic liberalisation. 
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As in other Arab republics, neopatrimonial governance in Jordan has been 
reinforced by this foreign aid mechanism. As noted, Jordan is poor in resources, in 
contrast to the Gulf monarchies, so its neopatrimonial framework depends on foreign aid, 
which allows the government to provide essential services to citizens which it otherwise 
could not. The government thus can position itself as the benefactor of the people, and 
the Hashemite monarchy in particular makes extensive use of this. King Abdullah II, and 
some other royal family members, regularly visit hospitals, schools, rural villages, injured 
citizens and military veterans in a show of solidarity and empathy with citizens. The king 
does so especially when there is tension and frustration among Jordanians. King Abdullah 
II also shows a great deal of support and respect for young Jordanians and has in the past 
visited universities for ‘youth forums’ in which he invites students for dialogue. He also 
holds various recognition events for ‘exceptional’ youth to celebrate their achievements. 
During these events he tends to emphasize the contributions of young people and 
reassures them that their opinions and struggles matter to the government. Since receiving 
his degree in International History from Georgetown University in the US and graduating 
from Sandhurst Military Academy in the UK, Crown Prince Hussein often accompanies 
his father during these engagements. Recently, for example, on 13 May 2019 King 
Abdullah II and Crown Prince Hussein held an event during which the king:  
stressed the need for adopting youth’s ideas and encouraging their political 
engagement, noting that young Jordanians must realise that their voice is heard 
and has an impact. During the meeting, attended by HRH Crown Prince Hussein, 
King Abdullah expressed pride in young Jordanians, noting that they give hope in 
Jordan’s economic, political and social reform endeavours.521 
 
Similarly, in January 2018, King Abdullah II met with students at the University of Jordan 
in Amman where he discussed ‘various local and international issues.’ He later stated on 
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social media that the dialogue ‘strengthened [his] faith that the youth of the homeland are 
the pillars of its future and capable of bearing the responsibility of continuing building 
and modernisation.’522 On the first Friday of Ramadan in 2019, King Abdullah II also 
visited a small town in Irbid where he joined Jordanians in the Friday prayer and made a 
surprise visit to two underprivileged families. In one of the families, both parents suffer 
from major health issues, and in the second family, there is an injured former military 
member. In both cases, the king directed his personnel to ensure the families receive better 
healthcare, more furniture and better homes. In addition, ‘His Majesty also instructed 
Royal Hashemite Court officials to ensure that 15 housing units are built for 
underprivileged families in Al Mukheiba, in line with the regulations of the Ministry of 
Social Development.’523 Further, King Abdullah II and other members of the royal family 
have established a variety of royal initiatives, also known as royal NGOs (RONGOs), that 
address diverse needs, in addition to the work of the government ministries. The 
RONGOs also play a role in upholding the monarchy’s appearance as popular 
benefactors, which as stated previously, is important to preserve the constructs of neo-
patrimonialism. 
The Jordanian government, headed by the monarchy, has instituted a model of 
managed change based on reforming political institutions in a way that gives the illusion 
of reform but does not redistribute power in a significant way.524 Reformists in Jordan 
have attempted to use this managed reform to position opposition networks and civil 
society groups within the government’s reform agenda, aiming thereby to increase the 
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government’s credibility both nationally and internationally. With these reformist tactics, 
King Abdullah II has gained favour with Washington, which has pressured Jordan to 
introduce reforms since 2001, and consequently his country benefits from aid packages, 
military cooperation, and trade agreements. Due to the unpredictability of change caused 
by potentially radical opposition forces, the United States and Europe have favoured the 
managed reform process,525 perhaps even more so since the regionally destabilizing ‘Arab 
Spring’ and its aftermath. Additionally, the Jordanian government itself realizes that 
extensive political liberalization could bring forces to power that oppose foreign actors, 
which would jeopardize the flow of foreign aid. One of the main concerns is that greater 
political liberalization would allow Islamists to gain strength but limiting Islamists’ 
access to power is one of the United States’ major interests in the Middle East.526 The 
Jordanian government has also been concerned with the youth bulge and the challenges 
it poses. In 2013, King Abdullah II wrote, ‘in recent years, we came to a challenge unlike 
any before. Jordan entered the 21st century with a large youth population, young men and 
women who have the same high expectations as their peers across the world.’527 Then, 
Jordan introduced Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security to the United Nations 
Security Council in 2015, the first time that the role of youth in global security was 
directly addressed by the Security Council.528  
Additionally, the monarchy’s objective is to maintain the existing political order 
and keep the country stable in the face of real and perceived threats to its authority, among 
which resource scarcity, economic struggles, a lack of a cohesive national identity, and 
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susceptibility to regional geopolitics rank high.529 The top-down managed reform process 
favoured by the Jordanian monarchy and foreign aid donors alike has not led to 
substantive change, ‘making at best a marginal difference on specific issues but not 
leading to the redistribution of power that a true process of democratization and even 
liberalization would entail.’530 In fact, true democratic transitions require reforms leading 
to a citizen-responsive political system rather than institutional (re-)arrangements that are 
purely formal and meant to assuage citizens’ discontent.531  
Sibille Merz argues that civil society, ‘together with a few key terms, such as 
democracy, human rights, participation, self-help and empowerment, … is at the very top 
of a neoliberal development agenda, which, driven by the twin motors of neoliberal 
economics and liberal democratic theory, sees private institutions and NGOs as the main 
agents of democratisation.’532 Thus civil society is closely tied to political and economic 
liberalisation in development policy. Following the ‘war on terror,’ development policies 
themselves became reframed in terms of security, ‘in the name of opportunity and 
empowerment.’533 As Mark Duffield explains, development efforts in this sense are a 
security mechanism that ‘promises to mobilize the poor and aggrieved against society’s 
enemies.’534 In Jordan, one of these perceived ‘enemies of society’ could be the influence 
of the Islamic State and radicalization towards violent extremism by other actors. Here, 
too, normative goals are utilized to support security- and stability-related objectives. 
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The Securitization of Youth in the Development Discourse 
 
The foreign aid discourse surrounding youth, development, and security has 
driven policies and programming in Jordan. The link between youth and security is deeply 
entrenched in how youth have been understood: ‘youth has always had a double-sided 
aspect, such that for every stereotypical representation of youth as problem and pathology 
there exists an inverse idealisation of youth as possibility and panacea.’535 In the current 
period, there has been a shift from youth being a local to a global security concern. As 
Sukarieh and Tannock argue, three frameworks of understanding youth as major security 
concerns emerged: the ‘problem of expanding surplus populations,’ often called the 
‘youth bulge;’ ‘the ideal of “youth as peacebuilders,”’ entrepreneurs, and agents of 
change that attempts to mould ‘young people into supporting the contemporary global 
economic order;’ and fear of increasingly-connected youth becoming radicalized and 
recruited for terrorism.536 More attention has been paid to the impacts of the ‘youth bulge’ 
and the effects of ‘alleged youth extremism’ since the United States launched its global 
war on terror.537  
These issues encapsulate the global securitisation of youth, where securitisation 
can be defined as ‘the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as 
an existential threat.’538 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde identify securitization as the process 
of state actors turning subjects into security matters; it is a form of politicization in which 
extraordinary means can be used in the name of security.539 As Roe points out, 
securitization can be viewed as a negative process in which democratic processes are 
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undermined and attention is turned away from scrutinizing political elites towards the 
subject of securitization; in this case, the youth population.540 To counter the above-
mentioned concerns, the international community has implemented various programmes 
for youth, involving, among others, empowerment, inclusion, participation, and 
entrepreneurship, which ultimately ‘promote the interests of business and political 
elites.’541  
The positive youth development movement is presented as a shift from presenting 
youth in a negative light to a ‘sense of positivity and a new-found commitment to 
embracing and empowering the young.’542 In this new adaptation of youth in 
policymaking agendas, youth are understood as important resources that can be developed 
into an asset, as opposed to being a problem that needs to be managed.543 The United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (S/Res/2250) aligns with the positive youth 
development movement, ‘recognizing the important and positive contribution of youth in 
efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.’544 Despite its positive 
approach, it still emphasizes the role of youth in preventing violence and extremism, and 
‘stresses the importance’ of promoting entrepreneurship among youth so that they can 
‘positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts.’545 Youth are still:  
being used to package and promote social change – a phenomenon that has been 
particularly pronounced in capitalist society, with its relentless promotion of 
radical social, economic and technological invention and upheaval. In this sense, 
it is perfectly understandable that neoliberal reformers would seek both to link 
neoliberal ideals and ideology with the image of youth, and to inculcate neoliberal 
subjectivities among the youth through education, training and development 
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programs that promote such concepts as youth entrepreneurship and financial 
literacy.546  
 
Youth development policies and programmes globally appear to have been focused on 
teaching the principles of neoliberal ideologies, including financial literacy, free market 
economic theory and values, and encouraging and sponsoring youth entrepreneurship. 
Rather than empowering youth and leading to their political emancipation, however, these 
programmes impose a ‘narrowly prescribed set of legitimate practices and viewpoints’ on 
participants and often function as mechanisms for control and management of the social 
space.547 This criticism is very much like the criticism of social capital as development 
policy – that it is prescriptive and exclusionary.  
Via the positive development approach, youth policy has been formulated through 
the lens of market economic and democratization demands of the international 
community. This understanding of youth as a social category ‘subordinate[s] it to the 
changing needs of the labour market and disrupt[s] the emergence of broad-based 
resistance or class consciousness.’548 The political institutions promoting neoliberal 
interests across the Middle East have created an understanding of youth that isolates them 
from other, older, generations and thereby ‘disrupts broader class consciousness.’ This 
allows for the legitimisation of managing and controlling youth, and youth policies and 
programmes are ‘a means of distracting attention from the deeper structural failings of 
national economies and the political regimes which rule them’549 rather than granting 
them meaningful modes of participation. Youth are instead given the capabilities and 
skills necessary to overcome their problems themselves, but they are not allowed to drive 
their own agenda and must remain within a tightly managed political and economic 
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framework. Social entrepreneurship has followed on from this and been framed in much 
the same way. Through the networks of association that social entrepreneurship support 
initiatives establish, the avenues for social capital available to youth have been clearly 
defined, confined, and monitored to serve certain purposes, such as countering 
radicalization and increasing economic productivity.  
A brief examination of the rhetoric of the main international actors involved with 
entrepreneurship promotion in Jordan sheds light on how they have framed their 
development objectives, specifically regarding social entrepreneurship. Foreign aid for 
social enterprises in Jordan originates from three sources: the European Union and 
European governments, the United States, and international organizations. Each of these 
will be examined in turn to show the aims and objectives of this aid, and the rationale 
behind the donor’s desire to support social enterprises. 
Foreign aid for entrepreneurship from the European Union and European 
governments and non-governmental organizations focuses on two primary objectives: 
First, developing the local economy through creating jobs and thereby reducing poverty, 
and second, increasing economic inclusiveness which includes empowering women. In a 
2018 call for project proposals, the European Commission states, for example, that 
projects should ‘contribute to poverty reduction and social inclusion of people confined 
in the informal economy and disadvantaged/marginalised groups. The design of the 
proposed actions should aim at generating jobs and developing competitive and social 
enterprises in Jordan.’550 Similarly, the European Union EU Neighbours ‘MedUP!’ 
initiative for 2018-2022 seeks to promote the ‘development of the social entrepreneurship 
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sector as a driver for inclusive growth and job creation.’551 The smaller programme 
‘Shamal Start’ is an EU-funded programme specifically for the Irbid and Mafraq 
communities, and while focused on manufacturing and service industries, also 
emphasizes job creation and local economic development.552 European initiatives from 
individual countries are more focused, but are in line with the broader objectives of the 
European Union. ‘She Entrepreneurs,’ a leadership and innovation programme by the 
Swedish Institute and the government of Sweden is designed for women entrepreneurs, 
and works for ‘an equal and sustainable society using entrepreneurial principles.’553 She 
Entrepreneurs seeks to create ‘a strong and active network of likeminded women 
entrepreneurs who inspire and support each other in driving important changes in 
society.’554 Meanwhile, the Swiss non-profit organization CEWAS’ Middle East branch 
addresses the region’s environmental challenges through entrepreneurship support. 
CEWAS states that ‘entrepreneurs and change-makers’ are needed to ‘invent the 
technologies and services for the green revolution in the Middle East’ because these have 
not been ‘brought about by conventional industrial solutions, governments, or 
development aid.’555 For this same reason, the British Council launched an initiative in 
2017 to include social entrepreneurship as a main pillar of education worldwide, because 
social entrepreneurs work ‘towards a world that has a fair and equal society where the 
potential of all people is fully realised. … They combine insight, compassion and 
imagination to solve social and environmental problems.’556 From the viewpoint of the 
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European Union and individual European governments, social entrepreneurship promises 
to be a leader and an inspiration for economic growth and solving social problems that 
the government has not addressed.  
Entrepreneurship aid from the United States government also seeks to promote 
job creation and a strong local economy in Jordan557 but emphasizes that creating these 
opportunities is not just ‘an economic imperative, but a security one as well.’558 One of 
the main ways in which the US government has supported social entrepreneurship is 
through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Civic 
Initiatives Support (CIS) programme, which in fiscal year 2019 has received 
approximately $32.5 million from the United States government.559 The USAID CIS 
programme ‘aims at cultivating a strong and vibrant civil society in Jordan through 
supporting a broad range of civic initiatives.’560 The hope is for enterprising Jordanians 
to lead development in ‘environment, water, energy, education, STEM561 education, 
democracy, and rights’562 through locally-driven solutions.563 Injaz, formerly a project 
under Save the Children funded by USAID, seeks to address ‘the wide range of needs of 
young Jordanians’ and prides itself in reaching ‘over 370,000 youth a year’ through its 
capacity-building programmes.564 One of these is the Social Leaders Program (SLP) 
which ‘empowers Jordanian youth to effect positive change in their communities through 
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… innovative and impactful social initiatives.’565 Ten enterprises are selected and paired 
with mentors for 18 months to help them implement their ideas. Injaz states that it invests 
in this programme ‘with the goal of impacting a much larger pool of beneficiaries than 
the ten SLP leaders and their teams. … with each program cycle the SLP can potentially 
create ten new nationwide social enterprises, each impacting their own specific pool of 
beneficiaries and each addressing an independent social concern or need.’566 Injaz’ SLP 
is thus an example of a social entrepreneurship support programme that focuses 
specifically on youth and aims for the beneficiaries themselves to further promote the 
SLP’s goals so that youth address their own needs through social enterprises. The United 
States’ justifications for supporting social enterprises show that this funding is, much like 
funding from Europe, intended to give Jordanians agency to address their own problems, 
and further, that those who received US aid are expected to ‘pay it forward’ by supporting 
others. 
The United States’ emphasis on social entrepreneurship as one possible solution 
or deterrent for youth ‘extremism’ becomes evident in the remarks of Alice Wells, US 
ambassador to Jordan from 2014 to 2017, at an entrepreneurship event in Amman in 2015:  
With Da’esh at our doorstep, we’ve seen how violent extremists are exploiting 
and tapping into the frustrations of our youth. While poverty alone has not been 
shown to cause terrorism or violence, investments in youth entrepreneurship and 
education are some of the most powerful antidotes that we have to combat violent 
extremism. Job creation is a key to our shared prosperity and security.567 
 
The former ambassador’s remarks outlined the United States’ view that there is a distinct 
causal relationship between promoting entrepreneurship, especially among youth, and 
ensuring both economic prosperity and the future security of Jordan, particularly 
regarding violent extremism. Regardless of whether this is accurate, it shows the US’ 
 
565 Injaz, ‘Social Leaders Program (SLP) & Competition,’ accessed February 6, 2019, 
http://injaz.org.jo/DetailsPage/DetailsPrograms.aspx?NewID=86. 
566 Injaz, ‘Social Leaders Program (SLP) & Competition.’ 
567 Wells, ‘Creating a Future of Prosperity.’ 
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primary objective for promoting entrepreneurship is Jordan’s stability, which ties into the 
broader US geopolitical goal to ensure regional stability. A 2018 US embassy call for 
grant applications states that grants will be given to projects that focus on the strategic 
priorities of economic stability, which includes expanding employability and creating 
economic opportunities for youth and women and promoting entrepreneurship.568 The 
application page further states that the second major objective is ‘political stability 
through an engaged civil society’ which can be achieved through ‘innovative approaches 
to solving societal challenges,’ or social entrepreneurship.569 The US embassy in Jordan 
views social entrepreneurship as one of the ‘moderating forces’ it supports to counter 
‘radical extremism and the forces that contribute to radicalization.’570 The United States 
expects social entrepreneurs to not only tackle social and economic problems, but also to 
counter radicalization and extremism in their communities. The rationale appears to be 
that unemployed youth are automatically at risk of radicalization, and that social 
entrepreneurship can prevent this from occurring by giving them a productive avenue of 
activity which also contributes to their community. 
 International organizations focus primarily on economic empowerment, much as 
Europe-based initiatives do, and stress the engagement of youth. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), for example, ‘sees entrepreneurship as a central 
driver of economic and social stability, and supports initiatives that tap into local skills, 
expertise, and resources.’571 Regarding youth involvement in entrepreneurship, the World 
Bank Group Youth Innovation Fund provides grant funding, meant to engage and 
 
568 United States Embassy in Jordan, ‘Public Affairs Section Notice of Funding Opportunity,’ accessed 
November 21, 2018, https://jo.usembassy.gov/embassy/jordan/sections-offices/public-diplomacy/small-
grants/. 
569 United States Embassy in Jordan, ‘Public Affairs Section Notice of Funding Opportunity.’ 
570 United States Embassy in Jordan, ‘Public Affairs Section Notice of Funding Opportunity.’ 
571 Jennifer Colville, ‘Unleashing the Entrepreneur Spirit for Economic Growth in Jordan: Let Me Count 
the Ways’ (United Nations Development Programme August 24, 2016), 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2016/8/24/Unleashing-the-entrepreneur-spirit-for-
economic-growth-in-Jordan-Let-me-count-the-ways.html. 
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empower youth,572 for them to implement innovative projects to help combat youth 
unemployment worldwide.573 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Office of 
Innovation also gives grants to youth to support their use of technology to address 
challenges facing children; they state that ‘in today’s world, innovation has become even 
more vital’ for this purpose.574 The project ‘Prevention of Violent Extremism through 
Youth Empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia’ by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) takes youth entrepreneurship a step further. This 
project, launched in April 2018, is designed to ‘support youth driven initiatives on the 
ground in education, sciences, culture, and the media to prevent violent extremism.’575 
The rationale is that youth empowerment through employment and youth engagement in 
local communities will lead to critical thinking, cross-cultural dialogue, and integration 
with constructive activities as an antidote to cycles of extremism.576 This mirrors the 
image of youth entrepreneurship as a solution to violent extremism outlined by US 
ambassador Alice Wells in 2015. Again, youth are presented with entrepreneurship as an 
all-inclusive solution to their own unemployment, frustrations, and potential 
radicalization. At the same time, youth are expected to contribute to the solution of social 
and economic problems; this is no small task. 
The aforementioned foreign actors have turned to ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘social 
entrepreneurship’ as new buzzwords for their development agenda as an extension of 
 
572 Youth to Youth Community, ‘Youth Innovation Fund (YIF),’ December 19, 2017, 
https://y2ycommunity.org/youth-innovation-fund-yif/. 
573 World Bank, ‘Youth Innovation Fund 2015: Empowering Young People to Translate Ideas into Jobs,’ 
September 4, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/09/04/youth-innovation-fund-2015-
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‘civil society’ support. Entrepreneurship, and especially social entrepreneurship, are well 
situated to address, in their view, economic development in a ‘self-help’ manner. It also 
allows foreign actors a less visible hand of influence, which may be met with less 
resistance in Jordan. As interviewee ‘73L’ commented, both the Jordanian government, 
foreign governments, and international organizations are motivated to support 
entrepreneurship in Jordan: ‘What’s the motive? We have a high rate of unemployment 
here. What’s the solution? One of the most appealing solutions is for the unemployed to 
start their own business and employ others. So, it is appealing for everybody.’577 
Simultaneously, social entrepreneurship has the potential to alleviate issues related to 
participation, empowerment, youth, and even violent extremism. In short, foreign actors 
support entrepreneurship in Jordan because they see it as a promising vehicle for 
economic development leading to greater state stability. They thus place social 
entrepreneurship at the intersection of support for development and civil society and the 
effort to prevent extremism. 
The Jordanian Ministry of Youth has taken a similar approach to youth and social 
entrepreneurship and has included some of the international actors’ foreign funding ideas 
into its own initiatives. The Ministry’s activities for youth have included camps, trips, 
cultural, arts and sports activities, recycling and waste management, and are intended to 
enhance youth capabilities and their participation in their community. In early 2016, the 
Ministry of Youth incorporated training on entrepreneurship for youth into the activities 
offered at its 120 youth centres located throughout the country. According to a Ministry 
of Youth official, the purpose of these activities, besides providing them training on small 
jobs that can make them qualified for employment and bring them some income, is ‘to 
 
577 Interview with ‘73L’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation), Amman, Jordan, February, 
2018. 
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keep the youth busy.’578 The main reason for ‘keeping the youth busy’ is ‘to face the 
unemployment problem and to face the political situation in the surrounding countries so 
that it will not affect the youth, not to be brainwashed and go in this direction.’579 This 
approach echoes the objectives of international actors regarding keeping Jordan’s youth 
from becoming radicalized. The introduction of social entrepreneurship promotion to 
address the youth’s challenges and prevent the development of extremism is much the 
same method as the one implemented by the international community. Several of Jordan’s 
royal NGOs (RONGOs) have also begun offering support for entrepreneurship, including 
social entrepreneurship, in recent years. These RONGOs are partnered with large 
international organizations and foreign aid donors such as USAID, the World Bank, and 
the International Youth Foundation, who presumably have at least some degree of 
influence over the RONGOs through financial support. Recently, the King Abdullah II 
Fund for Development (KAFD)580 announced plans to expand its entrepreneurship 
support pillar to include the ‘social entrepreneurship challenge,’ which ‘aims to support 
young people’s solutions for social challenges as well as provide self-recruitment 
opportunities.’581 The KAFD entrepreneurship pillar will also include a project on 
‘applied scientific research’ that is ‘devoted to young people who conduct applied 
scientific research and seeks to support those who have found solutions to their 
communities’ problems.’582 Thus, the government and monarchy-related organizations 
are incorporating the current development discourse regarding youth and social enterprise 
into their initiatives.  
 
578 Interview with ‘MB1’ (Official in the Ministry of Youth), Amman, Jordan, February 2018. 
579 Interview with ‘MB1.’ 
580 King Abdullah II Fund for Development, ‘KAFD’s Vision,’ accessed May 17, 2019, 
https://www.kafd.jo/en. 
581 ‘KAFD Launches Five New Projects Targeted Towards Youth,’ Jordan Times, March 24, 2019, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/kafd-launches-five-new-projects-targeted-towards-youth.  
582 ‘KAFD Launches Five New Projects Targeted Towards Youth.’ 
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The current development discourse surrounding social entrepreneurship is 
legitimating the Jordanian government and monarchy’s restrictions on the youth’s 
political and social space. On the one hand, the funding parameters of foreign actors 
restricts the space in which youth as social entrepreneurs can function by determining the 
topics that will receive support, and thus managing the areas where social enterprises can 
work. On the other hand, once foreign funding reaches Jordan, global goals and intentions 
also become subject to national power structures, ranging from the highest points of the 
Jordanian hierarchy (the monarchy and its royal NGOs) to the lowest (the ministries’ 
bureaucrats who handle social enterprise registration procedures). Further, because the 
international community stresses the importance of youth de-radicalization and overall 
Jordanian stability, the government can, in the eyes of foreign actors, use these same 
reasons to validate its own approaches to managing youth, civil society, and within this, 
social enterprises. Thus, the greater power structures framing Jordan’s political and social 
space restrict social enterprises’ establishment, function, and programmes to those that 
are accepted by both the international community and the government. 
Through entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship programmes, grants, and 
other support structures, foreign actors have introduced market principles into governance 
in Jordan. The old formula of ‘market economy + democracy = peace’583 is being applied 
to youth and other Jordanians through social entrepreneurship, which combines aspects 
of both market economic and democratic values, to maintain Jordan’s relative stability. 
The question remains whether it is possible at present for social enterprises in Jordan to 
fulfil the objectives the international community has defined. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, there are various obstacles in Jordan for entrepreneurs to become established and 
 
583 Constanze Schellhaas and Annette Seegers, ‘Peacebuilding: Imperialism's New Disguise?’ African 
Security Studies 18, no. 2 (2010): 4, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2009.9627524. 
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self-sufficient, among them bureaucratic and legal issues and an inability to become 
financially self-sustainable, which leads to their continuous financial dependency on 
international aid, which itself can be short-term and changeable. This insecurity coupled 
with the financial dependency on international aid leads to international donors dictating, 
in effect, the work of Jordan’s civil society organizations and social enterprises, 
particularly product- and service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs). Due to structural 
transformation-based social enterprises’ (STSEs) non-reliance on international aid, they 
are less affected by this issue. Encouraging entrepreneurship, while well intentioned, also 
relieves the government of its responsibility to address problems and instead places this 
burden on citizens. Many entrepreneurship programs and funders also emphasize that 
these entrepreneurs should be youth, thereby saddling them with the responsibility of 
addressing their own unemployment, while at the same time solving various social issues.  
Another issue that arises from foreign actors and the Jordanian regime supporting 
social entrepreneurship development issues is that they appear to assume that social 
entrepreneurship is an independent variable for development. However, as seen in the 
section on the criticisms of social capital, which is a defining aspect of social 
entrepreneurship, it is not at all clear that this is the case. Social capital may not be an 
independent factor which, once fostered and expanded, will lead to development in 
economy and politics. This key aspect of social enterprises may in fact be subject to 
external influences and could even be a dependent variable, that is, that external factors 
determine the function of social capital, and not vice versa. Therefore, social 
entrepreneurship may also be largely dependent on external factors, and, in fact, its 
success has been shown to rely on various features of the social entrepreneurship 
ecosystem. It is not clear that social entrepreneurship support programmes can achieve 
their objectives.  
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The following section assesses the role that foreign actors play in the Jordanian 
entrepreneurship ecosystem and evaluates the efficacy of the current foreign funding 
model for social entrepreneurship in light of social entrepreneurs’ needs.  
 
Assessing the Role Foreign Actors Play in the Jordanian Entrepreneurship 
Ecosystem 
 
Foreign actors’ emphasis on promoting entrepreneurship among youth as a way 
to alleviate high unemployment, increase civic participation, and counter extremism and 
violence indicates that especially the United States and international organizations view 
youth as a threat to Jordan’s stability and security. It is clear, further, that the US and 
international organizations believe that countering extremism and violence requires 
keeping youth occupied and satisfied, which can be achieved by creating employment 
opportunities, helping them to become involved in their communities, and encouraging 
political and civic inclusion. Social entrepreneurship has the potential to accomplish all 
of these, and, moreover, helps place the burden of doing so on the youth themselves, 
thereby removing pressure from the Jordanian government. The country’s youth bulge 
and unemployment issues must be addressed, but social entrepreneurship in Jordan, as 
encouraged and funded by international actors and the Jordanian government, is part of a 
development policy that is perhaps overly concerned with ‘reducing young people to a 
security risk,’ which Milton-Edwards warns against.584 Despite international trends to 
view youth as a positive changing force rather than a security threat, development efforts 
in Jordan have framed support for youth social entrepreneurship initiatives in terms of 
both reducing the security threat of youth and this population sector’s potential for 
positive development. Thus, youth are still being politicized, particularly by the United 
 
584 Beverley Milton-Edwards, ‘Marginalized Youth: Toward an Inclusive Jordan,’ policy briefing (Doha, 
Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, June, 2018), 1. 
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States and international organizations. Instead of de-‘securitizing’ youth, these social 
entrepreneurship support programmes take the responsibility of addressing the youth 
‘security issue’ from governments and place it in the hands of youth themselves. 
 Further, the Jordanian entrepreneurship ecosystem does not yet have the potential 
to solve social problems. As outlined by Bibars, an environment that enables social 
entrepreneurship requires financial investment; establishing effective networks and 
collaboration between stakeholders such as the social sector, the business sector, the 
government, and educational bodies; partnership with the media; and documentation and 
dissemination of effective practices. Bibars argues that these would allow for existing 
resource maximisation and population empowerment.585 At present, the Jordanian 
entrepreneurship ecosystem has not reached this point. An evaluation of foreign actors’ 
social entrepreneurship support mechanisms follows. 
Foreign actors fund enterprises because they constitute an attractive, self-
sustainable avenue for problem solving that can continue after the foreign funder has 
departed. The self-sustainable nature of the enterprise means that the organization will 
depend on foreign funds only at the beginning, and that after becoming well-established, 
the foreign funder can withdraw, confident that the funds were invested in an entity that 
will continue to benefit the community independently. In theory this is a brilliant way to 
make often limited and short-term foreign aid funds last longer and to build bottom-up 
organizations that can continuously evolve to be responsive to community needs. Funding 
social enterprises promises an even better, two-in-one deal: these enterprises provide 
solutions to social issues while boosting the local economy and providing essential goods 
and services. In a country such as Jordan where both the international community and the 
 
585 Iman Bibars, ‘A Decade of Social Entrepreneurship in the Region,’ in Social Entrepreneurship in the 
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monarchy favour stability, any initiative that might lead to increased social cohesion 
would be viewed as beneficial. 
There are two issues with this approach in Jordan. First, it assumes that the 
‘entrepreneurship ecosystem’ is robust, meaning that the network of support systems for 
enterprises is well-developed. This support system includes financial, legal, mentorship, 
and bureaucratic aspects. Jordan’s entrepreneurship ecosystem is only emerging, and as 
described previously, not yet able to offer entrepreneurs the range of support they require. 
Second, it assumes that enterprises can flourish with small short-term investments. The 
approach appears to be that it is better to fund many enterprises with small grants, rather 
than a few enterprises with large grants. The issue is that start-ups require significant 
initial financial investments to become established and self-sustainable, and that grants 
of a few thousand JOD are insufficient. For example, every registered company in Jordan 
must have an office space; office rental fees might consume most of these small grants, 
with little funding left over for running the enterprise. Isaac outlines the requirements for 
foreign aid to efficiently support social enterprises:  
If local entrepreneurs were trained to develop solutions to their endemic issues, if 
agencies worked through local entrepreneurs to develop sustainable solutions for 
such issues, if such entrepreneurs were then equipped with tools and funding 
necessary to sustain them within a future free market, such empowerment would 
go a long way for foreign aid.586 
 
This description contains many ‘ifs’ of potential, theoretical circumstances that must take 
place for this model to work. Moving forward, the foreign aid model for social 
entrepreneurship in Jordan must be adjusted in several ways if foreign actors wish their 
investment to have positive outcomes, that is, for foreign aid money to translate into self-
sustainable and continuing social enterprises. 
 
586 Cheryl Isaac, ‘Social Entrepreneurship and Foreign Aid: 3 Ways This Model Could Work in 
Developing Economies,’ Forbes, July 20 ,2012, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/07/20/entrepreneur-aid-3-ways-such-a-model-could-help-
foreign-aid-work-in-developing-economies/#1c533a836903.  
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Conclusion 
The chapter argues that the international community contributes to the 
confinement of the political space in Jordan as is evident in its interactions with and 
influence over civil society and social entrepreneurship. The chances of social enterprises 
achieving their objectives without external interference and functioning as truly 
community-responsive organizations, rather than being beholden to the demands of the 
international community, are slim. Most Jordanian social enterprises, especially product- 
and service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) ultimately depend on sponsorship from 
the international community, and thus the related funding proscriptions define the areas 
in which social entrepreneurs can work. Only very few, mostly structural transformation-
based social enterprises (STSEs), have established independent funding avenues and can 
therefore function more freely of the demands of foreign actors. 
When international organizations and foreign governments support social 
enterprises, they are promoting a development strategy that implicitly relies on social 
capital. This is because social capital constitutes an integral and defining aspect of social 
entrepreneurship. This is problematic because the concept and utility of social capital in 
development remain disputed. Rather than aiding political participation and economic 
growth, international actors might inadvertently be supporting a strategy that has been 
shown to be exclusionary, perpetuate the status quo, and promote only the ‘right’ kind of 
association, all while emphasizing the obligation of individuals to solve their own 
problems.  
Social enterprises established with support from foreign actors serve those actors’ 
purposes and represent those actors’ interests; thus, they are not, and cannot be, ‘bottom-
up’ organizations that wholly represent the interests of Jordanian communities. As shown 
in Chapter Three, the majority of product- and service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) 
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relies on continuing external funding, much of which comes from foreign governments 
or international organizations. These foreign actors include various requirements in their 
financial aid to foreign enterprises, beginning with the application process. Funders may 
require that social enterprises focus on one or a set of specific issues; to even be eligible 
for funding, therefore, social enterprises must match their work to that of the funder. If 
they do not, they will not receive this funding. These requirements also shift regularly, 
with funders adjusting their application requirements to overarching consensus on 
development needs. In Jordan in recent years, the shift has been from ‘empowering 
women’ to ‘empowering youth’ to ‘aiding refugees,’ with few funders’ requirements 
remaining constant. As social entrepreneurs continually amend their work in line with 
these shifts, they lose the ability to be independent community-responsive actors. This is 
not to say that the international community’s efforts and focuses are necessarily 
misplaced or incorrect, but that the way foreign actors interact with and impact the 
development of social enterprises renders them ineffective as civil society actors, and 
makes them inadequate in terms of economic development as well, since so many of them 
ultimately never become financially independent. The mode of social entrepreneurship 
support that foreign actors currently implement restricts social enterprises’ functions, and 
indeed directs their areas of work. At the same time, social entrepreneurs are not 
adequately equipped to become the independent, self-perpetuating ‘pay-it-forward’ 
organizations that foreign funders would ideally like them to be, because foreign 
investment has thus far been too minor, and social entrepreneurship training is lacking in 
some key areas.  
Social entrepreneurship, with its combined market economic and democratic 
principles, is an attractive way for foreign actors to support Jordan’s stability by 
preventing radicalization in youth, creating employment and inclusion opportunities, and 
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allowing for increased civic participation. At present, however, there are various changes 
that need to occur in the social entrepreneurship ecosystem in Jordan, including reforms 
to the way foreign actors approach their funding mechanisms. These reforms will need to 
occur before social enterprises as a sector can be effective change agents, whether 
economic or governance related.  
A key aspect of social entrepreneurship is the use and creation of social capital, a 
concept which is contested in development approaches, so its utility in this case must be 
considered. By promoting and supporting social enterprises, international organizations 
and foreign governments implicitly rely on social capital as an economic and civil society 
development tool. However, promoting social capital in development, in any form, faces 
certain issues. It is exclusionary and/or restricted to the ‘elite;’ it tends to promote 
‘correct’ or acceptable modes of association that reproduce the status quo; and it is unclear 
whether social capital is an independent or dependent variable, that is, whether increasing 
social capital (and social entrepreneurship) leads to development at all.  
In addition, as established in chapters one and four, social entrepreneurship can 
be a fundamentally destabilizing force due to its tendency to uproot traditional accepted 
values and its drive to create lasting structural change. Those citizens who have recently 
been financially and civically empowered by social entrepreneurship will be given a 
voice, will have certain demands that need to be met, and will take actions in their and 
their communities’ interests, which may not align with regime interests, and thus create 
tension. Further, Jordan’s government is not only unhelpful but is actively creating and 
enforcing obstacles for social entrepreneurs, particularly for those who rely in whole or 
in part on international aid. The Jordanian government’s involvement in social 
entrepreneurship is analysed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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Finally, another question arises: what happens to social capital in authoritarian 
regimes, or in contexts where the regime uses extensive surveillance? If social capital 
processes can be influenced by external factors, as the critical literature suggests, then it 
becomes necessary to examine them, as well as how this in turn affects the way social 
enterprises function. This will be explored in the following two chapters.  
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Chapter 5: The Restrictive Policies and Practices of the 
Jordanian Government 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter explores the relationship between the Jordanian government’s 
policies and the emergence of social entrepreneurship. The framework of the 
‘surveillance state’ and regime uses of administrative power allow for an examination of 
the Jordanian government’s tactics to manage, control, and ultimately repress social 
enterprises. The government implements extensive bureaucratic obstacles, including 
consistently confusing registration policies, ministry over-involvement, and other 
measures of oversight. It further implements restrictions through the legal code regarding 
the nature and function of associations and has implemented a foreign funding control 
mechanism. The monarchy has also systematically inserted itself, through royal NGOs, 
into the work of social entrepreneurs. These are all indicators of persisting neopatrimonial 
and semi-authoritarian governance approaches.  
 From the government’s use of administrative power and establishment of 
permissible and restricted activities, a clear hierarchy of social enterprises emerges. The 
more closely a social enterprise is affiliated with the government, the more it is tolerated, 
because the government exercises more management over it. Conversely, the more 
independent a social enterprise is, the less it is tolerated and subjected to greater 
repression methods, because the government must attempt to exercise more control. The 
emergence of social enterprises has prompted a mixed response of both toleration and 
repression from the government, creating a tension between social enterprises and the 
regime. The government’s response thus far has been a mix of state-led top-down control 
and toleration of government-affiliated (and to some degree managed) social enterprises. 
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 The chapter begins with an overview of the ‘surveillance state’ and government 
administrative control in theory, relating these to the development of political rights, and 
defining how ‘surveillance’ will be understood in this chapter. Following this is an 
analysis of the government-created social entrepreneurship hierarchy and which types of 
social enterprises are most or least likely to face government repression. This is related 
to Robert Dahl’s theories on polyarchy, totalitarianism and the likelihood of regimes 
tending towards repression or toleration. The chapter then discusses the Jordanian 
government’s various control tactics, including bureaucratic obstacles, ministry 
oversight, the control of foreign funding, and the work of royal NGOs. From this emerges 
an outline of the surveillance tactics the government implements; namely, direct control, 
intimidation and repression, and close monitoring. The chapter concludes by discussing 
the rationale behind the Jordanian government’s mixed toleration-repression approach to 
managing social entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Defining Surveillance 
 
As Horn outlines, states ‘can encourage, discourage, co-opt or restrict the effects 
of social entrepreneurship, particularly when structures of state power are threatened by 
new rules and norms created through the practice of social entrepreneurship.’587 The 
limitations that social entrepreneurship places on state power may not always be positive, 
because it signifies the state’s (partial) loss of its ability to guide and direct social and 
economic structures.588 Consequently, in the case of autocracies or semi-autocracies, the 
state’s response can be restrictive and repressive to achieve a re-balancing of power in its 
 
587 Denise M. Horn, Democratic Governance and Social Entrepreneurship: Civic Participation and the 
Future of Democracy (London: Routledge, 2013), 10. 
588 Horn, Democratic Governance and Social Entrepreneurship, 10-11. 
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favour, thereby again negating any positive effects. States’ responses can take the form 
of control through administrative power and surveillance.  
 Government surveillance over citizens has likely existed in some form, to some 
extent, throughout history.589 Raeff argues that the Reformation and the end of the Thirty 
Years’ War, which is generally understood to establish the modern concept of state 
sovereignty, also established the earliest versions of the modern police state, and its 
establishment of early forms of surveillance. Because the Catholic Church no longer 
offered religious and moral guidance in Protestant-controlled areas, secular rulers had to 
become interventionist and regulatory. In addition, it was believed that the welfare of 
subjects depended on the establishment of strong governments and leaders; likewise, the 
welfare and prosperity of subjects would benefit the state and increase the power of rulers. 
Thus, directing public welfare was believed to benefit the state and morality.590  
This led to a shift from the government’s traditional, passive role of preserving 
justice to the new active role of ‘fostering the productive energies of society and providing 
the appropriate institutional framework for it.’591 Just as the Church had previously 
regulated morality, now it was the obligation of the ruler to ‘enact the laws and regulations 
that shape society and keep it on the right path,’ which led to centralization and regulation, 
and the ‘tyrannical control and supervision of every facet of public and economic life’ 
found in states’ legislation.592 When the government took on this additional 
responsibility, it increased the degree of control and supervision its councils and central 
offices exercised over officials and institutions. Government oversight over institutions 
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and corporations was meant to favour entities that supported its interests. This also meant 
that an individual’s interests were subordinated to those of the community, ‘as 
personalized by the ruler or materialized in the state.’593 At the same time, the state 
fostered individual creativity through ‘centralized and directed controls’ because of the 
belief that this would allow the state to direct this creativity ‘into useful channels of 
innovation and dynamic progress.’594 Governments also realized that having a police 
force was the best way to tend to the population’s general welfare, which would allow it 
to maximize resources and the public’s potential.595 Regulation, supervision, and 
securitization were meant to maximize the potential of the population to play the role 
designed for it by the state. States justified their increased regulatory role by claiming that 
individuals’ selfishness needed to be kept in ‘socially tolerable bounds.’ Thus, states 
encouraged individualism, to the extent that it served state interests, and restricted 
individualism where it threatened ‘communal solidarities’ and did not benefit the state.596 
Raeff thus draws a clear conceptual link between community welfare, government power, 
and state surveillance in this historical case, one whose basic ideas can be seen in 
arguments for surveillance in the present day.  
Surveillance in contemporary society has been conceptualized and theorized in 
different ways. Michel Foucault’s use of Jeremy Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ as a metaphor 
for contemporary surveillance is one of the most influential in the study of surveillance. 
In a society under surveillance, individuals have very little agency. Instead, they are in 
the ‘panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power.’597 The ‘panoptic machine’ is a 
metaphor for the state’s constant surveillance which acts as a means of control: citizens, 
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feeling watched and monitored, are presumably more complacent to state-prescribed 
norms due to the threat of discipline. Management institutions shape the social and 
political space through bureaucratic and legal means, which citizens accept. The 
government’s surveillance, and its consequent gathering and ‘formation of knowledge,’ 
increase its power, and discipline is passive rather than active. In this pattern, ‘the 
formation of knowledge and the increase in power regularly reinforce one another in a 
circular process.’ 598 As in the ‘panopticon’ prison, an idea developed by Jeremy 
Bentham,599 citizens self-regulate their behaviour. The state, with this approach, can exert 
power over citizens without exerting physical punishment.600 Bentham defined 
surveillance as ‘a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind;’ this definition links 
surveillance to social control.601 This means that it is meant for the gathering of 
information about a person with the goal of coercion.602 Surveillance and management 
thus offer attractive benefits for states seeking to control certain population sectors 
without taking too great a risk of either tolerating or repressing opposition overtly, an idea 
further developed by Robert Dahl. 
Bentham’s panopticon has become a metaphor in the surveillance literature for a 
state that has created what Foucault calls a ‘disciplinary society’ in which citizens under 
surveillance constantly feel watched. Foucault thus established that this subjectification 
to constant observance makes overt violence unnecessary because citizens police 
themselves. One of the issues Foucault does not address is that surveillance can be used 
to identify citizens that need to be controlled more overtly. For example, as Duncan notes, 
‘policing decisions about protests may be either facilitative or militarised depending on 
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the extent of the threat that the police identify through surveillance.’603 A pertinent 
example in the contemporary period is the Israeli government’s surveillance and control 
over its Palestinian minority population through the educational system. As Sa’di 
demonstrates, the government’s frequent screening of educators reminds them of their 
economic insecurity, keeps them dependent on collaboration with the government, and 
coerces them to provide information on any dissent within the education system.604 This 
creates ‘something analogous to a panopticon within a panopticon, where watchful eyes 
and eavesdropping ears that might see or hear dissent were imagined everywhere.’605 
From the various works discussing the panopticon metaphor, it becomes evident that 
nation states tend to move towards ‘surveillance societies’ which are characterized by 
‘increased investments in bureaucracies and techniques to systematically – and over 
longer time periods – collect, store, and use information.’606 
Other scholars have argued that Bentham’s panopticon is not appropriate as a 
metaphor and point out that the greater diversity of surveillance actors in contemporary 
society means that the state-centric approach to surveillance studies is not relevant. One 
such scholar is Kevin Haggerty, who argues that surveillance now has a variety of 
functions beyond policing ‘problem subjects;’ therefore, surveillance should be 
understood in more neutral, less negative, terms.607 Haggerty and Samatas also 
acknowledge that surveillance constitutes ‘assorted forms of monitoring, typically for the 
ultimate purpose of intervening in the world.’608 One of the ways surveillance has become 
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more widespread and ‘democratic’ is citizens’ use of technologies ‘against the powerful 
and exposing their abuses of power’609 which is known as ‘sousveillance.’610 This 
challenges the view that surveillance is inherently negative. Thomas Mathiesen 
developed a term opposite to the panopticon: the ‘synopticon,’ where the many watch the 
few through mass media, as in the case of the general public observing celebrities’ and 
politicians’ lives.611 Further, diverse methods with diverse purposes can be used for 
surveillance, so it is no longer necessarily conducted by states in a top-down fashion. It 
also ‘transcends the boundaries of separate institutions,’612 which led Bauman and Lyon 
to coin the term ‘liquid surveillance.’ This type of surveillance relies on data coding and 
tracking through multiple data flows.613 Lyon defines surveillance as ‘any collection and 
processing of personal data … for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose 
data have been garnered,’614 which includes the information gathered through increased 
computerization that has rapidly expanded the surveillance capacity of any organization, 
public or private.615 He has further emphasized the need for researchers to study the ways 
in which people agree to, and even participate in, surveillance through internet and social 
media use.616 He coined the term ‘surveillance culture’  which refers to people accepting 
that information about them is collected and analysed, for better or for worse.617 Rule 
distinguishes between ‘systems of surveillance’ and ‘systems of control.’ He explains that 
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systems of surveillance refer to ‘activities having to do with collecting and maintaining 
information’ whereas systems of control encompass the ‘actual management of 
behaviour, through sanctioning or exclusion.’618 
Thus, the scholarship on surveillance can broadly be divided into two categories, 
panoptic and non-panoptic. The most important difference between the two is whether 
surveillance is inherently negative or whether scholarship should take a more neutral 
approach to it. The latter, non-panoptic and neutral approach, accepts the broader 
definition of surveillance as ‘an inevitable feature of modern bureaucracies.’619 The 
former, panoptic and negative approach, views surveillance as being used for ‘the 
collection and analysis of information primarily for repressive purposes.’620 Proponents 
of this approach argue that non-panoptic scholars depoliticize the problem of surveillance 
by including types of information collection in their definitions that should not be 
included. For example, Gary Marx argues that surveillance can be non-strategic, where 
information is gathered routinely and not for a particular end.621 Similarly, Clarke 
understands surveillance to be the systematic collection of information about persons and 
their associates.622 These broad definitions argue that surveillance is simply inevitable in 
modern bureaucracies and is not necessarily negative. This chapter follows the panoptic 
and negative approach to defining surveillance: it is the collection and analysis of 
information for the purpose of political or social control. As Boersma et al. point out, 
‘managing personal data implies a control perspective.’623 The chapter views surveillance 
through the lens of power and coercion and focuses on top-down state-citizen monitoring. 
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The chapter follows Giddens’ understanding of surveillance and situates the Jordanian 
case in this context. 
Giddens writes that surveillance occurs in the storage of information, which a state 
can use to increase its range of administrative control over persons by monitoring the 
activities of disobedient or potentially disobedient population sectors. Surveillance as the 
integration of information is thus related to surveillance as direct supervision. The state 
can regulate popular conduct by manipulating and controlling the civil society space. 624 
One of the most important aspects of this is a state’s constitution and legal code. Written 
laws, which can be both permissive and restrictive, establish what conduct is allowed and 
outline the formal repercussions of violations of the law. Surveillance can be understood 
as the mobilization of administrative power.625 Administrative power derives from 
disciplinary procedures, i.e. regularized supervision, and the legal code. The state can use 
this power to ‘inculcate or to attempt to maintain certain traits of behaviour’ in its 
subjects626 with the ultimate goal of internal pacification. Internal pacification refers to 
the state’s process of ‘the monopolization of physical force,’ and can be divided into the 
pacification of ‘observable behaviour’ and of ‘behavioural norms.’627 Due to the 
pacification of norms related to states’ use of violence internally, administrative power 
and surveillance have become the new norm of state control. The state’s involvement in 
the civil society space through surveillance restricts people’s civil and political rights; 
this then becomes a clear area of conflict between state and populace. The state uses 
judiciary and executive organizations to control ‘deviant’ conduct. Further, citizens’ 
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rights can themselves be mobilized as tools of surveillance, where the regime expands its 
control through its involvement in them.628 
In contrast to democracy/polyarchy, totalitarianism/autocracy depends on the 
state’s involvement in much of the population’s quotidian activities, made possible by a 
high level of surveillance. The state achieves such surveillance through information 
coding and documentation, and supervision of significant segments of the population. 
Another element of totalitarian rule is the management of activities, as carried out by 
increased policing.629 There is significant evidence of the state’s use of administrative 
power to control citizens in various ways through social entrepreneurship in Jordan. 
RONGOs’ support for social entrepreneurship represents the state’s establishment of 
permissible activity, whereas the foreign funding control mechanism, the restrictive Law 
of Societies, and the inhibiting character of the ministries’ bureaucracies represents the 
state’s administrative restrictions of certain activities. The various ways in which the 
Jordanian regime applies this administrative power has created a hierarchy of social 
enterprises, each of which is subject to a different level and type of surveillance and 
control.  
 
 
A Hierarchy of Social Enterprises 
 
The Jordanian social enterprise hierarchy relates to their degree of acceptance and 
surveillance by the regime. Those social enterprises that are more closely linked to the 
regime are more accepted, but subject to greater surveillance. The regime views those 
which are more independent as more threatening. The independent social enterprises 
cannot be monitored as closely as those directly linked to the regime, and thus they are 
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less easily controlled. The regime upholds bureaucratic and legal obstacles and employs 
intimidation methods with these independent social enterprises to exert some degree of 
control over them. The hierarchy of social enterprises is as follows, from most to least 
accepted (see Figure 5.1):  
1. Enterprises associated with the regime through RONGOs 
2. Enterprises reliant on foreign aid, the distribution of which the regime controls 
through the foreign funding control mechanism 
3. Enterprises whose projects rely on foreign or national grants or aid, which the 
regime controls, but whose organization is independently funded 
4. Enterprises such as PSSEs which are independent but focus on ‘non-threatening’ 
activities 
5. Enterprises that are fully independent and focus on structural change, such as 
STSEs 
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    (Figure 5.1) 
 
The degree to which a social enterprise associates with the government is 
inversely correlated to the amount of risk the social enterprise faces. That is, the more 
closely a social enterprise is associated with the government, the lower the risk of 
government intimidation, harassment, and bureaucratic obstacles. The more independent 
a social enterprise is, the more likely it is to encounter government opposition and 
repression. Two key points emerge from this. First, association with the government 
subjects the social enterprise to more direct government management and/or interference 
but affords it a degree of government approval, which leads to smoother functioning. 
Second, greater independence from the government subjects the social enterprise to 
government control and repression tactics but allows it to be a more robust and 
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community-responsive organization, because the government does not directly dictate its 
work. Simultaneously, more independent social enterprises will likely be subject to 
increased surveillance through, at the very least, monitoring activities. 
The Jordanian regime’s management and control of social enterprises follows 
Dahl’s argument that ‘the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition 
increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease.’630 In other words, the government 
tolerates social enterprises more closely associated with it because they represent a 
relatively small threat to the Jordanian status quo. The regime incurs few ‘costs’ in 
tolerating these social enterprises because it already monitors and controls them closely. 
The more independent social enterprises pose a greater threat to the regime, so the 
government perceives the ‘cost’ of tolerating them to be higher, and consequently enacts 
more measures to limit their space of operation.  
On the other hand, the government cannot be excessively repressive towards 
social enterprises, particularly because international organizations and foreign 
governments champion and indeed seek to fund social enterprises in Jordan. Therefore, 
Dahl’s argument that ‘the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition 
increases as the expected costs of suppression increase’631 also applies. The Jordanian 
regime depends on international aid in its various forms and cannot risk any kind of 
international backlash in response to repression. The government’s repression tactics 
must therefore be furtive and subtle and cannot be extraordinary. This explains why the 
government supports social enterprises through RONGOs, awards prizes, and allows 
them to register, but simultaneously upholds a bureaucratic maze, a foreign funding 
control mechanism, and restrictive legal frameworks. This tactic appeases the 
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government’s ‘audiences’, namely its population and international actors, but also suits 
its own needs. The Jordanian regime has implemented a series of surveillance tactics to 
influence, control, and direct the work of social enterprises. 
 
 
Regime surveillance tactics 
 
As part of the Jordanian regime’s surveillance, it employs three interrelated and 
interlinked tactics: direct control, intimidation and repression, and close monitoring. Of 
these, close monitoring is the most broadly applied, followed by intimidation and 
repression, whereas direct control remains limited (see Figure 5.2). In the first method, 
direct control, the regime inserts itself directly into the work of social enterprises or 
directly manages their sources of financial and social capital. This leads to 
depoliticization of the social enterprise as the government removes or directs its political 
agency. The regime implements the direct control tactic through the foreign funding 
control mechanism, the law on associations, and the monarchy’s role in RONGOs, and 
their associated ‘awards’ and co-optation activities.  
In the second method, intimidation and repression, the regime restricts the 
establishment of social enterprises and uses intimidation and repression tactics on 
established social enterprises, which restricts their political agency, though not as much 
as in the direct control method. The regime carries out this method through police and 
security forces’ attendance of social enterprises’ offices and events, by intimidating 
individual entrepreneurs rather than the organization as a whole, by intimidating the social 
enterprise’s target community, and by formally restricting the areas in which 
organizations may work and shutting down organizations or events which breach these 
restrictions.  
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The third method, close monitoring, applies to the previous two methods as well. 
In this method, the regime observes social entrepreneurs and their work through 
administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms, oversees social enterprises and uses 
monitoring tactics, which leads to social entrepreneurs constantly feeling observed. This 
can lead to social entrepreneurs self-censoring statements and activities in fear of more 
serious tactics. The regime achieves this tactic through the bureaucratic obstacles during 
registration procedures, formal oversight in the legal system, and requiring applications 
and reports on foreign funding sources.  
 
    (Figure 5.2) 
 
In each of the three methods, the regime exercises considerable control over social 
enterprises, ranging from direct control to inducing self-censorship, each of which affects 
social enterprises’ ability to achieve their goals. Social enterprises that are not formally 
registered with the government lie outside the regime’s targeted surveillance tactics, but 
because they are not legally established organizations, they are inherently limited by their 
need to be undetectable. In this way, the regime influences even those social enterprises 
outside its direct surveillance mechanisms: the threat of surveillance keeps these 
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enterprises from registering and minimizes their functionality, even though they are 
formally more independent than registered enterprises. 
Government policies play a significant role in shaping the opportunities for social 
entrepreneurs. Policies for small- and medium-sized businesses and for non-
governmental organizations all affect social entrepreneurs, especially regarding what 
function these organizations can have and how they are allowed to be financed.632 The 
Jordanian regime uses soft power through bureaucratic obstacles and oversight, a foreign 
funding control mechanism, and in some cases co-optation to manage and control the 
work of social enterprises. Each of these will be discussed in turn in the following 
sections.  
 
 
Bureaucratic Obstacles 
 
In Jordan, registration policies for nongovernmental organizations and businesses 
are carefully outlined, but not clearly, which complicates the registration process for 
social enterprises. As one social entrepreneur said, ‘every ministry has its own criteria, 
and some of them, by the way, they are not clear. … [There is a] list of about 600 pages, 
but it’s not clear within this list, which are the objectives that the organization is allowed 
to work in, so, it’s a mess and it’s a hassle.’633 Navigating these registration policies is 
one of the greatest challenges for social entrepreneurs, and interviewee ‘A28’ explained 
that because they are not clear, this stage of becoming established is ‘demotivating’ and 
discouraging.634 There are would-be enterprises which never legally registered and finally 
gave up on the enterprise because of this. Additionally, there are ‘no clear policies or 
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legislation in Jordan regarding entrepreneurship.’ This means that every entrepreneur 
applying for governmental papers must ‘learn it by doing it,’ which interviewee ‘BR1’ 
described as ‘exhausting.’635 This process becomes very drawn out and tiring, and ‘unless 
you know someone inside, your papers can take a year sometimes.’636 Those wishing to 
register a social enterprise in Jordan must be extraordinarily resilient, determined, and 
patient – or well-connected, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
Social entrepreneurs who went to the Ministry of Social Development or the 
Ministry of Trade and Finance to receive guidance during the process were also 
exasperated. Interviewee ‘0H6’ explained, ‘I tried to go to the ministry, back and forth, 
back and forth, asking if I am allowed to do this, or this. … And they said, “no, no, you 
are not allowed.”’637 Others described the negative attitude ministry employees had 
towards entrepreneurs, and that they struggled until they found the right person to speak 
with.638 Many social entrepreneurs described ministry employees as unhelpful and 
uncommunicative, and that many of them seemed to have been employed not because of 
their qualifications for the job but because of their personal connections, making them 
not only unqualified but seemingly uninterested in aiding the establishment of social 
enterprises. According to social entrepreneur ‘ZM3,’ ‘there are good people inside the 
ministries, but you have to go through a hundred until you find them.’639 
There were also accounts of social enterprises facing new bureaucratic 
obstructions from ministry officials even after registration. One interviewee outlined the 
process of trying to open an enterprise-related restaurant:  
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One day the government, the ministry asked, ‘you need to have two parking spots 
in front of the restaurant in order for us to give you the license.’ Once they secured 
the spots, [the ministry] said, ‘no, you need three.’ When they had secured three, 
[the officials] said, ‘no, there’s something wrong.’640 
 
Interviewee ‘R41,’ who works to connect entrepreneurs with suitable funding sources, 
explained that government officials ‘always come up with something,’ arguing that this 
tactic is a purposeful hindrance to the whole process.641 Another interviewee also 
observed that the government tends to arbitrarily ‘impose new fees or taxes without 
cause,’ which can have serious adverse effects on the smooth running of social 
enterprises.642  
 The ministries’ bureaucratic obstacles appear to be deliberate and systematic, 
designed to achieve three things. Firstly, these policies discourage social entrepreneurs 
from establishing their enterprise. Secondly, if the social entrepreneur overcomes the 
discouragement, they face various obstacles in registering the enterprise properly, risking 
legal action if it is not registered in the correct category according to its work. Finally, 
after successfully registering, the enterprise faces ongoing bureaucratic obstacles, from 
being required to apply for more permits to dealing with direct government oversight over 
their operations. The government thus uses its bureaucratic and administrative power to 
implement surveillance tactics that ultimately manage and control social enterprises’ 
establishment, function, and continuity. 
 
 
Oversight 
 
The government ministries also exercise considerable oversight of registered 
organizations; this constitutes perhaps the most easily identifiable surveillance measure 
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implemented by the regime. The level of involvement, supervision, and control over these 
organizations, or ‘associations’ as they are known, is especially high from the Ministry 
of Social Development. As Interviewee ‘0H6’ explained, ‘the ministry will be involved 
in the association: they want to know your plans, they want to check on your financial 
records, they come and monitor what you are doing, and you have to report everything.’643 
Social development ministry officials are allowed to attend official meetings of non-
governmental organizations, so they must be informed of any planned meetings. Ministry 
officials and even police officers then ‘sit in the meeting when you’re discussing … and 
see what is happening,’ so social entrepreneurs feel pressure and intimidation from being 
watched.644 A ministry official confirmed that he and his colleagues ‘follow up and 
monitor’ societies to check how they work, how they are spending money, what grants 
they receive, and whether they are abiding by ministry laws. The official explained that 
this was to prevent corruption in civil society.645  
Jordan’s social entrepreneurs perceive this government oversight differently, 
however. According to them, ministry involvement in their enterprises constitutes a type 
of social and political control. Because they feel that the ministry is constantly observing 
them and is suspicious of their activities, they always feel the burden to show that their 
work is legal and ‘not starting a movement.’646 At every step, communication with the 
government is key to being allowed to function unhindered. If the ministry becomes 
suspicious of the organization’s activities, officials arrive unannounced to inspect the 
office and paperwork: ‘one day five people came from the government to search in our 
papers and notes, to find one payment in all the invoices, so that they can find any 
 
643 Interview with ‘0H6.’  
644 Interview with ‘R34’ (Structural Transformation-based Social Entrepreneur), Amman, Jordan, 
February, 2018. 
645 Interview with ‘Q8L’ (Ministry of Social Development Employee), Amman, Jordan, March, 2018. 
646 Interview with ‘R34.’ 
206 
 
issue.’647 The need to constantly report back to the ministries slows the social enterprises’ 
work, and ministry harassment of this nature, in the name of countering corruption, is 
damaging to the enterprises’ ability to function. It may also lead to social enterprises self-
censoring their statements and activities, simply to be able to continue operating. One 
social entrepreneur, referring to his speeches and social media posts relating to his 
enterprise, said, ‘if I keep speaking like this, [the enterprise] is not going to continue.’648 
As another interviewee stated, ‘this is for civil society to not think and not work a lot: to 
be controlled.’649 
Another issue is that organizations in Jordan are not allowed to undertake 
‘political’ activities or objectives. For social enterprises, this presents a particular 
challenge because social issues are, more often than not, perceived to be political issues 
in Jordan.  
We’re not allowed to be involved in any political activities as an NGO, or they 
will close it, which is stupid, because what we do is political. You can’t divide 
politics and social issues. They want us just to be volunteers, because for them 
political activities are threatening, so we’re not allowed to talk politics or have 
any political activities. Indirectly in the law, you are not allowed. They shut you 
down.650 
 
Other social enterprises are afraid to register in the first place due to the government’s 
reputation for oversight and shutting down organizations that are ‘too political.’ To avoid 
registering, they operate as initiatives under the umbrella of another organization, or 
simply work secretly. One social entrepreneur whose enterprise was operating as part of 
an NGO explained that he would soon need to register with the Ministry of Social 
Development, because a financial supporter had requested it. He said, however, ‘I’m 
afraid to register…I have to register this month, but I’m worried…if someone [in the 
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ministry] hates me, they will just kick me out of the whole equation. They can literally 
stop me like this.’651 A social entrepreneur who independently and secretly runs his 
enterprise explained that only very few people know about the existence of the enterprise. 
He said, ‘I believe in a place like Jordan, if you want to [work on a social or political 
issue], you just have to work from your house and say, “hey, I’m here” and have people 
pay [for services and products] in cash…if you operate openly, you may go to prison in 
this country.’652 Operating illegally and secretively raises other issues, including not 
being able to advertise or fundraise on large scales, and risking severe legal consequences 
if discovered. 
The practical challenges Jordan’s social entrepreneurs encounter stem directly 
from the country’s legal code, which significantly restricts Jordanians’ freedom of 
association. The 2008 Law on Associations, and its 2009 amendments, prohibits 
organizations with ‘political goals’653 or that are ‘contrary to the public order’654 to form; 
these terms are broad and facilitate authorities’ refusal to register organizations. Further, 
if an organization is found to have political objectives or violate the public order, the 
registration committee of the Ministry of Social Development may dissolve it on 
recommendation of the minister.655 Authorities may refuse registration or dissolve an 
organization based on criteria taken from Article 22 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: ‘No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of [the right to freedom of association] other than those which are prescribed by 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
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or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’656 The Law on Associations and its 
amendments does not, however, show how the restrictions on freedom of assembly are 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ as required by the ICCPR. According to the 
International Center for Non-Profit Law, Jordanian authorities must demonstrate how 
restricting freedom of association based on ICCPR’s article 22 is necessary for a 
democratic society, but the Law on Associations does not address this.657 Additionally, 
authorities would need to justify the severe restrictions, such as the Ministry of Social 
Development’s power to dissolve associations. Again, this is lacking.658 Jordanian 
authorities maintain ultimate authority to decide whether an organization can be 
established or not and decides which organizations should be shut down. Prospective 
associations have the right to challenge a denial of registration in administrative court,659 
but because the government may deny permission to register without reason, and the ‘law 
includes no criteria for denying permission,’ any judiciary action can only evaluate 
whether authorities made a legal procedural error, rather than the reason for the decision 
itself.660 
The Law on Associations has another problematic provision, which is that a 
representative from the Minister and from the Register of Associations may attend any 
meeting of a general assembly of an association.661 In addition, minutes of meetings of 
the board of directors and financial registers must be accessible to the Ministry at any 
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time.662 Further, all board members ‘must be vetted by state security officials.’663 Non-
governmental organizations cannot operate independently from the government under 
these conditions. This degree of executive oversight, cemented in the legal code, allows 
for the systematic control over organizations which have, or which have the potential to, 
‘disrupt the public order,’ with authorities given the power to approve or reject both 
registration and foreign funding, as well as close with immediate effect associations they 
see as too ‘political’ or otherwise objectionable. Any social enterprise seeking to register 
with, or already registered, with the Ministry of Social Development is subject to these 
regulations and practices. This can severely hinder their ability to function as a robust 
civil society organization, as they are forced to either self-censor, or risk being penalized 
or shut down. In this way, surveillance has become legalized through the Law on 
Associations. The provisions in the law allow government officials to keep tabs on social 
enterprises (and other organizations) in the name of national security and preserving the 
country’s communal values. This is reminiscent of Raeff’s historical analysis of post-
Reformation states in Europe which also used this reasoning to establish regulatory, 
surveillant government mechanisms. 
 
 
 
Control of Foreign Funding 
 
Even though Jordan ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in 1975, the government still curbs fundamental rights and freedoms, due 
to claims of protecting national security.664 One example of this, which directly impacts 
Jordan’s social enterprises, is the 2008 Law on Associations and its 2009 amendment.665 
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This law restricts the foreign funding, including any donations, grants, or gifts that civil 
society organizations may receive.666 Under the law, associations must obtain government 
approval before they can receive foreign funding. The amendment, called the Law 
Amending the Law on Associations (Law 22 of 2009) further stipulates that associations 
must apply to receive foreign funding to the Registration Directorate under the Ministry 
of Social Development and state the ‘amount, method of reception, and purpose for which 
the money will be spent.’667 The applications must provide extensive information about 
the project for which funding is requested, and explain ‘how the project accords with 
Jordan’s national and development goals’ with numerous supporting documents.668 If the 
directorate approves the request, it will be sent to the council of ministers for approval. 
The council is not legally required to state the reason for rejecting a foreign funding 
request. Additionally, the government can reject funding requests simply by not 
responding to requests within thirty days. If funding is approved, the receiving group must 
submit a report and budget for the funding in addition to the normal reporting 
requirements.669 
Due to the foreign funding control mechanism, nongovernmental organizations in 
Jordan are required to request approval for foreign funding from the Ministry of Social 
Development. No justification for funding rejection is required to be given by the 
government. The new restrictions under the amendment to the 2008 law appears to 
‘provide a legal framework’ for this foreign funding control mechanism.670 Jordanian 
authorities argued that ‘they needed to better organize the nongovernmental sector and 
avoid duplication of work by various groups’ to justify the measures. An employee with 
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the United States Agency for International Development Civic Initiatives Support 
(USAID CIS) noted that there are two sides of the government’s acceptance for foreign 
funding applications. On the one hand, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is clear to 
both social enterprises and their international funding partners that projects related to 
sensitive topics, such as politics, religion, or any other subject currently being debated by 
activists, such as education reform, stands only a very low chance of receiving foreign 
funding approval. As one entrepreneur explained, a government employee had mentioned 
the reason for this is that ‘it is afraid to allow funding from terrorist organizations’ into 
Jordanian organizations.671 It appears, however, that the responsible government ministry 
is more concerned with the proposed programme content not addressing contested issues.  
For example, improving the education curriculum in Jordan became a topic of 
great discussion among activists in early 2018, to the point that it became politicised and 
taboo: the ‘activists scaled it up to a level that it became one of the issues that no one 
should discuss…[because] it’s political with a foreign agenda.’672 Thus, in spring 2018, 
proposals for projects related to developing education curricula requiring foreign funding 
were effectively ‘stuck with the government’673 and not receiving approval from the 
ministry. This means that ‘if the organization can’t get their foreign funding approval, we 
can’t, as a donor, transfer the money to their account,’674 and the enterprise will be unable 
to run their project with foreign funds.  
On the other hand, ‘if there is a donor and this donor will tackle the issue of 
renovating a school or rehabilitating a health centre, [the government] will welcome any 
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kind of ideas like this, or also something related to education.’675 There is a clear division 
between the kinds of projects the government deems acceptable and unacceptable, benign 
or threatening. Proposals for non- ‘political’ or non-taboo services are likely to be 
approved, whereas ‘political’ proposals are rejected; this has little to do with 
counterterrorism.  
The foreign funding control mechanism gives authorities the power to choose 
which organizations are allowed to carry out what projects, thereby undermining their 
‘ability to function free of disproportionate government interference.’676 Thus, NGOs and 
social enterprises dependent on foreign aid, mostly product- and service-oriented social 
enterprises (PSSEs) cannot operate independently of government approval. Further, this 
legal framework constitutes both a barrier to foreign funding resources for civil society 
and social enterprises and a restriction on the effectiveness of foreign actors’ aid goals.  
 
 
Co-Optation Through Royal NGOs 
 
Royal NGOs, or RONGOs, have been criticized for their involvement in civil 
society in the Middle East. They are a type of government-organized NGO (GONGO), 
sometimes referred to as semi-official NGOs. RONGOs insert themselves into civil 
society debates, and, through their dominance, exert a degree of control over the direction 
of these debates.677 In this way, RONGOs limit and direct the political liberalization 
process. RONGOs are, however, able to use their influence and stature to draw attention 
to worthy causes and provide services to citizens, even if their connection to the regime 
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undermines civic mobilization. The monarchy thus takes on both ‘advocacy and 
watchdog roles’ through RONGOs.678 
RONGOs work in a privileged political environment; they have a close 
relationship with both the state and international donors. As one social entrepreneur 
observed, ‘royal NGOs have a halo around them. They have special guidelines that protect 
them, certain exemptions, and certain ways to collect funds.’679 Through RONGOs, the 
state infiltrates civil society, and because of their dominance over international aid 
funding, which is actually intended to bypass the state and reach grassroots organizations, 
they increase competition for smaller independent NGOs and prevent them from 
accessing necessary resources.680 At the same time, the government, or more specifically, 
the monarchy, positions itself as social benefactor by addressing issues the government 
cannot afford to through state mechanisms. RONGOs ‘offer regimes opportunities to 
posture as supporters of civil society while preventing the emergence of autonomous civic 
life and insulating themselves from any meaningful public accountability.’681 
Wiktorowicz explains, 
A presumably independent space – civil society – is ‘colonized’ by the regime as 
it extends its reach through GONGOs…Through this strategy, the state gets the 
best of both worlds – it continues to receive international aid (through NGOs 
controlled by the regime) while reducing formal state expenditures, thus fulfilling 
neoliberal requirements of structural adjustment and privatization.682 
 
Authentic non-governmental civil society organizations become weaker due to limited 
resource availability: because GONGOs are better able to access international funding, 
they thrive, while other NGOs are ‘weeded out through a kind of donor-driven Darwinian 
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selection.’683 Due to Jordan’s strategic role in the Middle East peace process and its 
perceived role as a regional stabilizing influence, it appears that international donors are 
more interested in sponsoring organizations that enhance the country’s political and 
economic stability, rather than ensuring funding for a civil society independent and 
distinct from the regime.684 
In Jordan, there are several large RONGOs sponsored by various members of the 
Hashemite royal family with programmes focusing on development, education, youth, 
women, refugees, culture, the environment, and even advocating the regime’s moderate 
Islamic message. The two largest RONGOs are the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development (JOHUD),685 which was established by royal decree and contains various 
other organizations under its umbrella, and the Noor Al Hussein Foundation (NHF),686 
headed by Queen Noor. Other RONGOs687 include the Jordan River Foundation (JRF),688 
chaired by Queen Rania, the Arab Thought Forum,689 run by Prince Hassan, the Crown 
Prince Foundation (CPF),690 recently established by Crown Prince Hussein, the Queen 
Rania Foundation for Education and Development (QRF),691 also headed by Queen 
Rania, and the King Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD).692 
Since the terms ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘social entrepreneurship’ have entered the 
discourse of international organizations, some of these RONGOs have adopted 
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entrepreneurship programmes and sponsorship, sometimes known as ‘awards.’ For 
example, the Jordan River Foundation supports local social enterprises led by women 
through its ‘Building Social Enterprises’ programme. The JRF ‘strives to create 
sustainable economic opportunities for local community women and female refugees by 
capitalizing on their potential as independent breadwinners.’ The programme is designed 
to give women ‘employability and social skills,’ and teach them how to run a business.693 
The ‘Ebtekarthon forum’ is organized by the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development and held under the patronage of Princess Basma, where young 
entrepreneurs present their business ideas. JOHUD ICT for Development Director Ruba 
Hijazi said the Ebtekarthon forum emphasizes ‘the social aspect of entrepreneurship’ by 
helping participants combine their business ideas with social issues.694  Six finalists 
compete in the Princess Basma Award for Development and Community Service. This 
award was launched in 2011 and focuses on youth social entrepreneurship.695 
In September 2018, the Queen Rania Foundation launched the Queen Rania 
Award for Education Entrepreneurship, a competition which ‘recognizes the 
achievements and potential of home-grown education businesses in the Arab World that 
combine social impact with sustainable business models.’ Awards of 200,000 US dollars 
for business acceleration (growth) are given to three enterprises, and are meant to 
‘recognise and support innovative approaches making a real difference in the lives of 
learners.’696 Keeping in mind that education reform for Jordan was a contentious topic 
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among civil society organizations in early 2018, and that many independent applications 
for foreign funding for projects addressing education reform were denied or stalled in this 
period, it is significant that the QRF is now supporting education reform initiatives. The 
regime can, through the Queen Rania Award, hand pick which entrepreneurial ideas will 
succeed, and which will not. This is a clear example of social control through a RONGO: 
citizens may address an issue of pressing concern to them, but only on the monarchy’s 
terms.  
One of the four main purposes of the Crown Prince Foundation is to encourage 
innovation and entrepreneurship ‘to activate youth engagement through participation, 
leadership, and competitiveness.’697 The CPF ‘will incubate and launch our youth’s 
accomplishments and innovations.’698 Evidently, this includes co-optation of related 
social enterprises. In July 2018, the CPF officially launched Naua, an online ‘social 
impact platform’ that connects individuals wishing to volunteer or donate, charity 
organizations, and the private sector in order to increase the effectiveness of charity work 
and build a relationship of trust between charity organizations and users. The CEO, 
Ahmad El Zubi, stated that a major challenge for charity organizations is ‘the lack of trust 
and sufficient information, and the difficulty to communicate together. … Naua serves as 
a third neutral party that bridges the gap of trust through a transparent and efficient 
approach.’699 Naua achieves this by measuring and documenting the accomplishments of 
charity organizations, as well as the impact individuals have had through their volunteer 
hours and monetary donations. Users and organizations create profiles on the platform 
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and then record their work in quantifiable terms, such as the number of hours volunteered, 
the amount of money donated, how many trees were planted, or how many children 
gained access to education. Both organizations and individuals enter data about their 
social engagement into a database which is under the umbrella of the monarchy, and thus 
easily accessible to the government, which is problematic in and of itself. 
Naua was not intended to be part of the CPF: ‘this organization started out as a 
private initiative by a couple of very well-meaning individuals in society. The idea was 
that civil society in general is quite fragmented,’ unorganized, co-opted by the 
government, and dictated by donors.700 It was meant to be ‘an independent organization 
that has no stake in any of the operations’ which would measure social impact for 
individuals, companies and NGOs to encourage individuals to ‘do more and organize 
better’ and that ‘funds [would] be more efficiently directed towards more effective 
projects.’701 From 2015 until mid-2017, Naua’s founders registered the company, worked 
to gather support from companies and NGOs, and hired a developer to build the online 
platform. In 2017, the founders ‘were excited to launch – but then [they] got a phone call 
from the Crown Prince Foundation. … [The CPF] loved the idea, they were in the middle 
of revamping their work and restructuring their operations. … They decided that [Naua 
should become] one of the three main pillars of the Crown Prince Foundation, … 
promoting a culture of giving.’702 Naua and the CPF signed an agreement by which Naua 
has royal patronage. In practical terms, the agreement stipulates that the CPF now owns 
51% of the company, the CPF chooses four of seven seats of Naua’s board of directors, 
and the chairman of the board of directors is a CPF employee. Naua’s office also moved 
from its original location to within the CPF office. The CPF is now involved in all 
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strategic decisions, and Naua manages its day-to-day operations. In return, the CPF 
covers most of Naua’s budget requirements, and Naua has better access to large domestic 
and international donors due to the CPF’s position and influence. Thus, a social enterprise 
whose goal was to address a problem in Jordan’s system of charity and volunteerism has 
been co-opted by the CPF, which offered both material (funding and office space) and 
immaterial (strategic partnership, prestige) incentives and support. Its operation and 
strategic planning depend on CPF involvement and financing, and the information it 
gathers through the online platform is easily accessible to the CPF. This is another way 
in which the monarchy has managed to control a would-be independent social enterprise; 
it can now direct every aspect of Naua to align with its own purposes and avoid Naua’s 
work generating any kind of meaningful opposition to the regime.  
The King Abdullah II Fund for Development includes the King Abdullah II 
Award for Youth Innovation and Achievement (KAAYIA).703 King Abdullah II launched 
the Award in 2007 during the World Economic Forum; the Award is meant to ‘honor and 
support Arab social entrepreneurs of both genders who come up with innovative solutions 
to address pressing challenges in their communities.’704 The Award consists of a financial 
reward of 50,000 US dollars for the finalists, 10,000 US dollars for the runners-up, and 
several days’ leadership and financial management training. One of the award-holders, 
after gaining insight into the competition process, remarked that  
They say they are supporting the youth, but it’s more for public relations. If you 
want to really support us, there are a lot of things that need to be fixed: in 
universities, in the elections, putting so much pressure on us. On the ground there 
is no real support. In the end of the day an award is a gesture, whereas the 
government coming by and checking papers and harassing us is a real 
impediment.705  
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Supporting entrepreneurship through RONGOs may be a public relations strategy in 
which the monarchy positions itself as benefactor for the people, as it is known to do. In 
addition, however, it could be a way for the monarchy to exercise deliberate control over 
an emerging civil society sector. Through the KAAYIA, Kreitmeyr explains, ‘the 
Jordanian regime became more strategically involved’ in social entrepreneurship in 
Jordan. In fact, this is one of the few cases in which a ruler himself, not only elites, is 
involved in the social entrepreneurship network,706 which is composed of social 
entrepreneurs, business and political elites, and international actors. Kreitmeyr argues that 
social entrepreneurship networks ‘foster processes of authoritarian renewal through 
neoliberal forms of co-optation’ because links between elites and ‘hand-picked social 
entrepreneurs’ are strengthened.707 This achieves close control and management over 
social enterprises and ensures their alignment to the regime’s political objectives. The 
KAFD and its KAAYIA makes this possible, as does the QRF’s Queen Rania Award.  
Co-optation is ‘the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of 
actors) to the regime;’ this includes resource allocation, privileges, concessions, and 
patronage,708 all of which allow regimes to pre-empt demands for reform and expand the 
basis of their legitimacy.709 Regimes use co-optation so that the target actor does not 
obstruct regime interests and instead acts ‘in line with the ruling elite’s demands.’710 Co-
optation can be voluntary to a degree, when individuals or organizations prefer 
association with the regime because it allows them to achieve their objectives more 
efficiently. In this case, it is easier for the regime to employ the co-optation strategy 
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because ‘there is a market for it.’711 High unemployment rates, the ‘youth bulge,’ 
international support for social enterprises, and citizens’ demand for participation in the 
political process have created this market. The Jordanian entrepreneurship ‘ecosystem’ 
suffers from lack of financial options, bureaucratic difficulties, and legal obstacles. The 
monarchy’s RONGOs are well-equipped to address these issues, as they are able to give 
large grants to social enterprises. Further, affiliation with a RONGO offers social 
enterprises name-recognition, special status as ‘royally certified’ entrepreneurs,712 and 
prestige. In fact, several KAAYIA winners were subsequently recognized by international 
social entrepreneurship supporters Synergos and Ashoka. Adopting support for social 
enterprises suggests that the regime has devised a new component of its tactic of garnering 
support from citizens and international actors alike. The Hashemite monarchy’s targeted 
co-optation of the kingdom’s social enterprises through RONGOs is evidence of the 
resilience of authoritarian rule that seeks to neutralize potential opposition while 
appearing, on the surface, to be supportive of a potential transformative new sector of 
civil society.  
The work and influence of RONGOs constitutes one way in which neopatrimonial 
rule persists in Jordan. King Abdullah II and members of the royal family control and 
direct civil society through their patronage of royal organizations. The promotion of 
social enterprises, which include the ‘market’ concepts of self-empowerment, 
competition, and responsibility is part of a restructuring of ‘social relations and state 
power, economy and society.’713 Jordanian RONGOs’ involvement in social enterprises 
‘facilitates the co-optation and creation of a new generation of socio-economic elites’714 
that are complacent in shoring up the regime’s power. Any social enterprise that is 
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established through a RONGO training program, or that receives an ‘award’ or other 
funding from a RONGO, is in effect an extension of the monarchy’s rule – controlled, 
watched, registered, and tolerated only insofar as it benefits regime interests. International 
organizations and foreign governments supporting social enterprises through RONGOs 
are bolstering this neopatrimonial system. By focusing on social entrepreneurship funding 
through RONGOs, international organizations are helping to confine social 
entrepreneurs’ funding access to avenues dictated by the regime, and they are thus aiding 
the regime in its surveillance and control tactics. 
 
 
Surveillance, Social Enterprises, and Civil Society Development 
 
Thus, while the emergence of social enterprises in Jordan impacts development 
and builds civil society, it does not necessarily amount to civic empowerment in equal 
measure. The introduction of social entrepreneurship may grow civil society, but social 
entrepreneurship, as part of civil society, does not lead to greater political participation or 
democratization, contrary to expectations.715 Social entrepreneurship can also be 
understood as an avenue for microresponsibility, where economic empowerment of the 
individual and especially minorities through innovation and entrepreneurship leads to 
economic and other forms of empowerment. Microresponsibility represents a potential 
limitation to state power, as the provision of services shifts from the state to the individual, 
and it is also a potential ‘site of disruption.’716  
There is thus a tension between state governance and social entrepreneurship. On 
the one side is a developing country, Jordan, which is complying with Western-centric 
ideas of neoliberal and free market policies, where services normally provided by the state 
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were encouraged to be left to the private sector and civil society, thus forcing an 
expansion of civil society.717 On the other side is the neopatrimonial, clientelist, and semi-
autocratic regime attempting to maintain control and balance the demands of various civil 
sectors against collective national challenges and international demands, which has thus 
far driven a restriction of civil society. In the middle is social entrepreneurship, which 
expands the potential of developing a ‘shadow state’ in which the private sector provides 
goods and services that can both support and challenge the regime. Meanwhile, the regime 
has established its own ‘shadow state’ of RONGOs and other state initiatives that 
complement the work of government ministries and also allow the regime, and more 
specifically the monarchy, to position itself as a benefactor of the people. For example, 
the King Abdullah II Fund for Development complements the Ministry of Social 
Development, and Queen Rania’s education initiative ‘Madrasati’718 complements the 
Ministry of Education. These ‘shadow’ initiatives directly compete with civil society, the 
traditional establisher of a ‘shadow state.’ In its resistance to regime challengers, the state 
seeks to maintain established structures of power by limiting social enterprises’ work and 
influence, similar to how it has sought to limit civil society organizations’ influence. 
However, in this attempt the state is equally restricted to the limitations set out by the 
international community. As stated previously, the government cannot be too repressive 
without risking repercussions itself. Such repercussions could come in the form of a 
reduction in international aid, on which Jordan depends, but also in the form of popular 
unrest.  
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The Jordanian regime’s solution to this tension is a mix of ‘state-centered, top-
down social engineering’719 and toleration of government-controlled and -managed social 
enterprises. This is reminiscent of the ‘management apparatus’ developed by 
authoritarian republics such as Egypt and Libya, where leaders feared that any entity 
outside the top of their ‘hierarchical pyramid’ might compete with and challenge their 
hold on power. A bureaucratic apparatus such as the one devised in the Arab republics 
‘was relatively easier to control than other arms of the state.’720 Jordan’s monarchy 
appears to have taken a similar approach through its involvement in social enterprises 
through RONGOs and through the management of social enterprises through the foreign 
funding mechanism. The regime tolerates social enterprises registered with the ministries, 
so long as they operate within the regime’s ever-changing framework of acceptable 
topics. Allowing social enterprises to become established and work in Jordan appears to 
be a kind of ‘safety valve’ mechanism. As outlined by Ottaway, semi-autocratic regimes 
often allow public participation ‘safety valves’ that allow avenues of ‘social discontent, 
but not so much as to permit challenges to the incumbent regime,’ through carefully 
managed levels of popular participation.721 Managing social enterprises allows the 
Jordanian government to not only manage popular participation but also influence the 
direction of economic development, especially where the expansion of 
microresponsibility might challenge the state’s control.  
Social entrepreneurship is, of course, political by nature, but it ‘becomes 
politicized when the state … views social entrepreneurship as a threat to its own 
 
719 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, 
Reflexive Development,’ Development and Change 29, no. 2 (2002): 370. 
720 Joseph Sassoon, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 66. 
721 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 17. 
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power.’722 Although it may be advantageous to the state for citizens to attend to their own 
needs, the state would no longer control all aspects of social and material goods 
distribution, and social entrepreneurship requires citizens to think and act independently, 
which may also be perceived as a threat to the state.723 In fact, because social 
entrepreneurs not only act independently but also innovatively, they pose an even greater 
challenge to the state. Their methods are unique, adaptive, and changing, and in the case 
of structural transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs), they are also actively and 
intentionally disruptive of the status quo. 
Social enterprises have, by nature, the strong potential to effect structural change 
in political and social contexts. In this sense, both types of Jordanian enterprises, whether 
product- and service-oriented (PSSEs) or structural transformation-based (STSEs), pose 
significant potential challenges to the state. A single PSSE is unlikely to create far-
reaching social change, as outlined in Chapter Three. However, the establishment of a 
multitude of PSSEs throughout the country, their subsequent normalization, and the 
consequent increase in citizens’ direct involvement in governance at some level, might 
lead to a shift in citizen activism and attitudes towards the government. This threatens the 
regime’s own hand-crafted ‘shadow state’ which has given it a greater degree of control 
over civil society simply by infiltrating it. Further, STSEs specifically target structural 
change in the communities in which they work, and thus directly challenge the regime’s 
status quo. The regime must therefore create new mechanisms of control, or apply old 
mechanisms, in response. The main issue it faces is that it must simultaneously ‘deal with 
threats without undermining support for the regime.’724 A ‘coercive institution’ is 
necessary to keep potential centres of opposition under control without allowing the 
 
722 Horn, Democratic Governance and Social Entrepreneurship, 111. 
723 Horn, Democratic Governance and Social Entrepreneurship, 111-112. 
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institution itself to become an alternate concentration of power. Therefore, a certain type 
of institution which is allied closely enough with the regime must take on this role, as it 
occurred in the authoritarian republics of the Middle East.725 For the Hashemite 
monarchy, its royal NGOs are perfectly situated for this role.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through targeted use of administrative power and surveillance, the Jordanian 
regime has devised various tactics for dictating social enterprises’ political space, as is 
evident in its interactions with and influence over and social enterprises. The Jordanian 
government uses soft power through bureaucratic obstacles during the registration 
process; oversight in the form of ‘awards’, working with enterprises through royal NGOs, 
and even co-optation; and controlling the availability of foreign funds to regulate the work 
of social enterprises. Thus, the chances of social enterprises achieving their objectives 
without external interference and functioning as truly community-responsive 
organizations, rather than being beholden to the demands of the regime, are slim. Most 
Jordanian social enterprises are ultimately extensions of the regime’s neopatrimonial rule, 
and only select few function independently.  
 The tension between the government and the emergence of social enterprises in 
Jordan may be representative of a potential shifting balance of power between the regime 
and citizens. At present, the government is working hard to control social enterprises, 
however, and appears to have successfully maintained the old balance thus far. The 
government certainly has not overlooked the potential challenge social entrepreneurs pose 
to the status quo. With only very few social enterprises working outside the reach of 
government influence, and every social enterprise subject to some degree of government 
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control, it is questionable whether the government’s carefully orchestrated balance will 
shift. The regime’s avenues of influence over every aspect of civil society through various 
administrative, legal, and financial means are significantly inhibiting the establishment 
of independent social enterprises. For change to occur in Jordan through social 
entrepreneurship, at least one of two scenarios would need to take place: the government 
must relax its administrative control, or social entrepreneurs must become more 
consistently and habitually innovative, not in the products and services they provide, but 
in the way they function. In other words, they must remain ‘one step ahead’ of 
government policies and/or creatively make use of any loopholes that exist in these 
policies. The former scenario is unlikely, and the latter would certainly prove difficult. 
The more innovative and unusual social entrepreneurs’ practices become, the more they 
may appear to be a threat to the regime, prompting ever more repressive tactics. 
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Chapter 6: Social Capital Under Surveillance 
 
Introduction 
 
 Having established the role of state surveillance in Jordan in the previous chapter, 
this chapter examines to what extent the regime’s surveillance tactics penetrate civil 
society. The chapter focuses on the effect this has on social entrepreneurship by analysing 
the relationship between regime surveillance, the development or destruction of social 
capital, and the political liberalization process. The chapter begins with an outline of the 
ways in which social enterprises can theoretically support progress in political 
liberalization. It then describes the types of social capital, i.e. positive, negative, bonding, 
bridging, structural, and cognitive social capital. Next, the chapter discusses how state 
support or involvement with social enterprises and social capital can build hierarchical 
associational relationships instead of social networks that lead to political empowerment. 
The chapter takes a structural-institutional approach to social capital analysis. It does not 
discuss cognitive aspects of social capital due to the difficulty in determining this from 
the existing interview data. Through the structural-institutional approach, it is possible to 
determine that structural social capital comprises the rules, regulations, and procedures 
that can aid, but also hinder, mutually beneficial collective action that, according to the 
‘Putnam School,’ would lead to a process of democratization. 
 The chapter examines the relationship between public administration, 
surveillance, and civil liberties and argues that pervasive state surveillance negatively 
impacts social capital development. The role of social capital in the pathway to 
democratization is outlined according to the ‘Putnam School,’ and the chapter shows how 
this pathway is compromised with state surveillance. When social capital is restricted 
and/or directed by a top-down process, there is no progress in political liberalization. The 
next section comprises an analysis of the structural determinants of social capital 
228 
 
regarding social entrepreneurship in Jordan, and how these structural determinants restrict 
social enterprises’ work. In addition, the chapter argues that structural factors render 
social capital the dependent variable, which challenges the basic assumption of the 
‘Putnam School’ that social capital is the independent variable which determines the type 
of governance. Finally, the chapter offers a comparison of social enterprises in Jordan 
with the attributes of social entrepreneurship previously identified in Chapter One. The 
chapter concludes by evaluating social entrepreneurship in a civil society under 
surveillance, with reference to known Jordanian regime repression tactics. 
 This chapter argues that the regime acts as gatekeeper of success for social 
enterprises because it regulates their access to social capital through its administrative 
control and surveillance measures. In this way, it constrains any potential progress in 
political liberalization by interfering with the core of what has been called the ‘building 
block’ of democracy. 
 
 
The Promise of Social Entrepreneurship as Catalyst for Democracy 
 
Following the establishment of the Washington Consensus and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustment programs, governments took on less responsibility in 
fulfilling social needs such as health care, poverty alleviation, and education.726 
Government downsizing and ‘changes in the nature of government support’ for basic 
services have given rise to non-profits taking on ‘market-like approaches such as social 
enterprise.’727 NGOs and other non-state actors ‘became the de facto provider of social 
services in the age of post-welfarism.’728 One of these types of non-state actors are social 
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entrepreneurs, who are seen by many to be heroes who can change the world with the 
application of their new ideas to solve the most pressing issues.729 Social enterprises ‘can 
help to build participation, social interaction, political engagement and bonding social 
capital.’730 Some studies link social entrepreneurship and democracy731 although the 
argument has been made that ‘social entrepreneurship may lead to increased political 
empowerment only if human capabilities are fostered and states are willing to support 
these efforts.’732 
If social entrepreneurship is considered ‘an ethical and normative pursuit’ this 
opens up a space in which individuals may become empowered citizens who ‘strengthen 
democracies by deliberating their needs, demanding their rights, and participating to their 
fullest.’733 In reality however, various challenges to this idea have been observed in 
practice. First, projects that appeared to have the perfect solution to an issue have been 
extensively funded ‘only to result in abject failure, unintended consequences, or to find 
that the project rests upon unexamined assumptions.’ A second major issue is that 
‘success in one community is assumed to translate to success in others,’ so that when 
projects are replicated to other areas, ‘an increasing amount of hierarchy and abstraction 
becomes necessary, and local needs are less relevant,’ becoming replaced instead by top-
down structures, which social entrepreneurship was intended to replace.734 The third 
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problem arises when ‘empowerment’ becomes an important variable to measure the 
success of social enterprises. As Horn writes,  
At the heart of the matter is whether or not personal empowerment translates to 
political empowerment, and how this impacts an individual’s relationship with the 
state. Social entrepreneurship can be an effective tool in increasing democratic 
participation and growth, but only inasmuch as there is a focus on increasing 
capabilities and creating a relationship with the state itself.735 
 
Thus, there is a certain caveat associated with the ability of social enterprises to lead to 
political ‘empowerment,’ participation, and ultimately democratization: the social 
entrepreneurs’ relationship to the state. From this emerges the question of how social 
entrepreneurship is impacted if the state is hostile to the work of (independent) non-
governmental actors, as is the case in authoritarian regimes. To understand the role of the 
state in the development of social entrepreneurship, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship between the state and one of the key resources social entrepreneurship draws 
upon: social capital. 
 
 
The State and Social Capital 
 
Robert Putnam defined social capital as ‘the connections among individuals’ 
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them;’ 
these connections have value just as other forms of capital do.736 Social capital can be 
divided into four broad categories: bonding, bridging, positive, and negative. This brief 
review of the types of social capital begins with the difference between bonding and 
bridging social capital. These categories refer to the types of associations in a community 
or group. Bonding social capital occurs within a community, while bridging social capital 
is found among social groups (whether divided by geographic location, social class, 
 
735 Horn, ‘Social entrepreneurship, democracy and political participation,’ 233. 
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religion, race, etc.). Putnam distinguished between the two categories and asserted that 
bonding social capital is for ‘getting by’ whereas bridging social capital is for ‘getting 
ahead,’ thereby linking bridging social capital to greater progress while bonding social 
capital represents a maintenance of the status quo.737 Putnam suggested that bonding 
social capital is inward-looking, reinforces exclusivity, and promotes homogeneity. In 
contrast, he saw bridging social capital as outward-looking, and promoting links between 
diverse individuals and groups. Bonding social capital is found in networks ‘with a high 
density of relationships between members, where most, if not all, individuals belonging 
to the network are interconnected because they know each other and interact frequently 
with each other.’738 Bridging social capital is found in ‘associations between people with 
shared interests or goals but contrasting social identity.’739 Van Staveren and Knorringa 
additionally described the difference between bonding and bridging social capital as 
different types of trust, where bonding social capital can be understood as ascribed trust 
and bridging social capital as earned trust.740 
The second major distinction between types of social capital lies in whether it is 
positive or negative. For Putnam, positive social capital comprises horizontal social 
networks; this can lay the foundation for democratization. Negative social capital, on the 
other hand, is found in vertical social networks which, due to their inherent relationships 
of inequality, can shore up autocracy. Therefore, social capital can be a source of social 
control in which community or hierarchical relationships make formal or overt discipline 
and control unnecessary. As Sotiropoulos outlines,  
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Positive social capital is conducive to the strengthening of civil society. By 
contrast, negative social capital has exclusionary effects, limiting social ties to 
small-scale communities, sectoral interests and professional guilds, like-minded 
groups of people, and minorities sharing the same religious, ethnic or racial 
characteristics. Thus, if negative social capital prevails in social relationships, 
there are no benefits for wider civil society.741 
 
Sotiropoulos further demonstrates how top-down strategies to increase social capital may 
not lead to the development of civil society, because these strategies do not necessarily 
bring about an increase in trust in institutions. Developing institutions at the state level 
could lead to ‘overbearing institutions’ that ‘stifle individual and civic initiatives 
springing up from the level of society.’742 As in societies under Communist rule, state 
intervention past a certain degree can negatively impact social capital.743 The implication 
of this is that states can be purposefully ‘overbearing’ and ‘stifling’ through various 
institutional mechanisms as a form of social control. Thus, it becomes necessary to 
examine the context in which social capital exists to determine its role as either the 
independent or dependent variable for civil society.  
 
 
A Structural-Institutional Approach to Social Capital 
 
The concept ‘social capital’ has been used in the ‘Putnam School’ (consisting of 
Putnam and his followers) to represent six types of trust: ‘interpersonal trust, social 
solidarity, general norms of reciprocity, belief in the legitimacy of institutionalised norms, 
confidence that these will motivate the action of institutional actors and ordinary citizens 
(social solidarity), and the transmission of cultural traditions, patterns, and values.’744 As 
outlined in Chapter Four, one of the problems with the ‘Putnam School’ of social capital 
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is that it does not analyse the quality of associational relationships. Grix argues that it is 
not the density of civic associations but the ‘types of association, the breadth of their 
memberships, and the quality of relations between the associations themselves and 
between them and local government’ that indicates social capital. The density of 
associations does not necessarily relate to the robustness of democracy. Another problem 
with the ‘Putnam School’ is that it tends to assume that social capital is positive for society 
and does not address negative social capital. Clientelism, prominent in mafia groups for 
example, is an indicator of social capital, but has negative effects for society.745 
More recent scholarship has made a useful distinction between structural and 
cognitive social capital; evaluating social capital in these ways allows for research on the 
social context for social capital.746 Norman Uphoff distinguishes between structural and 
cognitive social capital in that structural social capital comprises ‘roles, rules, precedents 
and procedures as well as a wide variety of networks’ which aid in establishing mutually 
beneficial collective action. On the other hand, cognitive social capital comprises 
ideology, values, norms, culture, and attitudes and beliefs. Structural and cognitive social 
capital are interrelated because structural factors initially stem from cognitive 
processes.747 Grix explains that the difference between cognitive and structural social 
capital can be understood as ‘two areas in which social capital resides, or through which 
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it can be generated.’ Cognitive social capital is found at the individual level of analysis, 
while structural social capital is found at the institutional level of analysis.748  
Other scholars such as Foley and Edwards have called for a ‘conception of social 
capital that recognizes the dependence of its “use value” and “liquidity” on the specific 
social contexts in which it is  found’ which means that ‘access to social resources is 
neither brokered equitably nor distributed evenly.’749 Maloney, Smith, and Stoker argue 
that the context for associational activity is shaped by political structures and institutions. 
They identify trust, access, and resources as three important factors for the formation of 
social capital at the micro level.750 Thus, Grix points out, it becomes necessary to evaluate 
‘whether a particular mode of governance is more conducive than other modes to the 
creation or maintenance of social capital.’751 Dictatorial governance, for example, creates 
a lack of institutional trust and renders social capital the dependent variable.752 Similarly, 
in communist societies, ‘the horizontal ties of reciprocity, the hallmark of a vibrant civil 
society, [are] replaced by hierarchical ties of clientelism between rulers and ruled.’753 
This is because resource access in these conditions is limited to citizens with good 
connections and popular participation is ‘regulated and demanded by the state via state-
run associations.’ The social capital developed in this circumstance is not ‘based on trust 
relations and real reciprocity, but on a pragmatic coexistence between the ruled and 
rulers.’754 Former communist states also established not only a ‘legacy of hierarchical 
power relations’ but also a ‘lack of experience in horizontal relations of reciprocity 
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between actors in society.’ This has long-term negative effects such as a lack of trust in 
state institutions, politicians, and political parties and thus hinders the creation of social 
capital,755 which serves to uphold authoritarian government.   
It is important to examine the institutional and structural frameworks in which 
social capital can (or cannot) develop, because these frameworks determine individuals’ 
or groups’ ‘access to resources or influence on decisions.’756 In short, treating social 
capital as a dependent variable, that is, analysing the extent to which governance types 
and institutions matter in creating and maintaining social capital, allows for an analysis 
of how social contexts between and among actors and institutions facilitate or hinder the 
creation of social capital. This fills the gap in the ‘Putnam School’ literature by showing 
how social contexts influence the types and levels of social capital and corresponding 
variety of political outcomes.757 This chapter takes the approach that social capital can be 
rendered the dependent variable through overbearing state institutional mechanisms. One 
of the ways social capital can be transformed to the dependent variable is when the state 
employs inhibiting public administration procedures and surveillance tactics; the 
implications of this are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
Public Administration, Surveillance, and Civil Liberties 
 
Public administration comprises not only public service administration and 
facilitation, but also surveillance.758 States have always been concerned with ‘legibility,’ 
or the ‘arranging of population in ways that simplify traditional state activities such as 
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taxation, conscription, and thwarting civil unrest.’759 As Webster argues, the fact that 
public administrations ‘create, monitor and process large quantities of information so that 
citizens can participate in everyday life’ has been normalized.760 This information 
processing in public administration drives the modern surveillance society because of its 
central role in ‘sustaining surveillance apparatus, practices and norms,’ for these practices 
to flourish, and for surveillance norms ‘to be embedded in citizen-state relationships.’761 
Bigo shows how citizens voluntarily give information to the surveillance state in return 
for ‘being securitized, to be protected by a group of professionals in charge of security.’ 
When faced with the alternative of violence, Bigo asks, ‘who would not be seduced by 
promises of enhanced security?’762 However, the danger of this is that when surveillance 
is carried out through the exercise of state power, it can constitute citizens’ ‘susceptibility 
to state force and violence and deception.’763 Thus, surveillance becomes a civil rights 
issue. Much of the surveillance literature to date has been concerned with how 
surveillance affects rights to privacy and less so with other civil liberties.764 However, 
other civil rights depend on privacy rights to develop effectively; this includes freedom 
of expression and association.765 The basis of freedom of association lies in people’s 
ability to access, form, and develop social capital, which has been theorized to be the 
‘building block’ of democratization. This section investigates the relationship between 
surveillance and social capital. 
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The negative relationship between social capital and surveillance has been 
documented, but the literature remains limited. Two different studies on the effect of 
pervasive surveillance on social capital development were conducted in the former 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) by Jacob and Tyrell and by Lichter, Löffler and 
Siegloch. Both studies used quantitative analysis to draw conclusions based on GDR spy 
density and various quantifiable indicators of social capital. The two studies are described 
below. 
Jacob and Tyrell explain that, in order for policymakers to design policies and 
initiatives that support social capital development in the long term, it is necessary to 
explore how social capital accumulates and deteriorates.766 Through an investigation of 
surveillance density, social capital, and economic patterns in the former GDR, Jacob and 
Tyrell explore how surveillance negatively affects social capital development and 
economic development even twenty years after the end of the surveillance regime.767 
Having lived ‘in a regime with the world’s most pervasive and intrusive surveillance 
apparatus’ led to former East Germans retaining a ‘lingering sense of mistrust of members 
of society outside the immediate family circle.’768 The GDR’s state security system and 
its thousands of formal and informal informers created an environment ‘that narrowed 
social and cultural horizons, and fostered cultural traits that demoted social spiritedness 
and hurt economic development.’769 As Howard points out, people’s prior experiences 
with organizations and individuals in the GDR affected their desire to participate in 
voluntary organizations and cooperate with other members of society, because they 
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viewed them, and still view them, with mistrust and suspicion.770 This makes it difficult 
to ‘bridge the wide gap between private and public spheres, and to build trust extending 
beyond the immediate family circle.’ Social connections in the GDR thus were narrowly 
restricted to close friends and family members, which ‘allowed only very limited 
experimentation of free civic interaction and cooperation.’771  
Jacob and Tyrell measure social capital in terms of three factors: electoral turnout, 
organizational involvement, and post-mortem organ donation. They measure surveillance 
in terms of the density of state security (Stasi) officers and formal and informal informants 
across the GDR districts. Jacob and Tyrell found that ‘a one standard deviation increase 
in informer density in a district in the former GDR (about 2.73 informers per thousand 
people) is associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in electoral turnout, a 10% 
decrease in organizational involvement, and a 50% reduction of the number of organs 
donated post mortem in the district today.’772  These comparisons are made with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, for which Jacob and Tyrell assumed zero surveillance. The 
threat of a Stasi informant observing some type of unacceptable behaviour influenced 
most, if not all, social, political, and economic interactions. As Jacob and Tyrell point out, 
‘the regime knew a number of possibilities for dealing with the independent-minded: 
denial of higher education, inability to achieve positions of leadership, discrimination in 
career and chosen profession, and restrictions on travel, publications, and assembly.’773 
As Ostrom argues, ‘authoritarian policies deteriorate social capital by … undermining 
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citizens’ ability to experiment solutions to their problems and learn from experimentation 
over time.’774 
Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch come to similar conclusions. Social capital theory 
‘predicts an unambiguously negative effect of surveillance on economic performance.’ 
Surveillance over the population is destructive of social capital, or interpersonal and 
institutional trust.775 Through an analysis of the GDR, Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch find 
that spying has both a negative and long-lasting effect on social capital and economic 
performance; ‘more government surveillance leads to lower trust in strangers and stronger 
negative reciprocity.’ Those individuals who grew up entirely in the GDR experienced 
the greatest negative effect on interpersonal trust.776 Further, in areas where surveillance 
was denser in the GDR, ‘self-employment rates and the number of patents per capita are 
significantly lower’ than in other areas of lesser surveillance.777 
The authors measure surveillance through the spy density per capita and social 
capital through intention to vote in elections. They found that an increased spy density 
has a significant negative effect on citizens’ intention to vote.778 They measure economic 
performance through self-employment rates, patents per capita, and unemployment 
rates.779 Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch analysed the effect of surveillance on 
entrepreneurship, because a lack of interpersonal trust leads to extensive monitoring of 
‘possible malfeasance by partners, employees, and suppliers [and] less time to devote to 
innovation in new products or processes.’780 The authors found that in counties with 
 
774 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Policies That Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action’ in Moral Sentiments and 
Material Interests, ed. Herbert Gintis, et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 223–48. 
775 Andreas Lichter, Max Löffler, and Sebastian Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance: 
Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany,’ Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper Series No. 9245, July 2015, 2. 
776 Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance,’ 3. 
777 Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance,’ 4. 
778 Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance,’ 15–19. 
779 Lichter, Löffler and Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance,’ 20–22. 
780 S. Knack and P. Keefer, ‘Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1252–53. 
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higher spy densities, the self-employment rate is significantly lower, there are 
significantly fewer patents, and unemployment rates are higher. 
McCahill and Finn show how ‘the actions and choices of surveillance subjects are 
shaped by “the internalization of the objective patterns of their extant social environment” 
and by the position they occupy.’781 In other words, context matters in the development 
or destruction of social capital and in political liberalization. When public administration 
and surveillance move beyond gathering and sorting data for the purpose of efficiency to 
analysing the data to exert control over certain population sectors, social capital and the 
processes of democratization are undermined. This is explained in further detail in the 
following section. 
 
 
Social Capital, Surveillance, and Pathways to Democratization 
 
According to Putnam’s theories, social capital constitutes the ‘building block’ of 
democracy. This is because social capital and its two components, interpersonal trust and 
participation in associational networks, should lead to greater political awareness and 
civic engagement. This in turn leads to trust in institutions, and trust in government, which 
Putnam argues creates a pathway for democratization and development (Figure 6.1). 
However, this raises the question of what happens if any part of this social capital flow 
to democracy is interrupted, and whether a part of this process can be co-opted and 
controlled to produce a certain outcome.  
 
781 Michael McCahill and Rachel L. Finn, Surveillance, Capital, and Resistance (London: Routledge, 
2014), 3. 
241 
 
 
  (Figure 6.1) 
 
The regime’s involvement in social capital impacts the flow of the social capital-
democratization process (Figure 6.2). Rather than social capital leading to participation, 
trust, and accountable government, the state directs its institutions in a way that prescribes 
what kind of associational networks are acceptable and/or possible. In this way, the 
regime determines what type of social capital is created, among whom, to what extent, 
and how. Because social capital is still created, this may lead to greater political 
awareness, but civic engagement is limited due to the regime dictating its nature and 
extent. As far as citizens are aware of these regime processes (e.g. because they feel 
‘watched’ or because they constantly encounter resistance in associational activities), this 
erodes trust in state institutions and minimizes trust in the government, thereby rendering 
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the theorized effects of social capital creation inexistent. Thus, the state’s surveillance 
measures interrupt the path to democratization and development at its root. The regime’s 
surveillance tactics impact social capital development by perpetuating and expanding 
existing networks and therefore it disrupts the (theoretical) progression to increased 
political participation. The addition of regime surveillance measures to the social capital-
to-democratization process leads to social capital becoming the dependent variable that 
is influenced by a top-down process, rather than being the independent variable that 
initiates the democratization process from below. 
 
 
  (Figure 6.2) 
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Structural Determinants of Social Capital 
 
Social enterprises in Jordan depend on unrestricted social capital in various ways. 
Two of the most important of these are access to finances and access to networking. Social 
entrepreneurs need to gain access to various actors who can provide them with financial 
capital, such as incubators and accelerators, banks, Jordanian government organizations 
or royal NGOs, international organizations and foreign countries that give grants or loans 
for enterprises. They also need to be able to network effectively. Additionally, social 
entrepreneurs are more successful when they have access to smoother registration 
procedures, which can be achieved by deftly employing wasta, hiring legal counsel, 
receiving help from programs run by foreign actors, and through the “stamp of approval” 
gained by working with royal NGOs. These factors are part of what is known as structural 
social capital. 
Structural social capital consists of rules, procedures, precedents, and networks 
that can aid in establishing mutually beneficial collective action,782 but these also clearly 
define in what capacity and to what extent social capital can be generated. It can thus be 
a restrictive form of social capital. Social capital generated from rules and procedures 
also can be controlled by those same rules and procedures. When examining the context 
for social capital, it is thus necessary to analyse the role of structural factors. These 
determine the formation of social capital at the micro level because they influence two of 
the most important determinants of social capital creation: access and resources.783 The 
third and normative determinant of social capital formation identified by Maloney, Smith, 
and Stoker is trust. This chapter does not discuss trust, however, because it is difficult to 
measure and evaluate. In addition, there was insufficient qualitative information about 
 
782 Grix, ‘Social Capital as a Concept in the Social Sciences,’ 189–210. 
783 Maloney, Smith, and Stoker, ‘Social Capital and Urban Governance,’ 802–20. 
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this in the data gathered in the interviews to be able to offer more than anecdotal evidence. 
This section thus analyses only the way structural factors affect the existence and 
development of social capital in Jordan, specifically regarding social enterprises. 
If people cannot gain the access or resources they need, they cannot form social 
capital. Likewise, if the types of access and resources are predetermined, controlled, or 
subject to surveillance by structural factors, then only certain types or amounts of social 
capital can emerge. The structural factors that affect social capital in Jordan, specifically 
with regard to social entrepreneurship, are: bureaucratic obstacles, ministry oversight, the 
restrictive association law, the foreign funding control mechanism, wasta, RONGOs’ co-
optation of social enterprises, RONGOs’ influence over support organizations, the 
stratification of social enterprises, and regime surveillance tactics. These structural factors 
create hierarchical relationships between the regime and various population sectors and 
make overt discipline and control unnecessary.  
Jordan’s maze of bureaucratic obstacles complicates and delays the legal 
registration process for social enterprises, which is a necessary step and if successful, 
affords the enterprises a degree of legal protection and eligibility for certain funds and 
other resources. In addition, employees of the Ministry of Social Development and the 
Ministry of Trade and Finance are often either unwilling or unable to offer guidance 
during this process, which further exacerbates the problem. Even after registration, the 
bureaucratic issues continue, with entrepreneurs reporting that ministry officials make 
additional and sometimes unreasonable demands. Through bureaucratic obstacles such as 
these, the types of access and resources through social capital available to social 
entrepreneurs are restricted. 
The ministries responsible for social enterprises also exercise considerable 
oversight over them. Ministry officials may attend meetings, can inspect paperwork 
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unannounced, must be informed of any enterprise activities, and ensure that enterprises 
do not undertake ‘political’ activities. This oversight erodes trust between government 
institutions and social entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may feel obligated to self-censor 
statements and plan activities which they know would be acceptable for the regime. Other 
enterprises may work secretly to avoid regime surveillance. Thus, regime surveillance 
exercised through government institutions’ oversight over social enterprises constitutes a 
structural restriction on social capital and social entrepreneurship.  
The 2008 Law on Associations restricts social enterprises’ activities in a 
formalized way; it prohibits the formation of organizations with ‘political goals’ or that 
might upset the public order. These broad terms make it easier for ministry officials to 
reject social entrepreneurs’ registration applications. It also allows the ministries to 
dissolve a social enterprise if it is deemed to have political objectives. Therefore, social 
enterprises, which are inherently political, might not be able to access the types of 
resources they need because this could attract ministry attention, so they must operate 
without these resources or change their objectives. This means, for example, that an 
enterprise planning political activities cannot advertise or receive funding from banks or 
other organizations. 
Another way in which the 2008 Law on Associations limits social enterprises’ 
access to resources is by restricting the foreign funding that associations may receive. The 
law stipulates that the government must approve any foreign funding given to associations 
in Jordan. To apply for foreign funding approval, social enterprises must provide the 
Ministry of Social Development with the amount, type, and purpose for which the funds 
will be spent, including detailed information about the specific projects for which funding 
has been requested, as well as how these projects serve the national interest. The ministry 
may reject the funding application without explanation. The foreign funding control 
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mechanism is thus another way in which the regime controls social capital formation by 
institutional means: some social enterprises would be entirely unable to function without 
foreign funding and must therefore adapt to the regime’s interpretations of ‘acceptable’ 
objectives and programs. Through this mechanism, the regime determines in part which 
social enterprises can become established and continue to exist, so rather than social 
enterprises’ access and use of social capital, it is top-down external involvement in their 
source of financial support that determines their success. 
Another ‘area’ in which social capital emerges in Jordan is in the widespread 
reliance on wasta. This term describes the personal connections people use in order to 
access certain resources or even gain employment. However, wasta is not equitable; not 
everyone has powerful personal connections. The reliance on wasta can therefore exclude 
certain sectors of the population from achieving what more privileged or well-connected 
persons can do with a telephone call to a family friend or colleague. This type of social 
capital is negative and promotes the status quo. It is also a type of bonding social capital, 
in which members of one social sector access resources through their connections but do 
not ‘bridge,’ or make available, this social capital to members from other social sectors. 
Unfortunately, many social entrepreneurs cited wasta as one of the most important factors 
for their success, because it helped them reach the ‘right’ person at the ministry to register 
their enterprise or allowed them to gain financial or legal aid. 
The involvement of royal NGOs (RONGOs) in Jordan’s civil society increases 
competition for other non-governmental organizations and can prevent them from 
accessing necessary resources, because many international aid donors give funding to 
RONGOs. Jordan’s royal family sponsors and directs several RONGOs with varying 
missions; in recent years, they have adopted social entrepreneurship support into their 
agendas. In at least one case, a RONGO has also co-opted a previously independent social 
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enterprise. Due to RONGOs’ special status for international funding and government 
approval, it can be advantageous for social enterprises to work under the umbrella of a 
RONGO or in association with a RONGO initiative. By doing this, however, the social 
enterprises open themselves to oversight and direction by the RONGO, and thus, by the 
monarchy. Therefore, when social enterprises tap into the social capital afforded by 
affiliation with a RONGO, they are tapping into a source of negative, stratified, top-down 
social capital which may harm their ability to achieve their objectives rather than leading 
to mutually beneficial cooperation. 
There is also evidence that Jordanian RONGOs exercise considerable influence 
over other areas of the social entrepreneurship ecosystem’s support network, such as 
incubators and accelerators. Incubators and accelerators typically provide start-up funds, 
training, networking opportunities, and office space for enterprises that have not become 
established enough to be financially self-sustainable. For example, Oasis500 is an 
accelerator that was created in 2010 ‘by direction from His Majesty King Abdullah II’ to 
support ‘technology and creative startups.’784 In 2019, Oasis500 wanted to expand and 
start a special sector or umbrella for social enterprises, but it was denied permission to do 
so, and instead, the Queen Rania Foundation raised funds for a social enterprise support 
sector instead.785 This suggests considerable influence of RONGOs over the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem’s support network, in that they do not necessarily prohibit 
social entrepreneurship or support for social enterprises, but rather manage and direct 
through which channels social enterprises can work. Working with the Queen Rania 
Foundation instead of Oasis500 potentially subjects social enterprises to greater regime 
oversight and thus any social capital generated from this connection is hierarchical. 
 
784 ‘About Us,’ Oasis500, accessed October 2, 2019, https://www.oasis500.com/en/about-us. 
785 Interview with ‘T8Y’ (Social Entrepreneurship Support Organisation/Bank), Skype, July, 2019. 
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Overall, the various methods the regime employs have the effect of stratifying 
social enterprises according to their degree of ‘acceptance’ by the regime. As shown in 
the previous chapter, those social enterprises which are more closely aligned with the 
regime are viewed as less threatening to the status quo, because the regime can monitor 
them more closely and regulate them if necessary. Independent social enterprises are seen 
as more threatening because they are less easily monitored and require more overt 
repression methods. This stratification also means that enterprises more closely 
associated with the regime have easier access and use of resources because the regime 
places fewer obstacles in their way and they have a ‘stamp of approval’ by working with 
the regime. This affects the formation of social capital, as social entrepreneurs may orient 
themselves towards associational networks more favourable to the regime and avoid those 
which could pose a risk. Thus, the regime’s social enterprise stratification through various 
structural factors leads to a cycle in which the type of associational network favoured by 
social enterprises is predetermined and likewise also leads to the type of social enterprises 
that are established (i.e. aligned with the regime or not). In this scenario, social capital (as 
determined through associational networks) becomes the dependent variable. (Figure 6.3) 
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(Figure 6.3) 
 
Social enterprises, particularly structural transformation-based social enterprises 
(STSEs), are trying to build bridging social capital, but the impact of government 
measures results in mostly negative and bonding social capital. It is stratified 
hierarchically, and exclusive, due to government restrictions, co-optation, and control 
over various social capital sources. State surveillance influences civil society and any 
potential democratization process from the ground up, as it infiltrates even the 
development of social capital and determines which associational networks are 
acceptable. 
The Jordanian regime has manipulated the social entrepreneurship ecosystem 
through its surveillance tactics such that it can effectively act as gatekeeper of success for 
social enterprises. Local or international support for social enterprises and social capital 
development therefore does not support civil society growth and may also not lead to 
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economic growth. The social entrepreneurship scene could instead be another part of the 
regime’s political and economic liberalisation façade. Through the social 
entrepreneurship programs run by RONGOs, the regime positions itself as a supporter of 
Jordan’s social enterprises. Instead, however, the state’s institutions impose structural 
restrictions on social enterprises that interrupt their capacity to create social value. 
 
 
A Comparison of Social Enterprises 
 
The literature review in Chapter One established eight attributes of social 
entrepreneurship, of which four are essential to entrepreneurship, two make social 
entrepreneurship inherently social, and two are ‘optional’ attributes which many, but not 
all, social enterprises have. The four essential attributes to entrepreneurship distinguish it 
from other businesses, organizations, and undertakings. They are innovation, assumption 
of risk and/or uncertainty, autonomy in leadership and decision-making, and management 
and investment of capital. The two attributes which differentiate social entrepreneurship 
from other forms of entrepreneurship, i.e. that make it inherently social, are social 
objectives and social value creation. The final two attributes are not essential to social 
enterprises but do occur and define the function of social entrepreneurship in many cases. 
These attributes are a dependency-provision cycle and cooperation and/or involvement of 
society. This section reviews each attribute in turn and compares it with the qualities of 
the two types of social enterprises found in Jordan. This allows for an evaluation of 
structural transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs) and product- and service-
oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) in light of the structural factors that influence their 
operation and success (Table 6.1).  
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A Comparison of Social Entrepreneurship Attributes 
In social 
entrepreneurship 
theory 
Structural transformation-
based social enterprises 
(STSEs) 
Product- and service-
oriented social enterprises 
(PSSEs) 
Innovation Innovative in use of targeted 
creative reorganization and 
social capital 
Innovative in product and/or 
delivery 
Assumption of risk 
and/or uncertainty 
Risk from regime opposition 
and uncertainty from future 
operations 
Uncertainty from insufficient 
resources and financial risk 
Management and 
investment of 
capital 
Rely on social capital but this is 
restricted by structural factors 
Use mainly financial, material, 
and human capital 
Autonomy in 
leadership and 
decision-making 
More autonomous than PSSEs 
but also subject to surveillance 
and/or repression tactics 
Limited autonomy due to 
regime management, co-
optation, and surveillance 
Social objectives Aim to transform society and 
address structural issues 
Seek to solve a specific issue in 
the short term 
Social value 
creation 
Work to destroy and replace 
existing norms to serve society 
(Collectively) create social 
value by normalizing the 
entrepreneurial spirit 
Dependency-
provision cycle  
Usually establish this cycle as 
part of targeted creative 
reorganization 
Do not engage in this 
Cooperation and 
involvement of 
society 
Rely on society’s cooperation 
and involvement almost entirely 
due to reliance on social capital 
This is often essential to 
operations (e.g. volunteer 
workers) but PSSEs rely more 
on sponsors, donors, INGOs, 
and the government 
 (Table 6.1) 
 
One of the key attributes of entrepreneurship is innovation. In order to distinguish 
itself from similar or related undertakings, a social enterprise must have a characteristic 
that is new or different, whether that is the product, its conduct, its management or any 
other attribute. STSEs and PSSEs are both innovative, with STSEs innovating mostly in 
their employment of targeted creative reorganization and use of social capital to achieve 
their objectives. PSSEs are innovative in the product they design or the delivery of that 
product to the community. Thus, both STSEs and PSSEs match the criteria for innovation 
in entrepreneurship. 
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 Enterprises assume risk and/or uncertainty from various factors. The viability of 
an enterprise depends not only on members’ efforts but on their ability to secure resources 
and manage capital. Again, both STSEs and PSSEs deal with risk and uncertainty, albeit 
in different ways. STSEs face greater risk from government opposition and consequently 
uncertainty from not knowing whether they will be allowed to operate in the future. 
PSSEs face mostly financial risk and their uncertainty stems from the possibility of being 
unable to generate sufficient resources, in part due to the changeability of the international 
funding on which so many PSSEs rely. Aside from general risk and uncertainty that any 
enterprise might face, both STSEs and PSSEs deal with risk and uncertainty generated by 
structural factors.  
The third attribute of entrepreneurship is the management and investment of 
capital. This refers to the entrepreneur managing the capital necessary to produce the 
enterprise’s services and to investing sufficient capital so that the future operation of the 
enterprise is secured. Enterprises can use any combination of financial, physical, human, 
or social capital. STSEs rely mainly on social capital; in fact, creating, managing, and 
investing in social capital tends to be one of their main objectives. PSSEs are more reliant 
on financial, material, and human capital, but often need to use some form of social capital 
to access those. For both STSEs and PSSEs, structural factors influence the types of 
capital available to them and impacts how and to what extent they can use social capital. 
The final attribute essential to entrepreneurship is autonomy in leadership and 
decision-making, meaning that enterprises are not managed, directly or indirectly, by any 
private or governmental organization or authority. In theory this means that enterprises 
should be able to formulate their positions and organize their actions freely, as well as 
terminate their work. Both STSEs and PSSEs in Jordan fail to achieve this due to the 
regime’s systematic control, management, and surveillance measures. Enterprises around 
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the world are subject to structural factors, such as rules and regulations, that impose 
certain limits on their work, such as antitrust or labour laws. Within this framework, they 
are free to make autonomous decisions regarding the enterprise. In an authoritarian 
context, however, these structural factors are such that enterprises can no longer be 
considered autonomous. Instead, they are managed, to varying degrees, in a way that 
restricts them to a narrow set of regime-‘approved’ functions. 
Social enterprises must have social objectives; they must aim to serve society, or 
a sector of society, to some degree. Social entrepreneurs assess opportunities in terms of 
their possible social impact, rather than financial wealth creation. This is one of the 
attributes that distinguishes them from other types of entrepreneurs. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, social enterprises in Jordan fall into two broad categories which are 
divided mainly by their social objectives. STSEs, with their focus on structural 
transformation, seek to transform society in a significant way over the long term, while 
PSSEs work to solve a specific issue in the short term by providing a certain product or 
service. 
The second essential distinguishing attribute of a social enterprise is its focus on 
social value creation, which it does through ‘creative destruction’ of existing norms to 
effect change. This can also be understood as exploiting changes as opportunities for 
social enterprises. Social value is difficult to measure, but STSEs incorporate goals for 
social value creation into their work by replacing existing norms through targeted creative 
reorganization of society, which is their social objective and what makes them innovative. 
PSSEs can collectively create social value by normalizing the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in 
society. The extent of STSE and PSSE social value creation is limited to the frameworks 
approved by the regime, however.  
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The final two attributes that social enterprises may have are the establishment of 
a dependency-provision cycle and the cooperation and involvement of society. A 
dependency-provision cycle occurs when an enterprise has identified a need in society 
and positions itself as the best provider of solutions to those needs. Thus, society becomes 
dependent on the social enterprise’s services, but the enterprise also depends on society’s 
continued support. STSEs often create a dependency-provision cycle as part of the 
targeted creative reorganization process; this is what makes the process work best. PSSEs 
do not aim to establish a dependency-provision cycle, although they do seek to create an 
influential product or service. The cooperation and involvement of society refers to the 
social enterprise functioning with and encouraging the support of the community in which 
it operates; in this case, community members’ participation may become crucial to the 
social enterprise’s success. Again, STSEs tend to rely on this almost entirely through their 
use of social capital and the targeted creative reorganization method. For PSSEs, this can 
be essential for everyday operations (such as through volunteers) but they tend to rely 
more on the involvement of sponsors and donors such as international organizations or 
national support organizations. Thus, there are aspects of a dependency-provision cycle 
and the cooperation and involvement of society found in both STSEs and PSSEs. 
In sum, the classical entrepreneurship literature assumes that enterprises are 
established as bottom-up organizations, that is, without significant aid, hence the 
importance placed on the idea of autonomy in leadership, management, and funding. 
However, enterprises established with international aid or through national initiatives, 
and which are subject to significant regime management tactics, are top-down and 
therefore have limited autonomy.  
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Social Entrepreneurship in a Civil Society Under Surveillance 
 
Civil society is composed of associations that occupy the space between the state 
and individuals, and is generally understood to be an organic, bottom-up mechanism for 
collective empowerment with which citizens protect themselves from the state. There are 
various contending definitions of civil society, but most approaches assume that 
association leads to social empowerment786 because individuals acquire norms of 
democratic interaction and subsequently ‘create institutions capable of resisting 
authoritarian power.787 This view also points to the importance of social capital because 
‘a sphere of voluntary, purposive association’ can counter ‘forces of chaos [and] 
oppression.’788 Civil society has also been used as a prescriptive device by various 
approaches that argue that civil society can empower individuals and groups against 
authoritarianism.789 The idea is that civil society can construct an independent sphere of 
interaction with parallel institutions and structures are created that serve the needs of 
ordinary citizens; this is sometimes called a shadow state.790  
In studies of the Middle East, civil society is seen as having an important role, 
even if limited, in mobilizing dissent and opposition voices and in providing an arena for 
empowerment for citizens who are otherwise excluded from formal politics.791 Indeed, 
the number of nongovernmental organizations in the region has grown and professional 
 
786 John Hall, Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge, UK: Blackwell, 1995). 
787 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,’ Comparative Politics 
33, no. 1 (2000): 44. 
788 Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, ‘Civil Society and Social Capital beyond Putnam,’ American 
Behavioral Scientist 42 (1998): 125. 
789 Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, ‘Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in 
Comparative Perspective,’ American Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 1 (1998): 5–20. 
790 Václav Havel, ‘The Power of the Powerless’ in The Power of the Powerless, ed. John Keane (Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 78–79. 
791 See, for example, Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, vols. 1–2 (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1996); Jillian Schwedler, ed., Toward a Civil Society in the Middle East? A Primer (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
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organizations are active in public policy debates.792 The 2019 month-long Jordan 
Teachers Association strike, during which teachers asked for higher wages and an 
acknowledgement of and apology for the government’s infringement on teachers’ 
political rights during a sit-in protest, is one example of this.793 However, as Weber has 
stated, ‘the quantitative spread of organizational life does not always go hand in hand 
with its qualitative significance.’794 Civil society expansion does not necessarily translate 
to increased avenues for meaningful political participation, and ‘nondemocratic forces 
and movements’ can undermine it. Therefore, the political context for civil society is 
relevant when evaluating its possible effects on the democratization process.795  
In the Middle East, the political context differs from Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. In these two regions, civil society was ‘an organic grass-roots process in which 
actors from civil society challenged the state and incumbent regimes.’796 In contrast, in 
the Middle East, civil society emerged in large part because ‘regimes in the region 
initiated political liberalization to enhance legitimacy in a context of prolonged economic 
crisis’797 in the 1980s and 1990s in order to stave off the destabilizing effects of 
widespread collective action and popular protests.798 This also means that civil society 
has been controlled and regulated by a web of administrative procedures and bureaucracy, 
 
792 Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, ‘Professional Associations and National Integration in the Arab World, 
with Special Reference to Lawyers Syndicates’ in Beyond Coercion: Durability of the Arab State, eds. 
Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (New York: Croom Helm, 1988). 
793 Raed Omari, ‘Teachers’ Month-Long Strike Over, Students to Return to School,’ Jordan Times, 
October 6, 2019, https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/teachers-month-long-strike-over-students-
return-school. 
794 Max Weber quoted in Sheri Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,’ World 
Politics 49 (April 1997): 407. 
795 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 46. 
796 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 46. 
797 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 43. 
798 For Jordan, see Katherine Rath, ‘The Process of Democratization in Jordan,’ Middle Eastern Studies 
30 (July 1994): 530–57; Laurie Brand, ‘Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The 
Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’ in Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, ed. 
Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Rex Brynen, ‘Economic 
Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan,’ Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 25 (March 1992): 69–97. 
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which is representative of a ‘trend away from overt repression toward less visible forms 
of social control,’ which calls into question the assumption that the existence of civil 
society is representative of social empowerment.799 Moderate political liberalization has 
now been part of a regime survival strategy, known as ‘defensive democratization,’ for 
several decades, and civil society growth does not ‘precede or lead to political change; it 
follow[s] regime-sponsored reforms.’800 With the emergence of regime-initiated political 
liberalization efforts, raw coercion has given way to alternative measures of social 
control.  
The modern Middle Eastern state has shifted to the Foucauldian use of 
disciplinary power, described in greater detail in Chapter Five, that derives from 
partitioning society into units that state institutions can regulate through surveillance 
measures.801 As Wiktorowicz describes it, ‘by dictating when and where individuals are 
present and even their relations with one another, the state enhances its social control.’802 
By disciplining society with an extensive administrative apparatus,803 the state can engage 
in ‘domestic colonization’ so that it can eliminate ‘unsurveillable, uncontrollable 
space.’804 In Jordan specifically, government ministries engage in pervasive engagement 
and control with associations, and each ministry has a specific area of responsibility. 
Organizations may not function in areas that are subject to multiple ministries. Besides 
limiting the options for organizations’ activities and objectives, this also means that ‘civil 
society is thus partitioned and segmented.’805 
 
799 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 44. 
800 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 47–48. 
801 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
802 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 48. 
803 Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1995), 320–27. 
804 Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline (London: Routledge, 1994), 99. 
805 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 49. 
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Wiktorowicz’ 2000 analysis of state partitioning and surveillance of civil society 
in Jordan has not changed. He argued that the system the regime built relies on the 
‘predictability and visibility’ of civil society, in which ‘collective action in the niches of 
society’ is minimized to reduce the threat to state power.806At present, this is 
demonstrated by the difficulties social enterprises report.  They cannot operate under 
more than one ministry, must follow that ministry’s strict yet obfuscated regulations, must 
report all activity to the relevant ministry, and are under surveillance. In addition, the 
regime has implemented certain measures to exercise administrative control and 
surveillance over social enterprises which have not reached the official ministry 
registration stage by nearly monopolizing these organizations’ access to financial and 
social capital through the work of RONGOs. Thus, the independent realms in which social 
enterprises might function are significantly narrowed, and because the threat of regime 
surveillance and repression tactics are well-known, most social entrepreneurs choose 
pathways in which they are associated with the regime in some way. These avenues are 
more attractive because they offer more security and opportunity, and less risk of simply 
being shut down or receiving penalties of some sort.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, policymakers have turned to social 
entrepreneurship in the Middle East in the hope that it can reduce the youth 
unemployment rate and increase popular participation in civil society. This chapter 
addresses whether any personal or collective empowerment does arise from social 
enterprises in Jordan, given the context of individuals’ precarious relationship with the 
state. The regime’s tactics for dealing with an emerging, and potentially independently-
 
806 Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control,’ 49. 
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minded sector of civil society are analyzed through the lens of social capital and by 
focusing on structural factors. 
This chapter has examined the relationship between social capital, a key resource 
for social enterprises, and the Jordanian regime’s repression tactics in the form of 
administrative management and surveillance. The Jordanian regime uses surveillance to 
direct and restrict the work of social enterprises. Therefore, they fail to contribute to the 
growth of an independent civil society and are not effective development agents due to 
the many regulatory restrictions that govern them. The regime’s interference with social 
capital effectively negates any theoretical potential it may have to be the building block 
of civil society. Specifically, regime surveillance strongly contributes to undermining 
bridging social capital, which affects how people internalize certain attitudes: citizens’ 
trust in government and institutions is eroded, and Jordanians may even have become 
more suspicious of one another due to their fear of being observed. This chapter 
demonstrates that the Jordanian regime stipulates which associational networks are 
acceptable and subsequently controls those networks. The regime undermines the 
development of social enterprises in civil society by restricting citizens’ ability to access 
mutually beneficial social capital. In this way, Jordan’s social capital functions partly in 
the way Bourdieu described: it is for the few, not the many, and controlled by the elite 
who use it to ‘gatekeep’ avenues of political participation. It also appears to align with 
Grix’s theories on social capital, in which he argues that under authoritarianism, social 
capital is the dependent variable, that is, dependent on the mode of governance. Social 
capital is certainly a source of social control in Jordan, as Portes demonstrated it has the 
potential to be. The regime’s surveillance tactics contribute to the stifling of horizontal 
social networks and instead encourage top-down vertical networks that are characteristic 
of negative social capital. This situation, as Sotiropoulos explained, does not lead to a 
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strengthened civil society but rather one that is undermined by exclusionary hierarchical 
relationships that make formal control unnecessary. Thus, the regime perpetuates the 
status quo and disrupts the theoretical progression of the population to increased political 
participation. The state’s influence extends to the very foundations of any 
democratization processes in Jordan.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has addressed whether social enterprises act as independent civil 
society organizations in the Kingdom of Jordan, considering the pervasive surveillance 
mechanisms of the state. In so doing, it has examined why and how social enterprises are 
formed in Jordan, and what their sources of financial, material, human, and social capital 
are. It has discovered which laws and regulations apply to forming and upholding social 
enterprises. The support organizations and networks available to social enterprises were 
analysed, and likewise, the obstacles that social enterprises face were identified. The 
thesis examined whether social enterprises face restrictions from the Jordanian regime, 
as other civil society organizations do, and what these restrictions are. Finally, social 
enterprises’ use of social capital and the way in which regime repression tactics impact 
social capital were investigated. 
Chapter One reviewed studies on social entrepreneurship and investigated the 
origins and various meanings of the concept. The chapter identified innovation, 
assumption of risk and/or uncertainty, autonomy in leadership and decision-making, and 
management and investment of capital as aspects of entrepreneurship which distinguish 
it from other types of organizations. Likewise, social objectives and social value creation 
are crucial to social enterprises and distinguish them from other enterprises. The 
dependency-provision cycle and the involvement of society were shown to be non-
essential characteristics of social entrepreneurship, which means that a social enterprise 
does not necessarily have these characteristics, but that they can influence how social 
enterprises function. This outline of social entrepreneurship lends clarity to the thesis, as 
the many definitions of social entrepreneurship vary and are sometimes vague. It also 
allows for consistent identification of social enterprises in the field, although the post-
positivism approach explained in the introduction allows for some variation depending 
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on local context. The third chapter does take this approach and distinguishes between the 
Western-centric views on social enterprises and the aspects of social entrepreneurship in 
Jordan. Finally, Chapter One establishes the importance of social capital in social 
entrepreneurship and shows how the different types of social capital have been theorized 
to lead to either progression towards democratization or entrenchment of 
authoritarianism. 
The domestic and international relations of the Kingdom of Jordan are outlined in 
Chapter Two. It explains how the monarchy has balanced international policies with tribal 
divisions, economic challenges, and citizens’ demands through much of its history since 
its establishment as an independent state. This balancing act coincides with the regime’s 
establishment of repressive or liberal policies, particularly during times of social unrest 
or when appeasing international donors. Simultaneously, Jordan has dealt with high youth 
unemployment rates and various refugee crises. Still, the regime has allowed for a degree 
of citizen participation and the growth of civil society, both of which it has managed 
carefully to maintain power and stability. The regime’s reliance on aid from regional and 
international donors significantly restricts its policy options, as shown in the case of the 
Gulf War. Likewise, the regime restricts civil society and citizen activism to maintain a 
measure of control. Chapter Two thus contributes the background on the social and 
political context in which Jordanian social enterprises operate and shows how any 
initiative is tied up in the state’s domestic and international objectives. 
Chapter Three discusses the essence of social entrepreneurship in Jordan and 
identifies their sources of support, as well as the various challenges they face, from 
securing a sustainable income to dealing with government bureaucracy. Crucially, the 
chapter establishes that social enterprises in Jordan are not homogenous; there are two 
types that have distinct qualities and that take on different roles in the country’s socio-
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political landscape. Structural transformation-based social enterprises (STSEs) address 
structural social issues and focus on self-sustainability and continuity. In practice, they 
do this by creating independent or hybrid funding models so that they are independent of 
international and domestic aid sources. STSEs instead rely on social capital to succeed 
and incorporate their goals into the community they serve, with the objective of changing 
community norms. The chapter explains STSEs’ objectives, funding models, use of 
‘targeted creative reorganization,’ the challenges they face, and their resiliency tactics. 
Due to STSEs’ independence from external funding sources, they are able to address 
community needs and can formulate their objectives and implement their plans freely. On 
the other hand, product- and service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs) provide specific 
goods and services with the aim of addressing a specific social need in the short term. 
These enterprises depend on grants and loans and struggle with maintaining their funding 
sources. The chapter outlines PSSEs’ formation process and the impact the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem has on them; they cannot implement long-term plans, but 
they do have the potential to make advances in smaller ways. Establishing the differences 
between STSEs and PSSEs is important for an accurate understanding of social 
entrepreneurship in Jordan and for analysing its relationship with the state, particularly 
because the two diverge in both function and objectives. They thus pose different 
challenges or create opportunities for the regime. The chapter also revises previous 
assumptions about entrepreneurship as the solution to a variety of issues in the Middle 
East by showing the complex problems social entrepreneurs themselves face. The 
potential for success that social enterprises have is not what matters, it is their actual 
ability to achieve their goals. 
Through the lens of social capital theory and its criticisms, Chapter Four analyses 
how the international community’s implicit support for social capital creation actually 
264 
 
restricts social enterprises. The chapter first reviews social capital theory and outlines 
both the positive and negative effects of social capital. Then it provides an overview of 
Jordan’s political economy and the strategies the regime has used to bolster security. It is 
within this context that international aid programmes operate and where social capital 
development lies. The role of these foreign actors in the Jordanian entrepreneurship 
ecosystem is assessed and ultimately the chapter argues that the international community 
contributes to the restriction of the political space in Jordan. Foreign aid for social 
entrepreneurship implicitly promotes a development strategy that relies on social capital, 
which is problematic because the utility of social capital in development is disputed. This 
means that international actors may be supporting a strategy that has been shown to be 
exclusionary, promote only the ‘correct’ kind of association, and perpetuate the status 
quo, while emphasizing the individual’s responsibility to solve her/his own problems. 
These issues raise the question of the role of social capital in an authoritarian regime such 
as Jordan, where government surveillance is prevalent. 
The Jordanian regime’s use of administrative power and surveillance to dictate 
social enterprises’ political space is analysed in Chapter Five. The regime uses soft power 
through bureaucratic obstacles during the registration process, co-optation, oversight in 
the form of awards, the involvement of royal NGOs, and a foreign funding control 
mechanism to regulate social enterprises’ work. A hierarchy of social enterprises emerges 
from the regime’s use of administrative power and establishment of permissible and 
restricted activities. The more closely a social enterprise is affiliated with the government, 
the more it is tolerated, because the government exercises more management over it. 
Conversely, the more independent a social enterprise is, the less it is tolerated and 
subjected to greater repression methods, because the government must attempt to exercise 
more control. The emergence of social enterprises has prompted a mixed response of both 
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toleration and repression from the government. Thus far, the regime’s response to social 
enterprises has been a mix of state-led top-down control and toleration of government-
affiliated (and to some degree managed) social enterprises. Therefore, the chances of 
social enterprises achieving their objectives without external interference and functioning 
as truly community-responsive organizations, rather than being beholden to the demands 
of the regime, are low. Most Jordanian social enterprises are ultimately extensions of the 
regime’s neopatrimonial rule, and only very few are independent. Thus, social enterprises 
are very much ‘on the radar’ of the regime, which appears to have adapted its strategies 
to include greater involvement of RONGOs in its surveillance activities. This 
demonstrates an evolution of authoritarianism in the country. 
Chapter Six examines the impact of the regime’s surveillance activities on civil 
society and focuses specifically on the effect this has on social entrepreneurship. The 
chapter examines the relationship between regime surveillance, the political liberalization 
process, and the development or destruction of social capital. It argues that state support 
or involvement with social enterprises and social capital can build hierarchical 
associational relationships instead of social networks that lead to political empowerment. 
Through the structural-institutional approach taken in the chapter, it is determined that 
structural social capital comprises rules, regulations, and procedures that can both aid and 
hinder mutually beneficial collective action; according to the Putnam School this 
collective action can lead to democratization processes. This chapter demonstrates how 
the pathway from social capital development to democratization is compromised with 
state surveillance. When social capital is restricted and directed by a top-down process, 
there can be no progress in political liberalization. Such is the case in Jordan, with social 
enterprises repressed by regime surveillance and bureaucratic management processes. 
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This thesis makes three contributions to the field; first, in how social enterprises 
can be understood in a non-Western context, second, in the way state surveillance tactics 
influence social capital, and third, in how the Jordanian state’s authoritarian governance 
appears to be evolving.  
The thesis establishes that social enterprises in Jordan are not like their 
counterparts found in Europe or North America. Social enterprises in Jordan appear in 
two subcategories and are thus not homogenous; each must be understood in the particular 
context of the opportunities they can take and the challenges they face. Product- and 
service-oriented social enterprises (PSSEs), for instance, are not autonomous in the sense 
they should be when understood in the Western definition of social enterprises, because 
they rely almost entirely on external funding. This also impacts their ability for 
independent decision-making and programme design. Structural transformation-based 
social enterprises (STSEs) are financially independent but suffer from far greater state 
interference through regime surveillance mechanisms. Due to these issues, neither type 
of social enterprise in Jordan is able to function as an independent civil society actor, 
contrary to what the dominant literature suggests.  
Further, the thesis presents a criticism of the Putnam-based social capital literature 
which views it as the ‘building block’ of democracy. The case of Jordanian social 
enterprises, which rely on social capital, and the state’s restriction of social capital 
through surveillance mechanisms shows how the process of social capital leading to 
liberalizing political processes can be co-opted and controlled. State surveillance disrupts 
the process of social capital formation and development. It can direct who and what 
circumstances create social capital. This undermines the next step in the process, the 
creation of trust in government institutions, and thus prevents any progress in 
democratization. Economic development and civil society promotion efforts, whether 
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national or international, are thus futile if they support organisations such as social 
enterprises whose success depends on social capital formation. 
Finally, the challenges social entrepreneurs face in Jordan regarding state 
bureaucratic and surveillance mechanisms indicates that authoritarianism in the country 
is not only persistent but also evolving. That the regime would employ surveillance 
mechanisms to control social enterprises is, considering Jordan’s history, to be expected. 
The involvement of royal NGOs in this process through sponsorship, awards, and co-
optation of social enterprises, however, is new, particularly for King Abdullah II’s reign. 
It suggests a more direct participation of the monarchy in the surveillance apparatus which 
was not present before. It also shows that the monarchy, through its direct involvement, 
is tightening the leash it has given civil society, and is devising new realms of influence 
through which society can be directed, restricted, and ultimately controlled. 
 Ultimately, this work questions the role social enterprises can play in authoritarian 
realms and concludes that with the emergence of social entrepreneurship in Jordan, 
sectors of both civil society and the state have evolved, each countering and balancing 
the other. Thus, the thesis contributes not only to our understanding of civil society’s 
creative methods to defy repression strategies but also to debates on democratization 
processes and regime survival tactics. 
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 المشروع ملخص
 
 
 اسم المشروع:
 الماهية: حركة وتأثير ريادة الأعمال في المجتمع المحلي الأردني  
 
 
 اسم الباحث: 
 ليليان توبر
 
 الأكاديمي:نبذة عن موضوع البحث 
يدرس هذا البحث المؤسسات الأجتماعية في المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية، ويفحص دورها في المجتمع المحلي 
يهدف البحث الى اكتشاف ألية عمل هذه المؤسسات وإستجابة المجتمع المحلي بمختلف قطاعاته لهذه  الأردني ككل.
ليدي المعتاد عليه لريادة الأعمال من جهة ومفاهيم الريادة الى المقارنة ما بين الوصف التق المؤسسات. بالإضافة
التساؤل عن مدى فعالية دورمؤسسات  الإجتماعية من جهة أخرى التي يجب مراجعتها واعادة صياغتها. في ظل
 القضايا الاجتماعية.المجتمع المدني في السابق وطرق تفعيل تأثيرها الإيجابي على المجتمعات المحلية في مواجهة 
 
 تمويل البحث وإعتباراته الأخلاقية: 
وهو ممول من   يعتبر تنفيذ هذا المشروع جزء من بحث رسالة الدكتوراة في جامعة درهام في درهام انجلترا.
وطرقه من قبل لجنة المبادئ مجلس البحث الاجتماعي والاقتصادي في المملكة المتحدة. تمت مراجعة البحث 
 81والدولية. وتم منح الموافقة بتاريخ والأخلاقيات الإجتماعية في جامعة درهام لدراسات العلاقات الحكومية 
  .7102تشرين الأول 
 
 ن اجر.ث وفي المقابلات طوعية وبدوتعتبرمشاركتك في مشروع البح ▪
 لك الحرية بالانسحاب وانهاء المقابلة في اي وقت.  ▪
 سيتم تسجيل المقابلة صوتيا بموافقة منك، وسيتم الاحتفاظ بملاحظات مكتوبة.   ▪
 . اتلافهاالملاحظات بشكل أمن وسري وبعد الانتهاء من تحليل المقابلة يتم يتم حفظ التسجيلات و ▪
 ات المقابلة.  الوصول لبيان للباحث فقط حق ▪
بيانات المشارك في المقابلة لن تكون مجهولة تلقائيا قبل النشر، لكن قبل المقابلة للمشاركين حق اختيار ما  ▪
 اذا بياناتهم ستكون:
 رالاسم والمسمى الوظيفي)،مجهولة بشكل كامل (عدم ذك -
 ذكر الاسم)أو مجهولة بشكل جزئي (ذكر المسمى الوظيفي او المؤسسة مع عدم  -
 أوغير مجهولة (ذكر الاسم والمسمى الوظيفي). -
 لا يوجد مخاطرعند المشاركة في مقابلة لاغراض البحث. ▪
 
اذا كان لديك اي اسئلة او استفسارات متعلقة بهذه الدراسة يرجى الاتصال مع مشرف الرسالة الدكتور كليف جونز 
 ku.ca.mahrud@senoj.a.cعلى  البريد الالكتروني: 
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 نموذج الموافقة
 
 اسم المشروع:
 الماهية: حركة وتأثير ريادة الأعمال في المجتمع المحلي الأردني
 
 ليليان توبر اسم الباحث:
 
  يرجى وضع اشارة في المربع
أؤكد أني قرأت وفهمت ملخص المشروع  المؤرخ بتاريخ   .1 
 _____________ للمشروع المذكور أعلاه.
 
 سئلة.وأتيحت لي الفرصة لطرح الأاطلعت على ملخص المشروع   .2 
 
أدرك أن مشاركتي طوعية وأن لدي حرية الانسحاب في اي وقت بدون  .3 
 اعطاء سبب.
 
أدرك أن المقابلة ستسجل صوتيا وأن التسجيلات ستحفظ بشكل أمن وتتلف  .4 
 عند الانتهاء. 
 
 أدرك أن بياناتي لن يتم الوصول اليها الا من قبل الاشخاص الذين يعملون .5 
 على المشروع.
أدرك أن بياناتي لن تكون مجهولة تلقائيا قبل النشر، ولكن لدي حق الاختيار  .6 
 ما اذا بياناتي ستكون: 
 مجهولة بشكل كامل (عدم ذكرالاسم والمسمى الوظيفي).
 
مجهولة بشكل جزئي (ذكر المسمى الوظيفي او المؤسسة التي اعمل فيها مع عدم  
 ذكرالاسم).
 
 والمسمى الوظيفي).م (ذكر الاس غير مجهولة 
 
 أوافق على نشر تعليقاتي بدقة. .7 
 
لدي الاستعداد ليتم الاتصال بي في المستقبل بخصوص هذا المشروع او  .8 
 مشاريع مستقبلية. 
 
 أوافق على المشاركة بهذا المشروع. .9 
 
 
 اسم المشارك  التوقيع التاريخ
 
 
  
 اسم الباحث التوقيع التاريخ
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Interview Questions 
 
Although the research was based on semi-structured interviews, which do not 
use a rigid question-and-answer system, there are indicative questions which show the 
types of questions asked or the topics I addressed. There were slight differences in the 
questions for social entrepreneurs themselves and for persons knowledgeable about 
social entrepreneurship, such as local academics, government officials, and members of 
non-governmental organizations. Both are listed below, with labels indicating which 
questions are for which group of interviewees. 
In order to answer the previously mentioned research questions, social 
entrepreneurs must first be identified. One of the most determining factors will be 
whether the enterprise in question has a social ‘mission’, as this is central to the idea of 
a social enterprise. Having determined whether the enterprise is indeed a social 
enterprise, the interview progresses to the first and second research questions regarding, 
first, the circumstances that lead to the formation of social enterprises, and second, how 
the social enterprises are formed, and their function and purpose. The following 
indicative questions will help to identify social entrepreneurs and answer the first two 
research questions:  
 For social entrepreneurs: 
Can you tell me about your motivation for forming this enterprise? What 
circumstances led to your decision to form the enterprise? 
Why did you choose [particular social issue] and why did you decide to try to 
solve it with an enterprise? 
Can you describe the process of forming your enterprise, from the very 
beginning? 
 
For others: 
What comes to mind when I mention ‘social enterprise’?  
Have you personally participated in the work of one of these enterprises, 
observed their work, or otherwise interacted with a social enterprise? 
Why do you think people are forming social enterprises in Jordan? 
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Following this, the interview will seek to determine the sources of financial, material, 
human, and social capital, which answers the third research question. The questions 
related to the enterprises’ sources of capital are:  
 For social entrepreneurs: 
Financial capital: What were your initial sources of funding? Can you describe 
your current funding sources? 
Material capital: Do you receive any materials through donations? Do you have 
volunteers working with you? 
Human capital: Do you or other members of the enterprise have any education or 
training that contributed to forming the enterprise? Did you participate in a 
training school specifically geared towards forming an enterprise? If so, which 
organization ran this training school? 
Social capital: Who is involved in the enterprise besides yourself? Are you 
connected with them through ways other than the enterprise, e.g. are they family, 
friends, neighbours, or simply like-minded individuals? How do you get the 
word out about your enterprise? How do you find suppliers and customers? Do 
you use the internet (e.g. social media or a website) to advertise or to make 
connections? 
 
For others: 
To your knowledge, what are the sources of financial capital for social 
enterprises? 
What are the sources of material capital (donated materials or volunteers)? 
What are the sources of human capital (education, training, etc)? 
What are the sources of social capital (social connections that facilitate the 
work)? 
 
Answering the fourth question regarding who manages the social enterprises, who the 
entrepreneurs themselves are, and whether they constitute one particular part of 
Jordanian society (e.g. students, youth, businesses), is facilitated by the question:  
For social entrepreneurs: 
Who makes the decisions in this enterprise? Who manages the enterprise? 
 
For others: 
Are there particular social strata that seem to be forming social enterprises more 
than others? If so, who are they, and why are they in particular doing this? 
 
Questions 5, 6, and 7 regarding what, if any, laws, regulations, and/or restrictions apply 
to forming and upholding social enterprises in Jordan, how these laws, regulations, 
and/or restrictions compare to those of civil society organizations, and whether there are 
275 
 
any ‘unofficial’, i.e. unregistered, social enterprises will be answered with documentary 
research but supplemented in the interviews with the following question:  
For social entrepreneurs: 
Can you tell me about the laws or other regulations that you must adhere to? Do 
you encounter any restrictions or support legally? 
 
For others: 
Are you aware of laws or regulations that apply to social enterprises in Jordan? 
Are these laws different from laws governing businesses or NGOs? 
 
The following interview questions supplement the questions about legal issues and 
explore other challenges that social enterprises in Jordan may face:  
For social entrepreneurs: 
Have you encountered any problems with the enterprise? If so, what are/were 
they? How do you deal with these problems? 
What do you perceive to be the greatest obstacles to the success of your 
enterprise? How could these issues be alleviated? 
What do you think are your greatest sources of support? Do you think the 
support you receive is adequate? 
 
For others: 
Do you think that there are obstacles that social enterprises face in Jordan? If so, 
what are they, and how do you think they could be alleviated? 
What do you think are the sources of support for social enterprises in Jordan? 
Are they adequate? 
 
Answers to the following interview questions will provide further understanding of 
social enterprises, entrepreneurs, how they function in Jordanian society, and how they 
might be understood across various strata of Jordanian society: 
For social entrepreneurs: 
Have you had any interaction with government officials? If so, can you tell me 
about these interactions? 
Have you had any interaction with non-governmental organizations or inter-
governmental organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, etc? If so, 
can you tell me about these interactions? 
What do you feel is the difference between working in your enterprise and 
working in an NGO/CSO that has a similar purpose? Is there a difference?  
Do you feel that there is a relationship between the work of your enterprise and 
the greater civil society in Jordan? If so, what is it? If not, why not? 
What do you feel is your social enterprise’s role in Jordanian society? What do 
you think is the role of social enterprises in general in Jordanian society? 
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For others: 
What do you think has been the reaction of the government to the work of social 
enterprises? 
What do you think is the difference between social enterprises and NGOs and 
the services they provide? 
Can you tell me about the relationship between social enterprises and civil 
society?  
What do you think is the role of social enterprises in Jordan? 
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Glossary of Social Enterprises 
 
Name of organization Type of Social 
Enterprise 
Objective 
Accessible Jordan PSSE Raises awareness about 
accessibility issues and 
advocates for changes to 
cities and tourism sites to 
make them accessible to all 
Jordanians 
Ayadeena PSSE Empowers and educates 
underprivileged women in 
poverty areas through 
employment in cross-
stitching, which allows 
them to earn an income 
from home 
Be Environmental PSSE Develops recycling 
solutions for urban 
neighbourhoods in Jordan 
to reduce waste in public 
spaces 
Creative Club PSSE Offers arts and science 
programmes to children 
and youth to increase their 
ability to compete for 
private-sector employment, 
and provides young people 
with constructive ways to 
fill their time to help them 
reject violence and 
extremism  
Deserttulip Jordan/Groasis PSSE Restores vegetation growth 
and gives underprivileged 
families a source of food 
and income with ‘plant 
boxes’ requiring minimal 
water or attention 
EnvaTechs PSSE Creates recycling solutions 
for difficult-to-recycle 
materials such as 
Styrofoam to reduce waste, 
and raises awareness about 
environmental issues 
Greening the Camps PSSE Provides refugee 
communities with 
environmentally friendly, 
sustainable, and 
independent sources of 
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nutrition and income by 
installing rooftop gardens 
and teaching refugees basic 
gardening skills 
Ilearn Jordan STSE Provides at-risk children 
with non-traditional 
learning opportunities and 
access to ‘safe spaces’ 
where they can interact, 
express themselves freely, 
and acquire the skills, 
attitudes and behaviours 
necessary in life 
Kaamen PSSE Identifies the untapped 
opportunity for profitable 
social impact, where the 
interests of a corporation 
meet the interests of 
communities, and then 
designs investments and 
programmes, making 
enterprises leaders and 
beneficiaries of social 
progress 
Leaders of Tomorrow/For9a STSE Advocates for widespread 
and accessible free speech, 
human rights, social 
equality, and educational 
opportunities 
Naua PSSE/RONGO Raises awareness about the 
importance of social and 
development issues and 
active volunteerism in 
Jordan through an online 
platform that provides 
transparent information on 
various organizations’ 
impact 
Ruwwad STSE Helps disadvantaged 
communities overcome 
marginalisation through 
youth activism, civic 
engagement and education 
SahhaTech PSSE Develops technology-based 
solutions for 
pharmaceutical issues in 
Jordan, aiming to make 
pharmaceutical information 
more accessible to all 
citizens 
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Shams Community STSE Promotes civic awareness 
and inter-personal dialogue 
through discussion-based 
shared meals in which 
participants discuss 
contentious topics in a safe 
environment 
SheFighter PSSE Empowers women, gives 
them confidence, and 
combats domestic violence 
through self-defence 
courses 
Taqaddam STSE Aims to build a strong 
progressively minded 
community of Jordanians 
through political and social 
communication and citizen 
engagement through an 
online platform, debates, 
and public outreach 
activities 
Teenah PSSE Creates jobs for Syrian 
refugee women in the north 
of Jordan through printed 
cloth bag manufacturing 
The Orenda Tribe PSSE Runs art workshops for 
people from all ages, 
mainly children, that focus 
on empowerment, breaking 
barriers and developing 
life-skills while raising 
awareness on different 
social issues 
Turjumaa PSSE Translates WASH (Water, 
Sanitation, Hygiene) 
related materials from 
English to Arabic and aims 
to create Arabic content in 
water and sanitation fields 
Under My Olive Tree STSE Promotes social activism, 
volunteering, the right of 
education and sustainable 
projects in less privileged 
areas in Jordan 
Women in Business Arabia PSSE Provides an online platform 
for Arab women to connect 
and share experiences, 
advice, and knowledge 
regarding their independent 
businesses 
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YARA (Youth Association 
for Reality and Awareness) 
STSE Raises the awareness and 
potential of younger 
generations through 
education, dialogue, and 
self-realizing projects 
Zikra Initiative STSE Bridges gaps between rural 
and urban communities 
through ‘exchange tourism’ 
to ease ethnic and socio-
economic friction 
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